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SUMMARY  
Egypt faced three central pressures to introduce its own competition law in 2005: first, 
EU/Egypt trade relations, second, introduction of the 1991 privatisation programme and 
third, its long-term desire by virtue of its Constitution to follow Islamic principles that 
condemn monopoly. However, Egypt was not forced to transplant EU rules as a result 
of EU/Egypt trade relations, although it is implicit that the EU deems it desirable to do 
so. By employing the functional method of comparative law for the purposes of the 
study on EU, Islamic, and Egyptian laws, the central argument of this thesis is that the 
Egyptian treatment of abuse of dominance is distinctive in three ways. First, Egyptian 
rules do not prohibit the practice of excessive pricing. Although in jurisdictions that 
prohibit it, most notably the EU system, competition authorities do not contemplate it as 
an investigation priority, it is argued that the lack of its prohibition raises Islamic law 
concerns and may lead to potential effects on the Egyptian economy. However, the 
difficulties which investigators face in settling such practice (as the South African 
Mittal case demonstrates) suggest that the Egyptian legislator may have adopted the 
right approach not to prohibit it; otherwise, this may have increased the likelihood of 
committing type II errors and, as a result, violate Islamic law principles of injustice. 
Second, in contrast with EU law, Egyptian rules do not cover the practice of below-cost 
margin squeeze. Although it is argued that its omission does not pose potential effects to 
the economy, it is suggested that it raises Islamic law concerns on the basis of fairness 
and intentions principles. Given that it is relatively easier to investigate, compared to 
excessive pricing, it is suggested that the Egyptian legislator should re-consider 
encompassing it in the future while drawing on the approach adopted in EU law. Third, 
the Egyptian Competition Law reflects the EU Commission‘s initiative of employing an 
effects-based approach to abuse of dominance. However, the Egyptian system, arguably 
influenced by the Islamic principles on market intervention, goes a little further to 
require an actual effects standard. Despite an effects-based analysis being difficult to 
employ in emerging economies with inadequate economic expertise like Egypt, it is 
argued in its favour for two reasons. First, it increases the chances of avoiding type II 
errors, which, similar to excessive pricing and margin squeeze, violate Islamic law and; 
second, the Egyptian Competition Authority‘s analysis in the Steel study shows that it is 
capable of employing this approach at this stage. For the purposes of re-considering the 
foregoing (gaps) in the future, the Egyptian Competition Authority should focus on 
increasing economic expertise and seek technical assistance from competition 
authorities of the developed world.   
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Market power and cartels were given attention as early as ancient times. Particularly the 
perils of monopoly may be traced in ancient Greece and the Bible. Later, in 1776, Adam 
Smith published his renowned book: ‗The Wealth of Nations‘. In it, he stated that: 
―People of the same trade seldom meet, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or some contrivance to raise 
prices‖. Smith thus cautioned the society about the threats of monopoly on welfare1. 
Paradoxically, however, the emergence of competition law in modern history was not 
rapid and did not happen overnight. It rather took a gradual stance; starting from the 
adoption of such law in developed countries and then moving to developing countries.  
 
It all started when Americans expressed their fears about the adoption of trusts by firms 
during the 19
th
 Century. Particularly, the concern derived from the trend that prevailed 
at the time whereby American firms acquired stocks from other competing firms and 
transformed them into trusts in a manner that controlled the transactions of these 
competing firms in aspects such as pricing, volume of output, etc. with the intention to 
eventually monopolize the market in question. These concerns eventually materialized 
with the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. The Act prohibited agreements that 
restrained trade as well as monopolistic practices
2
.     
 
Furthermore, the increasing use of economic power and cartels during the Second 
World War on the international level in general and Europe in particular led 
governments to consider the enactment of antitrust laws to combat these practices
3
. 
Particularly, in Europe, this led to the emergence of a group of intellectuals of the 
Freiburg School (in addition to some members of the Austrian School) to develop some 
initiatives in pursuit of market reform (what was then known as Ordoliberal thought). In 
fact, it was these initiatives that arguably formed competition provisions of the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957; Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
                                                          
 
1
 See Peeperkorn, L. & Verouden, V. (2007) ―The Economics of Competition‖ The EC Law on 
Competition, 2
nd
 Edition. Faull & Nikpay (Eds.) OUP, p.6, citing Adam Smith.   
2
 Dhall, V. (2007) ―Overview – Key concepts of Competition Law‖ Competition Law Today – Concepts, 
Issues, and the Law in Practice, Dhall (Eds.), OUP, pp.1-2. 
3
 The terms ‗antitrust law‘ and ‗competition law‘ shall be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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Community (‗EEC‘) [now Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‗TFEU‘)]4. These provisions prohibit agreements restrictive of 
competition and abuse of dominance.  
 
The interface between trade and competition is immense. The relationship evolved more 
than half a Century ago and, precisely, since the conclusion of the Second World War. It 
was widely perceived that trade relations that were unaccompanied by competition rules 
may result in considerably detrimental consequences to the nations involved. This is 
because trade liberalisation solely removes public barriers (quotas, custom duties etc.). 
Private barriers (abuse of dominance, cartels, etc.), on the other hand, given the chance 
of their occurrence in any trade relationship, and thereby leading to trade distortion, are 
merely regulated by competition laws
5
.    
 
Consequently, trade agreements that were concluded throughout the past two decades –
regional or bilateral agreements – included competition rules. In fact, the entrenchment 
of competition rules in trade agreements arguably became a tool used by developed 
countries to encourage their developing partners to enact their own competition laws; 
otherwise the former‘s laws may be applicable in the event of disputes. However, the 
enactment of competition law in developing countries
6
 is subject to substantial debate. 
While some argue that developing countries should adopt their own national 
competition laws, others suggest that there is no need for such law. For instance, it is 
often argued that introducing competition law in developing countries may help reduce 
                                                          
 
4
 For literature that argues in favour of positive Ordoliberal influence on the drafting of Articles 85 and 86 
EEC, see Gerber, D. J. (1994) ―Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition 
Law and the ―New‖ Europe‖ (42), American Journal of Comparative Law, American Society of 
Comparative Law. For a converse view, see Akman, P. and Kassim, H. (2010) ―Myths and Myth-Making 
in the European Union: The Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy‖ 48(1), 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
Note that these contrasting views shall be discussed in detail in chapter three of the present thesis.    
5
 Geradin, D. & Petit, N. (2003) ―Competition Rules in the Euromed Countries with a special emphasis 
on Network Industries‖ Paper presented at the World Bank ABCDE Conference, Paris, 15th -16th May, 
2003, available from: (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=489691), accessed 18-01-
2008; Geradin, D. (2004) ―Competition Law and Regional Economic Integration- An Analysis of the 
Southern Mediterranean Countries‖ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 35, Washington 
D.C.: World Bank.   
6
 The terms ‗developing countries‘ and ‗emerging economies‘ shall be used interchangeably throughout 
the thesis. 
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the high concentration levels that inherently prevail in these nations and that are likely 
to lead to anti-competitive practices
7
.  
 
Competition law is, moreover, seen as a tool for attracting foreign direct investment 
(‗FDI‘)8 in developing countries. Particularly, foreign investors may be induced to 
invest in countries that have a sound competition culture, and since many developing 
nations lack this characteristic, competition law is seen as a tool that may help tackle 
this issue. Competition law is also perceived a mechanism for combating poverty in 
developing countries in the sense that it helps keep prices as low as possible and as such 
enables the poor to have access to resources. On the other hand, arguments countering 
competition law for developing countries seem to focus on the idea that such law will 
hardly play any role since the decision-making of competition authorities is not 
independent, but is rather subject to the scrutiny of the government. Thus, decisions of 
competition authorities may be highly influenced by interested political parties
9
.           
 
Negotiations pertaining to the adoption of Egyptian Competition Law and Regulation 
commenced in the mid-1990s. Following several drafts and debates in the parliament, 
the Egyptian Competition Law and Regulation were introduced in 2005. Given that 
such law and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Egypt (‗EMAA‘) 
were being negotiated during the same period, it is sometimes argued that the EU posed 
some pressure on Egypt to accelerate the introduction of its law. However, one should 
not attribute the adoption of such law solely to the external pressures posed by the EU.  
 
The Egyptian government encountered a couple more pressures that are deemed 
internal. First, the Egyptian Constitution stipulates that Islamic law
10
 constitutes the 
main source of legislation in Egypt. Monopoly is explicitly condemned under Islamic 
                                                          
 
7
 Dabbah, M. M. (2010) ―International and Comparative Competition Law‖ First Edition, CUP, pp.297-
298  
8
 FDI may be defined as: ―Ownership and (normally) control of a business or part of a business in another 
country‖. It is also renowned as a ―driver‖ for economic development. For an expansive discussion on 
FDI, see Trebilcock, M. J. & Howse, R. (2005) ―The Regulation of International Trade‖ Third Edition, 
Routledge, London and New York, pp.439; Evenett, S. J. (2003) ―Links between Development and 
Competition Law in Developing Countries‖ available from: 
(www.alexandria.unisg.ch/EXPORT/DL/22249.pdf) accessed 07-05-2010, p.7.    
9
 See Dabbah, M. M. (2010) ―International and Comparative Competition Law‖ First Edition, CUP, 
pp.298-304 
10
 The terms ‗Islamic law‘ and ‗Shari‘ah‘ shall be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
  
5 
law. However, there is no direct evidence that the relevant authorities are obliged to 
follow the Shari‘ah principles within the framework of the Egyptian Legal System. 
Nevertheless it is argued that the wording of the Egyptian Constitution implies the 
desire to do so. Second, and even more rigid than the former, the privatisation 
programme that was introduced in Egypt in 1991, which transferred monopoly from the 
state to the private sector also contributed to the necessity to carry out legal reform by 
the government.  
 
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate the influences of EU Competition Law 
and Islamic principles on the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian 
Competition Law; through which the study will explore the distinctive characteristics in 
this treatment. These (gaps) are likely to have potential effects in the economy and may 
concurrently raise Islamic law concerns and, as such, may call for future reform. The 
question is what sort of reform? Are legal transplants the solution? It is perceived that 
this investigation may be best conducted by determining the similarities and differences 
between the EU rules, Islamic principles, and the relevant Egyptian rules on abuse of 
dominance. This will be carried out by employing the functional method of comparative 
law, aside from the thematic method, which recognizes that the comparativist should 
not merely investigate the similarities and differences of respective laws in theory, but 
should more importantly go deeper to explore how they function in practice. Given the 
relative lack of case law under the Egyptian system, the gaps will be explored by 
drawing on the relevant EU practice and, in some respects, South African practice (as a 
comparable emerging economy).    
 
Unlike EU Competition Law, the Egyptian and Islamic rules on competition have been 
dealt with only on very few occasions and from a very generic perspective. Particularly, 
most of the studies carried out tended to look at aspects such as the Egyptian law itself, 
how it may be implemented, and how it may help Egypt adapt to the 1991 privatisation 
reform, etc. Indeed this is not surprising since the law has been recently adopted and the 
volume of (published) guidelines and case law until today is relatively limited. 
Similarly, Islamic law studies carried out so far merely focussed on the economy in 
general and hardly make any reference to antitrust in particular. However, this may be 
explained by the fact that competition law is a relatively new field in the Middle Eastern 
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and North African regions. In fact, there are hardly any studies that investigate the 
influences of EU law and Islamic principles on Egyptian Competition Law with 
reference to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Studies that were carried out in this 
respect merely focussed on the EMAA in generic terms; all of which adds to and 
combines with the importance of this thesis.      
 
However, this thesis will not cover agreements restrictive of competition (be it 
horizontal or vertical agreements)
11
. This is because it is argued that the relevant 
Egyptian rules addressing them are appropriate as they stand. Particularly, the Egyptian 
legislator seems to have imposed a per se prohibition to horizontal agreements. This 
means that investigating authorities shall not conduct a study of the agreement‘s effects. 
Although it is argued in favour of an effects-based approach in relation to abuse of 
dominance
12
 in chapter five, this argument does not extend to anticompetitive horizontal 
agreements (e.g. dividing markets, price fixing, etc.)
13
, since they are arguably less 
likely to generate pro-competitive benefits in Egypt than abuse of dominance practices. 
That said, it is perceived that a per se approach may be the favourable legal treatment.     
 
With regards to vertical agreements, the Egyptian legislator requires a rule of reason 
approach
14
. Although this may in itself raise concerns that closely correlate with the 
approach in relation to the method of appraisal of abuse of dominance, given that this 
                                                          
 
11
 Horizontal agreements are agreements between market players who operate at the same level of 
competition (e.g. agreement between two or more competitors). Vertical agreements, on the other hand, 
are agreements between market players at different levels of competition (e.g. agreement between 
producer and supplier).  
12
 Although employing an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance was seen as a peculiarity in 
Egyptian Competition Law that may have an effect in the economy, given that such approach may be 
difficult to employ at the early stages of implementation, it is concluded that employing such approach 
does not pose any potential risk to the economy on the basis that such approach helps avoid type II errors 
(falsely condemning pro-competitive practices) and that the Egyptian Competition Authority has so far 
deployed it in a competent manner.    
13
 See Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority ―Study on the Cement Market in the Arab Republic 
of Egypt in light of the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices‖ 
Study by virtue of the Minister of Trade and Industry‘s request dated 16th July, 2006 [Report in Arabic], 
published on the website on 5
th
 September, 2008, available from: 
(http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Publication/List.aspx?CategoryID=1) accessed 01-10-2009; Judgement of 
the Egyptian Court of First Instance on Misdemeanours Nasr City (2900/2008) August 25, 2008. Note 
that this Judgment was upheld on appeal; making it the first case to be finalized under Egyptian 
Competition Law with positive findings until current. See appeal in East Cairo (22622/2008) 
14
 Rule of reason is understood as an approach that balances pro and anti-competitive effects and 
determines which form of effects outweighs the other. This approach will be discussed in detail in chapter 
three.   
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approach is arguably difficult to implement for newly established competition 
authorities like the Egyptian one, it is suggested that disputes involving anti-competitive 
vertical agreements may on some occasions bring benefits to consumers. Take for 
instance resale price maintenance. A practice as such may be beneficial to consumers 
where the manufacturer sets a maximum resale price for his supplier in the sense that 
consumers may benefit from low prices. Moreover, the Egyptian Competition 
Authority‘s (‗ECA‘) studies it conducted so far may suggest that it is capable of 
competently employing such test. For that reason, this thesis will only discuss the 
treatment of abuse of dominance. 
 
The thesis does not, furthermore, extend to the investigative procedure of Egyptian 
Competition Law. This is because the accessible (published) case law does not seem to 
go into detail in relation to how, for instance, the competition authority gathered its 
documentation, how it intends to carry out inspections, etc. Hence, it is perceived that 
encompassing the investigative procedure in the thesis, at this stage, may represent no 
more than a reiteration of what legal provisions stipulate; along with some speculation 
over how they could be construed. Therefore, the thesis only goes as far as the method 
of assessment is concerned
15
.       
 
The thesis is formed of five chapters. The first chapter elucidates the historical 
background of the EU/Egypt trade relations and delineates the development of 
competition law and regulation in Egypt and the pressures which the Egyptian 
government had encountered thereto. It finds that the Egyptian government did not only 
encounter the external pressure posed by the EMAA in relation to the introduction of its 
own competition law, but also the internal pressure that followed the 1991 structural 
reform. Not least, it explores the Egyptian government‘s long-term desire to comply 
with the Shari‘ah principles as set out in the Constitution as a further indispensable yet 
arguably less rigid internal pressure. It also provides interpretations to the wording of 
the EMAA and determines whether or not Egypt was obliged to transplant EU 
                                                          
 
15
 For a detailed interpretation of the enforcement procedure, see Greiss, M. (2010) ―Investigative powers 
of the Egyptian Competition Authority: A guide for companies in the Egyptian market‖ 31(11), European 
Competition Law Review, Sweet & Maxwell, pp.459-465, available from: 
(http://eprints.sussex.ac.uk/2482/) accessed 2-12-2010 
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competition rules and determines when the EMAA‘s competition rules are applicable. 
Finally, it investigates whether or not the EMAA‘s competition rules are directly 
effective before national authorities/courts.  
 
The second chapter identifies the comparative law methods that will be employed in the 
comparative study of EU, Egyptian and Islamic rules on monopoly. It determines the 
comparability of the systems under consideration and identifies the EMAA as the 
common denominator for the comparative study. It moreover contemplates the 
functional method as an indispensable tool for conducting the present study, since it 
does not merely focus on legal rules in theory, but also extends to envisage how they 
function comparably in practice. The chapter furthermore investigates the parameters 
for which one may decide whether transplantation may or may not be successful in the 
borrowing state.    
 
The third chapter investigates the similarities and differences of the origins and values 
of EU and Egyptian Competition Laws using the functional methods discussed in 
chapter two. It particularly investigates the influence of Ordoliberalism on the drafting 
process of EU Competition Law. The role of competition before and after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) is also compared. It is argued that EU 
Commission is moving towards an effects-based approach – a movement that (arguably) 
contradicts with the Ordoliberal theories that favour minimal market intervention. 
Moreover, it is suggested that employing an effects-based analysis may help avoid type 
II errors (falsely condemning pro-competitive practices).  
 
The chapter also importantly foregrounds the constitutional parameters within which 
Egyptian Competition Law may operate. This is primarily based on the Shari‘ah 
principles on market intervention – this is premised on the arguable desire of the 
Egyptian government to comply with these principles. It is concluded that 
Ordoliberlaism and Shari‘ah overlap in aspects such as fairness and degree of influence 
on the drafting of competition law. However, they relatively vary in relation to the 
existing constitutional underpinnings. While the EU Commission and Courts are not 
obliged to follow Ordoliberal theories while implementing competition law, the ECA 
and Courts, on the other hand, while they are not constitutionally obliged to follow 
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Shari‘ah principles, there exists a desire from the Egyptian government to comply with 
them.            
 
The fourth chapter, employing the functional method, determines the influence of EU 
and Islamic laws on the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition 
Laws and, on which basis, explores the distinctive features in the latter system. It 
particularly finds the lack of prohibition of both excessive pricing and downstream 
below-cost pricing margin squeeze, and the employment of an effects-based approach to 
abuse of dominant in general at this stage as distinctive characteristics that may have 
potential effects in the economy. It also argues that the former two (gaps) raise Islamic 
law concerns, while employing an effects-based approach reflects the EU Commission‘s 
initiative to follow this approach. However, the Egyptian approach, arguably influenced 
by the Shari‘ah principles of market intervention, goes a little further to require an 
actual effects standard.         
 
The fifth and final chapter evaluates the potential effects of these gaps in the Egyptian 
economy. Arguing in favour of the Harvard School‘s structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, it finds that the high concentration levels that still prevail in Egypt as a result 
of the 1991 structural reform may increase the likelihood of success of excessive pricing 
that, as a result, may directly harm consumers and hinder the economy through an 
inefficient allocation of resources. Although the lack of prohibition of the practice raises 
Islamic law concerns, and given the difficulties in investigating it (as the South African 
Mittal case suggests), it is argued that the Egyptian system should not opt for such 
reform at this stage. Apart from these difficulties, it is argued, from a Shari‘ah point of 
view that employing it may, on the contrary, lead to type II errors that are certainly not 
desired on the basis of injustice.  
 
Moreover, the chapter argues that the lack of prohibition of below-cost (downstream) 
price squeeze may pose limited effects in the economy. However, given that such 
practice raises Islamic law concerns and, unlike excessive pricing, it involves relatively 
less complex analysis, it is perceived that the Egyptian legislator should opt for legal 
reform in a manner that closely correlates to the EU‘s treatment of margin squeeze in 
general. It is also concluded that although the deployment of effects-based approach 
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may generate potential effects in the economy at this early stage of competition law 
implementation, it is suggested that the ECA and Courts should stick by it on the basis 
that it helps avoid type II errors and that the ECA had employed it competently in the 
Steel case. For the purposes of tackling these gaps, however, it is argued that Egypt 
should increase the level of economic expertise in competition law through seeking 
technical assistance from competition authorities of the developed world.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN 
EGYPT AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN 
PARTNERSHIP 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The interface between trade and competition is inevitable. It is widely perceived that 
trade agreements that are free from any competition rules may generate formidable 
consequences for parties involved, since trade agreements tend to merely enshrine 
public barriers to trade. Domestic competition laws, on the other hand, only tackle 
private barriers. Thus, the past two decades experienced an inclination towards the 
entrenchment of competition rules in trade agreements; particularly those between 
developed and developing countries.         
 
Following such trend, the EU concluded the EMAA in 2004. It is believed that the 
negotiation process formed part of the pressure on the Egyptian government to adopt its 
own competition law. However, Egypt encountered two further internal pressures. This 
chapter aims to highlight the historical background underlying the relationship between 
Egypt and the EU and the link between it and the enactment of Egyptian Competition 
Law and to provide an interpretation to the EMAA‘s competition rules and discern 
whether or not these rules may be invoked before EU and Egyptian Courts. 
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will provide chronology of the 
EU/Egypt trade relations. The second part will identify the rationale behind the 
inclusion of competition rules in trade agreements in the first place and underline the 
pressures that the Egyptian government encountered in relation to the adoption of 
Egyptian Competition Law and Regulation. The final part will provide an appraisal of 
the relevant competition provisions of the EMAA and discern whether or not they may 
be invoked before national courts.   
 
 
  
13 
1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EU/EGYPT TRADE 
RELATIONS 
The EU/Egypt trade relations initially emerged in 1977 when the EU signed the General 
Cooperation Agreement with Egypt. Specifically, such agreement provided a 
preferential trade relationship that prevailed until 1996. It, moreover, provided non-
reciprocal free market access for industrial Egyptian exports (with the exception of 
textiles and clothing) to the EU market
16
. The agreement did not, however, include a 
section on competition rules
17
. It was not until the Barcelona Conference that convened 
in 1995 when negotiations of the association agreement commenced. The negotiations 
lasted approximately four and a half years and a further two years for both parties to 
sign the agreement in 2001 followed by another three years for ratification by the EU 
and Egyptian Parliaments
18
.   
 
But what is an association agreement within the framework of EU law? Does it by any 
means resemble cooperation agreements that maybe concluded on a unilateral basis i.e. 
non-reciprocally such as the aforementioned one with Egypt in 1977? One would have 
expected Article 217 TFEU [ex. Article 310 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (‗EC‘)] to have clarified the meaning of an ‗association agreement‘ but in 
fact, it has not. It solely entitled the EU to enter into such agreements by stipulating: 
―The Union may conclude with one or more member third countries or international 
organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedure‖19. 
  
The Court of Justice of the EU (‗CoJ‘) in Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 
however, provided a more precise definition. According to the CoJ: ―Association 
                                                          
 
16
 Holmes, P., Ghoneim, A., Gasiorek, M. and El-Garf, M. (2008) ―Chapter one – EU/Egypt ENP as a 
form of deep integration‖ Examining the Deep Integration aspects of the EU-South Mediterranean 
Countries: Comparing the Barcelona Process and Neighbourhood Policy, the Case of Egypt, FEMISE 
Project No FEM31-08, available from: (http://www.femise.org/PDF/ci2006/FEM31-08.pdf) accessed 22-
08-2009, pp.1-30 
17
 At this particular stage, only a few number of agreements contained competition provisions in a manner 
that simply promotes fair competition practices. See for example, the Association Agreement between the 
European Economic Community [now EU] and Cyprus, 19
th
 December, 1972, O.J. L133/2, 21
st
 May, 
1973. 
18
 More specifically, ratification by the European Parliament on 29
th
 November, 2001 and on 7
th
 April, 
2003 by the Egyptian Parliament.   
19
 Article 217, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2007], O.J. C.306/01 
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agreement creat[es] special, privileged links with a non-member country which must, at 
least to a certain extent, take part in the [Union] system‖20. The definition unequivocally 
indicates that association agreements imply a return from all its parties and not 
unilaterally from the EU, as was the case with respect to the 1977 Cooperation 
Agreement.  
 
The objective behind the Barcelona Process was mainly to adopt a free trade area 
between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours by the beginning of 2010. Most of 
the EU‘s neighbouring countries, including Egypt, were involved in the negotiations21. 
Following a series of intensive negotiations, the EU agreed to adopt the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreement with each of its Mediterranean neighbouring 
countries on a bilateral basis
22
. The EMAA was signed and came into force in July 
2004. Egypt was given a five-year provisional period for implementation of some of its 
obligations, including competition provisions; at the time Egypt was yet to enact a 
competition law. It is somewhat implicit from provisions of the EMAA that drafters 
have feared the latter (as will be discussed later on in part 1.4.1 of this chapter). 
Recognizing that it is a mechanism that may deepen the EU/Egypt trade relations, the 
EU also adopted the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy (‗ENP‘) following 
preliminary discussions that took place in 2003
23
.  
 
The ENP is a mechanism enabling the governance of the EU‘s trading partners - Eastern 
European and the Southern Mediterranean region including Egypt
24
. The ENP was 
accompanied by an action plan for each Mediterranean partner. According to the EU 
Commission‘s communication to the Council and Parliament regarding the 
                                                          
 
20
 Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund [1987] E.C.R. 3719 
21
 Negotiations also involved countries like Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria 
and Tunisia. 
22
 Montanari, M. (2007) ―The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Trade 
Integration‖ 45(5), Journal of Common Market Studies, pp.1011-1040 
23
 See EU Commission (2004) ―European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper‖, Brussels 5th December 
2004 COM 2004 373 Final  
24
 Apart from Egypt, other ENP countries are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Ukraine and Tunisia. It is 
worthy to note that Ukraine is the only country that does not name the ENP Action Plan as such. The 
Ukrainian Government rather names it as ‗Enhanced Agreement‘. For more detail, see Hillion, C. (2007) 
―Mapping-out the new Contractual Relations between the European Union and its Neighbours: Learning 
from the EU Ukraine ‗Enhanced Agreement‘‖ (12), European Foreign Affairs Review, Kluwer Law 
International BV, pp.169-182 
  
15 
strengthening of ENP, actions plans are set as a tool for enhancing and deepening trade 
relations
25
. Following several negotiations and drafts, the action plan with Egypt was 
signed and came into force in March 2007. Whilst objectives of the ENP were rightly 
described as elusive and uncertain by many, an implied objective, according to 
Hoekman, is that it is perceived as a driving force for deepening trade and economic 
integration; specifically with the South Mediterranean region
26
. To elaborate more on 
the objectives of the ENP, the EU Commission, in its communication to the European 
Council and Parliament in 2006 stated that: ―A key premise of the ENP was that 
economic integration should go beyond free trade in goods and services to also include 
―behind the border‖ issues: addressing non-tariff barriers and progressively achieving 
comprehensive convergence in trade and regulatory areas (such as […] competition 
policy […] research cooperation […])‖27.  
 
The Communication clearly reflects the Commission‘s emphasis on both competition 
policy and cooperation
28
. One should, in turn, expect a detailed section that explains the 
working of the ENP and its action plan, as an arguably considerable extension to the 
EMAA, with regards to competition and cooperation along with some guidelines for 
their application within the context of the EMAA
29
. The question that should thus be 
raised in this respect: What did the ENP and its action plan add to the EMAA? This is 
obviously given the fact that the Egyptian government had indicated in its action plan 
that economic reform was one of its future priorities. 
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 European Commission (2006) ―Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy‖, Brussels, 4 December 2006 
COM(2006)726 final 
It is worth noting that the ENP‘s action plan is not a legally binding agreement as is the case with the 
Association Agreement itself.  
26
 Hoekman, B. (2005) ―From Euro-Med partnership to European Neighbourhood: Deeper Integration a 
la Carte and Economic Development‖ ECES Working Paper No. 103, Cairo: Egyptian Centre for 
Economic Studies. 
27
 European Commission (2006) ―Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy‖, Brussels, 4 December 2006 
COM(2006)726 final, 4 
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The weakness of the ENP throughout its implementation (2005-2006) led the 
Commission to consider taking further action towards strengthening it. In 2006, the 
Commission adopted a proposal named ENP-plus where it prioritized economic reform 
that encompassed competition policy among some other issues
30
. A further but more 
recent development was the adoption of the Union for Mediterranean (‗UfM‘). French 
President Sarkozy initially proposed the UfM in 2007. Sarkozy perceived that the 
initiative could hasten the Barcelona Process; aside from attempting to bring the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to an end. Following several meetings, the EU endorsed Sarkozy‘s 
initiative and adopted the UfM during the Paris Summit on 13
th
 July 2008
31
.  
 
In fact, the UfM emerged after a wide recognition of the underlying weaknesses of the 
Barcelona Process as it stands. That said; the objective of the UfM is to further 
strengthen the Barcelona Process and help achieve its goals. According to the EU 
Commission, the UfM may help accelerate the Barcelona Process in three ways. First, 
by maintaining the institutional imbalance between the EU and its Mediterranean 
partners; second, improving the ―co-ownership‖ of the region‘s multilateral relations32; 
and third, increasing transparency among the region‘s citizens that this initiative shall 
competently resolve their day-to-day problems. However, it may still be too soon to 
judge upon the success of the UfM in general and, in particular, in relation to the EU 
cooperation on competition matters with Egypt
33
.                                           
 
1.3 THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF 
COMPETITION RULES IN TRADE AGREEMENTS: PRESSURES 
ON EGYPT TO ENACT COMPETITION LAW 
Ever since the Second World War, numerous endeavours have been made to enact 
international antitrust rules through trade negotiations. Antitrust rules were considered 
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by 1947 in the Havana Charter and International Trade Organization (‗ITO‘). This was 
through a chapter that stipulated the relevant restrictive practices. However, the ITO 
soon collapsed due to refusal from the U.S. government and no agreement was reached 
on antitrust rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‗GATT‘), which 
followed the ITO, in turn, did not contemplate such rules
34
.      
            
The intensive World Trade Organisation (‗WTO‘) discussions on the relationship 
between trade and competition did not take place until the mid-1990s. At that stage, 
trade agreements (whether on the regional or bilateral level) gradually started taking a 
different stance - one that included competition provisions
35
. That said, during the 
1970s when EEC/Egypt trade relations initially emerged, competition provisions were 
not perceived as a ―must include‖ in the 1977 EEC/Egypt Cooperation Agreement. In 
fact, throughout the WTO discussions on the interface between trade and competition, 
the EU perceived that the inclusion of its competition rules in trade agreements might 
play a significant role in its future WTO negotiation position with respect to 
competition rules. This was particularly the case in relation to regional trade agreements 
(‗RTAs‘); whereas a number of countries are subject to the same competition rules36. 
 
The post-1995 era featured a trend on the adoption of bilateral trade agreements 
between developed and developing countries. Among these were the Europe 
Agreements concluded by the EU with Central and Eastern European countries 
(candidate countries) and Association Agreements with Mediterranean Countries 
(including the EMAA) – agreements with non-candidate countries. A common 
characteristic of these agreements was that they included competition rules that 
correspond to EU rules. In this sense, the EMAA, in contrast with the EEC/Egypt 1977 
Cooperation Agreement, demonstrates a modern theme of how far competition rules 
should be given attention in trade agreements
37
.  
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In fact, there exists somehow a relationship between the EMAA and the introduction of 
competition law in Egypt. Ever since negotiations of the EMAA - the Barcelona Process 
–commenced in 1995, Egypt had opted to introduce its own competition law. The 
question that should be raised in this respect: Is this relationship a causative one? In 
other words, did Egypt enact its own competition law solely to satisfy the EU‘s pre-
requisites – or otherwise evade application of EU competition rules?   
 
Truth be said, the Egyptian government did not only face the external pressures posed 
by the EMAA
38
, but was also face with some internal pressures. It encountered a 
religious pressure to adopt and implement competition law; given that Egypt is an 
Islamic Law country; and that monopoly is strictly condemned and prohibited under the 
Islamic Shari‘ah39. The need to adopt competition law is arguably supported by Article 
2 of the Egyptian Constitution which stipulates that: ―Islam is the religion of the State 
[...] and the principles of the Islamic Shari‘ah are the major source of legislation‖. 
However, such religious pressure is not a new one; but has existed since the 1971 
Constitution that declared the principles of Islamic Shari‘ah as ―a‖ principal source of 
legislation
40
. The position of these principles was further strengthened in 1980 to 
declare Shari‘ah as the major source of legislation when the wording of ―a‖ was 
replaced by ―the‖ in Article 2 (as quoted above)41.        
 
But what is the meaning of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution in this context? At 
first sight, Article 2 seems to have two meanings. First, it entails that the lack of a legal 
rule(s), which prohibits a practice that is originally condemned by Shari‘ah may, in 
itself, raise constitutional concerns – such as the pressure mentioned above on Egypt to 
enact a competition law in general. Second, Article 2 may require that any existing legal 
rule(s) that is incompatible with Shari‘ah may be declared as unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
gains Brusick, P., Alvarez, A. M. and Cernat, L. (Eds.), United Nations (New York and Geneva) 
available from: (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20051_en.pdf) p.66 
38
 Apart from the external pressures that were posed by the EU through the EMAA, the Egyptian 
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(‗COMESA‘) to which Egypt is a party. Competition provisions of the COMESA are to a large extent 
inspired by the EU rules on competition. 
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 The Shari‘ah principles on monopoly will be discussed in detail in chapter three.  
40
 Nonetheless, this was not the first time for Shari‘ah to feature in the Egyptian Constitution. Article 149 
of the 1923 Constitution contemplated ―Islam‖ as ―the religion of the state‖. However, the position of 
Shari‘ah was not strengthened until the 1971 and 1980 amendments.        
41
 Article 2, Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt amended according to the result of the plebiscite 
on the constitutional amendment that was conducted on May, 22
nd
 1980 
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Challenging the constitutionality of legal rules is carried out before the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 175 of the Egyptian Constitution
42
. This means 
that the constitutionality of competition rules may not be challenged before ordinary 
courts (economic courts for the purposes of this thesis)
43
. Hence, if constitutionality is 
raised before these latter courts, they shall refer the suspected unconstitutional matter to 
the Supreme Constitutional Court and then settle the original subject matter.  
 
Following the 1980 Constitution amendment, the Supreme Constitutional Court issued 
an interesting judgement. The concern was on Article 227 of Civil Law No. 131 of 1948 
that entitles contracting parties to agree on the price of interest in return for delayed 
payments; which in itself violates Shari‘ah. The Court held that although Article 227 as 
such violated Article 2 of the Constitution, it was still deemed constitutional. In its 
reasoning, the Court indicated that the law concerned was issued in 1948, while the 
commitment to Islamic law principles in Article 2 was explicitly recognized at a later 
stage (1980). It added that Article 227 was not amended ever since Law No. 131 of 
1948 was issued and that Article 2 does not apply on a retroactive basis. In other words, 
Article 2 does not apply retroactively to laws and regulations that were issued prior the 
1980 Constitution amendment
44
.            
 
Notwithstanding the explicit stipulation of Article 2 of Egypt‘s supreme law, the 
Constitution, as well as the aforementioned judgement concerning civil law, there exists 
no direct evidence of an obligation on the legislator, relevant enforcing authorities or 
courts to follow Islamic principles. Subsequently this means that challenging the 
constitutionality of an Egyptian rule (or the lack of a rule concerning an act that is 
prohibited under Islamic law) on the basis that it does not adhere to the Shari‘ah 
principles may not be sufficiently premised, if at all existent in practice. However, it is 
argued that by virtue of Article 2 there exists somewhat a desire to reflect Islamic 
principles under the Egyptian Legal System. That said one might not consider Article 2 
as a rigid pressure on the Egyptian government to enact competition law.            
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according to Article 4 of the Law establishing Economic Courts. This law came into force in October 
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44
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In fact, an internal pressure of a much more rigorous nature and impact than that of 
Article 2 is the one that derived from the 1991 privatisation programme that 
transformed state monopoly (state-owned enterprises, control over economic activities, 
etc.) to private sector monopoly. Up until the early 1990s the Egyptian government, via 
its state-owned enterprises, had control over economic activities, exchange rates, 
subsidies and the imposition of export bans. It therefore had a monopoly and so 
competition law was thought to be of no use at the time. It was, hence, perceived that 
competition law was of no use at that time. However, this strategy led to various 
structural impediments in the market by the late 1980s; being nonetheless, 
overshadowed by a substantial rise in its external resources and capital inflows. While 
these available resources enabled the government to maximise its expenditure to a 
certain extent, they have been subject to a dramatic depression during the mid 1980s 
and hence, structural barriers became more and more patent. This has undoubtedly, 
given rise to the compelling need for a stabilization mechanism and economic reform
45
.  
 
In 1991, an economic reform and structural adjustment programme finally took place, 
which was led by the International Monetary Fund (‗IMF‘) and assisted by the World 
Bank. The main aim of this programme, as stated by the IMF was to ―create, over the 
medium term, a decentralized market based, outward-oriented economy where private 
sector activity will be encouraged by a free, competitive, and stable environment with 
autonomy from government intervention‖46. This strengthened privatisation programme 
has had its remarkable role in the substantial and rapid emergence of the private 
sector
47
.  
 
However, the Egyptian experience of the introduction of the privatisation agenda was 
challenging. This was primarily due to the fact that the regulatory structure that existed 
prior to privatisation (where the state had control over most domestic projects) was 
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adopted and implemented solely to match that particular stage. In other words, the 
regulatory structure that existed during the state-monopoly era did not match the post-
privatisation circumstances. Furthermore, the transfer of monopoly from the public to 
the private sector led to an increasing number of anti-competitive allegations 
unaccompanied by a detailed competition law
48
. 
 
In pursuit of satisfying these internal and external pressures, and following numerous 
drafts commencing from the mid-1990s, the Egyptian Parliament approved the Law No. 
3 of 2005 promulgating the Law on Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Conducts (‗Law No. 3/2005‘) on 15th February 200549. This was followed 
by the issuance and approval of the Prime Ministerial Decree No.1316 of 2005 issuing 
the Executive Regulations of Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Conducts Law No. 3 of 2005 (‗Executive Regulations‘) on 16th August 200550. 
 
1.4 COMPETITION PROVISIONS OF THE EURO-
MEDITERRANEAN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT 
1.4.1 Appraisal of the competition provisions 
Competition rules of the EMAA are addressed in ‗Chapter 2 – Competition and other 
Economic Matters‘ under ‗Title II – Free Movement of Goods – General Principles‘. 
Drafters of the EMAA possibly intended to stress the relationship between free trade 
and competition rules; otherwise the latter would have rather been placed under a 
separate title. This is indeed, reflected in the EMAA‘s competition rules. Particularly, 
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abuse of dominance is addressed under Article 34(1); according to which: ―The 
following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, insofar as 
they may affect trade between the [Union] and Egypt: [...] (ii) Abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position in the territories of the [Union] or Egypt as a whole 
or in a substantial part thereof [...]‖51.  
 
At the outset, one may observe that an abusive practice that does not affect trade 
between the EU and Egypt may not be subject to Article 34(1) of the EMAA, but 
instead to either EU or Egyptian competition law, depending on the territory where the 
practice took place. Such pre-requisite is indeed not surprising; given that the core 
objective and rationale behind competition rules of the EMAA is to foster trade and not 
only to protect the competition process between the EU and Egypt. Hence, the effect on 
trade remains a turning point in any dispute within the context of the EMAA
52
.  
 
Article 34(1), should not be read in isolation. It was rather accompanied by two 
Declarations. First, The Declaration made by the European [Union] on Article 34 which 
provides that: ―The [Union] declares that, until the adoption by the Association Council 
of the implementing rules on fair competition referred to in Article 34 paragraph 2, in 
the context of the interpretation of Article 34 paragraph 1, it will assess any practice 
contrary to that Article on the basis of the criteria resulting from the rules contained in 
Articles [101, 102 and 107 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union] 
[…]‖53. And, second, The Joint Declaration made by Egypt and European [Union] on 
Article 34 which states that: ―The parties recognise that Egypt is currently in the process 
of drafting its own competition law. This will provide the necessary conditions for 
agreeing on the implementation rules referred to in Article 34(2). While drafting its law, 
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Egypt will take into account the competition rules developed within the European 
Union […]‖54. 
 
These Declarations may be construed in two distinct ways. One reading may imply that 
EU competition rules were meant to apply in the event where Egypt did not introduce 
its own law and where trade between the EU and Egypt is hindered by the scope of 
Article 34(1). Indeed this in itself may have accelerated the process of introducing 
competition law in Egypt, due to a possible fear of the application of EU rules. 
Moreover, applying Article 102 TFEU and its relevant EU practice until the Association 
Council adopts the related implementation rules may have an inevitable influence on the 
shape of the latter.    
 
A second interpretation to these Declarations is that - until the implementation rules of 
Article 34 are adopted and due to the non-existence of any alternative replacement rules 
(Egyptian competition rules) at the time of entry into force of the EMAA - the EU 
competition rules are to apply. As for the point of giving account to EU competition 
rules while drafting the Egyptian ones, it may have intended to signify that the Egyptian 
regime should be more or less in line or compatible with the EU system, at least to some 
extent, for the purposes of the EMAA. 
 
In other words, it is sometimes argued that a de facto imposed harmonization with EU 
competition rules may be indirectly inferred from the EMAA. Not only may this be 
clear from the Declaration made by the EU on the application of the TFEU rules until 
adoption of the EMAA‘s implementation ones, but also from the following statement in 
the Joint Declaration: ―While drafting its law, Egypt will take into account the 
competition rules developed within the European Union‖55. A statement as such, if 
narrowly construed, it may imply that the Egyptian legislator should harmonize 
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Egyptian rules with EU ones. Mr Juan Riviere
56
, one of the negotiators of the EMAA, 
however, disagrees with this second interpretation.  
 
In an interview with Mr Riviere regarding competition provisions of the EMAA, he 
stated that: ―Since I negotiated the competition chapter with Egypt I could confirm to 
you that our intention wasn‘t to oblige to copy our laws but to encourage the 
implementation of competition policy. It is right to say that before having a national 
competition law our trade relations involving competition issues will be to assess under 
the [EU] articles because it was the only legal reference in force. In fact during the 
negotiation the Egyptian side was thinking in terms of trade relations with future new 
WTO (GATT) obligations, subsidies treatment to some agriculture products, etc.; and 
we had already come to the conclusion that was better for future trade relations that the 
other party has competition legislation in force at home that to only cover X% of trade 
relations by competition provisions in the Association Agreement. This is obvious since 
the key for our relations was that the European companies trading and investing in 
Egypt had comparable treatment conditions, as the Egyptian companies will benefit in 
the EU market. You will understand our approach because anticompetitive effects 
occurred in each party market and not in the middle of the Mediterranean‖57. 
 
Given such intention during the negotiation process, one should more or less recognize 
that the Declarations were meant to act as a tool to pressure Egypt to adopt its own 
competition law. A further implied belief is that Egypt is not forced to harmonize its 
own competition law with that of the EU
58
. Nevertheless, one may consider that it is 
desirable that Egyptian competition law be as compatible as possible with that of the 
EU. This is to provide comparable treatment conditions in Egypt for EU investors 
similar to those existing in the EU to Egyptian investors. This may signify that there 
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should be at least as Mohieldin argues, a common denominator between the two laws
59
. 
Pursuant to Article 34(2) of the EMAA however, Article 34(1) is not to be read 
exclusively, as it merely sets out the prohibition rules in a very general manner. The 
Association Council is yet to provide the necessary implementation rules that were 
initially expected within the five-year period that followed entry into force of the 
EMAA (i.e. until 1
st
 June, 2009)
60
.  
                        
1.4.2 Invocation of the competition provisions 
This part aims to enquire as to whether or not the Association Council‘s decisions based 
on competition provisions of the EMAA may have a direct effect. This would enable 
individuals or companies to invoke them before national courts of Egypt or EU member 
states. As noted earlier, the Association Council has not yet put the implementation 
rules in place. It is commonly agreed that, prior to the adoption of implementation rules 
in any association agreement with the EU, competition provisions therein would not be 
in question with respect to any dispute within the scope of the agreement and that the 
EU rules may be the applicable ones
61
. Therefore, this question is as yet unanswered. 
One should distinguish between direct effect in the EU and that under the Egyptian 
system. 
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1.4.2.1 Direct effect in the EU 
Direct effect in the EU may be defined, according to Prechal, as: ―The obligation of a 
court or another authority to apply the relevant provisions of [EU] law [or international 
agreements], either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal 
review‖62. In order to approach the direct effect enquiry of EMAA‘s provisions in the 
EU, one should, at the outset, question whether or not association agreements, in 
general, fit within the EU legal order. While generally these agreements have been 
adopted in accordance with the terms of Article 217 TFEU, it would not be surprising to 
consider them as part of the EU legal order. This is indeed supported by the case law. 
 
In R. and V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, the CoJ considered the Association 
Agreement between the EU (then EEC) and Greece as part of the Union‘s legal order. 
More specifically, the CoJ indicated that since the agreement was concluded in 
accordance with the terms of Articles 215 and 217 TFEU (then 228 and 238 EEC), it 
should be contemplated as an act of one of the Union‘s institutions within the 
meaning of sub-paragraph (B) of the first paragraph of Article 267 TEU (then 177 
EEC) and that as of its entry into force date, it would constitute an integral part of the 
Union
63
.  
 
However, the CoJ in Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund provided that 
some conditions should be met for provisions of an international agreement to be 
directly effective. It indicated that provisions of the agreement should provide clarity, 
preciseness and unconditional obligation. Particularly, the CoJ held that since some of 
the provisions of the Association Agreement with Turkey were not adequately 
―precise‖ and ―unconditional‖, they were not subject to direct effect64. The CoJ in 
Sevince v. Staatssecretaris Van Justitie later on confirmed this when it indicated that 
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decisions of the Association Council had direct effect since they, along with 
provisions of the agreement itself, were ―clear, precise and unconditional‖65.  
 
Nonetheless, in Simutenkov, which concerned the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with Russia, the CoJ did not follow the Demirel criteria. The CoJ in that 
case upheld direct effect even though ‗recommendations‘ by the Cooperation Council 
were yet to be put in place for implementation of the concerned non-discrimination 
principle. However, this may be explained, according to Jacobs, by the fact that these 
recommendations were not in themselves binding and, hence, the question of direct 
effect did not depend on whether or not they have been adopted
66
.         
   
Given that the criteria identified by the CoJ in Demirel remain central for the present 
inquiry - notwithstanding the Simutenkov decision - the question that should be raised 
for the purposes of this thesis: do the EMAA‘s competition provisions satisfy these 
criteria? One may, at the outset, argue the EMAA‘s provisions as they currently stand 
(i.e. excluding implementation rules) lack clarity, preciseness and their application is 
conditional to adoption of implementation rules and hence, may not have direct effect 
until these latter rules are put in place. This argument was in fact supported by the 
case law. According to the CoJ in Demirel, the fact that implementation rules have 
not yet been adopted for an association agreement may mean that its competition 
rules are not directly effective until they are put in place
67
.  
 
However, it may be argued that since competition provisions of the EMAA (and 
association agreements in general) are based on EU competition rules in terms of 
interpretation and content, and while such rules are directly effective within the 
Union in the first place, then they may automatically be transposed to the EMAA‘s 
competition rules. However, the fact that there is no provision in these agreements, 
including the EMAA, promulgating the direct effect doctrine parallel to Protocol 35 
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of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) renders this a moot point
68
. While 
it is true that the EMAA does not explicitly address the doctrine of direct effect, it 
does not necessarily exclude its applicability. For instance, in Sevince, the CoJ 
adopted its judgment based on the decision of Association Council of the EU-Turkey 
(then EEC-Turkey) Association Agreement; nonetheless the latter did not explicitly 
address the doctrine of direct effect in the first place
69
.  
  
Furthermore, on many occasions, the EU case-law apply/adopt principles that are not 
stipulated under the TFEU, directives, primary or secondary legislations. In other 
words, one should not rely on the fact that the EMAA has not addressed the direct 
effect doctrine. Moreover, Article 218(7) TFEU [ex. 300(7) EC] made clear that the 
EMAA, as one of the agreements concluded in accordance with Article 218, is 
binding to the Union and its member states, which may indeed imply a direct effect 
grant
70
. In fact, recent case law suggests that the treatment of direct effect still 
remains unaltered from the above-mentioned cases.  
 
For instance, in Mohamed Gattoussi v. Stadt Rüsselsheim, the question of direct effect 
was explicitly raised. Particularly, Gattoussi, a Tunisian national residing and 
working in Germany through an unlimited work permit, invoked Article 64 of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Tunisia which provides for non-
discriminatory treatment in relation to the working conditions on Tunisian nationals 
across member states. Gattoussi invoked Article 64 after German authorities have 
decided to limit his permit since he no longer lives with his German wife (the initial 
basis for which the unlimited permit was granted). The CoJ held that Article 64 was 
directly effective and could hence be invoked in Germany
71
. To recap, competition 
provisions of the EMAA have direct effect in the EU (arguably) prior to the adoption 
of implementation rules, but certainly following their adoption.     
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1.4.2.2 Direct effect in Egypt 
The case of direct effect in Egypt lacks relevant case law on the matter. Most of the 
disputes on international agreements in general focused on whether or not they would 
prevail over domestic laws and regulations in the event of conflict among their 
stipulations. Decisions in these cases tended to favour international agreements over 
domestic laws so long as they comply with the terms of Article 151 of the Egyptian 
Constitution which provides that international agreements, treaties and conventions 
gain the force of law following their conclusion, ratification and publication
72
.  
 
The only (fairly) relevant case that was found in this regard is where an importer 
appealed the Authority for Environmental Affairs‘ decision that declined a permission 
of entry of one of its shipments since it contained some non-environmentally friendly 
material. The High Administrative Court of Egypt refused the appeal on the basis of 
the terms of the Basel Convention to which Egypt is a party and indicated that Article 
151 made clear the force of law of conventions following their ratification and 
publication
73
. This case shows that provisions of international agreements are directly 
effective. In fact, the Court in this case invoked the Convention and Article 151 
voluntarily (i.e. with no request from any of the parties involved). This may a priori 
imply that concerned parties may have the right to invoke provisions of international 
agreements based on Article 151. But how can one apply Article 151 to the question 
of direct effect of the EMAA‘s provisions?                      
 
The Egyptian system understandably lacks literature on direct effect of the EMAA at 
this stage – aside of international agreements in general. Commentators seem to have 
focused on provisions of the EMAA, alongside direct effect in the EU as a well-
recognized doctrine thereof. To determine whether or not the EMAA‘s competition 
provisions and Association Council‘s decisions in relation to their application have 
direct effect in Egypt, one should first question the degree of recognition of 
international agreements in general within the Egyptian legal system. Article 151 
signifies that competition provisions of the EMAA do comprise part of the Egyptian 
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legal system as of their publication in the Official Gazette. Does this mean, however, 
that decisions of the EMAA‘s Association Council are directly effective before 
Egyptian Courts? 
 
This inquiry requires a thorough reading of Article 34, its Declaration by the 
European [Union] and Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution; all of which are to be 
read in conjunction. Arguably, Article 151 implies a case of direct effect of the 
EMAA‘s competition provisions. If read, however, in conjunction with Article 34(2) 
and the Declaration by the European [Union] on Article 34 of the EMAA (which 
provides for application of TFEU rules until adoption of implementation rules), the 
situation may be viewed differently. This is because Article 151 intends application 
of the EMAA‘s provisions themselves and not those of the TFEU. Indeed, the 
Declaration by the European [Union] on Article 34 of the EMAA refers to the 
application of the TFEU rules, but this is arguably, not the meaning intended under 
Article 151. If the application of Article 34(1) is pending the adoption of 
implementation rules (which is the case today), then it should be declared 
inapplicable and hence shall not be directly effective in Egypt pending the adoption 
of these rules. In other words, Article 34 shall not have direct effect until it becomes 
operational (i.e. until implementation rules are put in place by the Association 
Council).  
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
The Egyptian government encountered several pressures to adopt its own competition 
law. Among these pressures was that posed by the EU through the conclusion of the 
EMAA, which included competition rules that were mostly based on those of the EU. 
Egypt also encountered two (internal) pressures; first, a religious and constitutional 
pressure to tackle monopoly on the basis that Shari‘ah, a constitutional underpinning in 
Egypt, explicitly condemns it. However, there seems to exist no direct evidence that 
obliges the legislator, relevant authorities or courts to follow Islamic law in this respect. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution implies the desire to 
reflect or comply with Shari‘ah principles within the Egyptian Legal System. Second, 
and arguably a more compelling (internal) pressure than the former, is the 1991 
privatisation programme that triggered some structural changes in Egypt (particularly, 
transfer of monopoly from public to private sector) that eventually pressured the 
introduction of competition law.       
 
The language of the EMAA‘s competition provisions may at first sight imply that it 
imposes on Egypt an obligation to harmonize its laws with EU ones. However, deeper 
insights refute this and suggest it was in fact Egypt‘s responsibility to adopt its own law. 
Nevertheless, it is arguably desirable to approximate Egyptian Competition Law with 
that of the EU. This may be rationalised by the ideology that the EU may want to ensure 
that a comparable treatment is provided to EU investors in Egypt.   
 
Even though the Association Council has not yet adopted the implementation rules 
pertaining to the application of Article 34(1) of the EMAA, it may still arguably have 
direct effect before investigating authorities of EU member states. This is based on the 
premise that while Article 34(1) is primarily based on EU competition rules, which have 
direct effect in the EU, so should Article 34(1) also be directly effective. In this case, it 
may satisfy the criteria for direct effect discerned by the CoJ in Demirel. In contrast, 
however, Article 34(1) may not be invoked before Egyptian Courts prior to the adoption 
of implementation rules. This is because EU competition rules may remain applicable to 
disputes within the context of Article 34(1) until implementation rules are adopted and 
  
32 
that Article 151 of Egyptian Constitution grants direct effect to provisions of 
international agreements only. Hence, this excludes direct effect of EU rules.      
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COMPARATIVE LAW METHODS IN CONTEXT 
IN RELATION TO THE STUDY ON EU AND EGYPTIAN 
COMPETITION LAWS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The reception of foreign law and legal transplantation became a major comparative law 
debate during the second half of the 20
th
 Century. This trend emerged as a result of the 
European reception of Roman law that took place about a Century before. It is widely 
agreed that the lessons and methods learnt from the dissemination of Roman law 
throughout several areas of Continental Europe and Scotland are significant. In fact, it 
may have inspired legal systems of many countries to follow the same or similar 
pattern
75
.   
 
The codification era that terminated the ius commune in Europe may best illustrate this 
inspiration. For instance, the French Civil Code (also known as Code Civil - codified in 
1804), given its global duplication, was contemplated as one of the prominent 
codifications in Europe. It travelled to the African and Middle Eastern regions – Egypt 
is indeed a notable example
76
. However, the literature on comparative law is not 
confined to receptions and transplants of laws. The 1970-80s experienced a dramatic 
growth in the literature on new principles, methods and approaches to comparative law.     
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate and elucidate the relevance of comparative law 
methods to the present study. To be more precise, it will discuss the methods that will 
be employed in the thesis and investigate in detail how their application will proceed. 
Thus, the discussion of comparative law methods will only be limited to the methods 
that will be employed in this thesis. The chapter will start off by reviewing the history 
and success of comparative law in Europe. It will then move on to analyze the relevance 
and importance of comparative law methods with reference to the present study. It will 
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then explore the history of the Egyptian Legal System and its classification. And, 
finally, it will discuss the concept of legal harmonization, its relevance, criticisms, and 
success.            
 
2.2 COMPARATIVE LAW: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 
METHODS AND PRECEPTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE 
2.2.1 Historical background of comparative law in Europe 
Comparative law in Europe went through two eras: the ius commune and codification 
eras. The 17
th
 Century experienced the emergence of the ―ius commune‖ of Continental 
Europe
77
. The age of ius commune experienced a common evolutionary process of 
distinction between laws and scholarship among both judges and lawyers in different 
jurisdictions during the 17
th
 Century. As Schlesinger illustrates, a lawyer who is located 
in Belgium and seeks legal advice on a Belgian rule may consult some material 
prepared by an Italian or French national or university as long as it is convincing 
enough. The Belgian Court will not reject reliance on such work on grounds of the 
concerned scholar‘s nationality. Put differently, legal scholarship and material 
comparison was a widely acknowledged research method at the time, irrespective of the 
distance and nationality of the sources at stake
78
.  
 
In fact, when lawyers and judges relied on material of this sort, they contemplated them 
as similar i.e. not deriving from a foreign source. Thus comparison of legal rules at the 
time took an ―integrative‖ rather than ―contrastive‖ approach. However, the late 18th 
Century experienced a different style of thinking in Europe; namely ―the age of 
codification‖. During this period, all countries of the European Continent had their rules 
codified and translated in their own language. Lawyers and judges contemplated rules 
and material originating from a different country as foreign source. Hence, comparative 
law started taking a different path. Contrary to the past, comparisons focussed more on 
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the variances rather than resemblances - a ―contrastive approach‖ (unlike the ius 
commune era)
79
. 
 
However, such contrastive approach merely prevailed until the past 2-3 decades; 
whereby comparative law started fading away from this pattern and recalling back to the 
―integrative approach‖ of the ius commune era. This reform was justified by the free 
movement of people, goods and services policy on the international level, alongside 
globalisation. In relation to comparisons, scholars explored the shared features of legal 
systems instead of merely distinguishing them. Europe may be taken as a simple 
illustration for such pattern. The evolution of the EU may be seen as an unequivocal 
recall of the ius commune. In fact, Schlesinger names this approach as the ―new ius 
commune‖. Interestingly, he argues that since the EU is composed of civil and common 
law systems, the new ius commune had to be confined to the common features of both 
systems
80
.  
 
Later on during the second half of the 20
th
 Century, comparative law was characterized 
by its ability to provide knowledge. It was perceived that knowledge dramatically arose 
during this period, compared to the first half of the Century. Particularly, given the 
relative lack of literature during the first half of the 20
th
 Century, one may have been 
able to handle most of the comparative law literature in just a matter of weeks, while 
nowadays it may take years, if at all attainable in the first place. Moreover, the 
comparative law scholarship during the second half of the 20
th
 Century, established a 
―world map of law‖. It was perceived that most comparative law scholars at the time 
were reasonably familiar with the existing models (such as Rene David‘s and Zweigert 
and Kotz‘s models on the definition of families according to ―style‖) which Reimann 
believes that their models have become more or less out-dated relative to nowadays‘ 
literature. This is based on three grounds
81
.  
 
                                                          
 
79
 Ibid, pp.478-479  
80
 Ibid, pp.478-480 
81
 Reimann, M. (2002) ―The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century‖ (50), American Journal of Comparative Law, pp.674, 676 
  
37 
First, the categorizations that were conducted between legal systems were not as precise 
as they seemed. For instance, when we classify legal systems as common, civil or 
mixed, this is a mere superficial or un-detailed classification. In other words, there lies a 
more in-depth distinction than the simple and generic classification of civil or common. 
Many legal systems - not necessarily called mixed or combined between civil and 
common law - add some constituents from other systems. In fact, the distinction does 
not lie in ―substantive rules‖ but rather in ―institutions‖, ―procedures‖, and ―techniques‖ 
that are likely to be modified in the future. Second, one should not overlook the history 
and development of a legal system at the expense of the rules set forth. For instance, 
looking at a system‘s ―legal traditions‖ may be a fine way. In addition, exploring a 
system‘s ―legal cultures‖ may enrich insights (such as ―economies‖, ―religions‖, 
―social habits‖ etc.). Third, there somehow exists a correlation between ―legal families‖, 
―traditions‖, and ―cultures‖82. 
 
Although it is commonly perceived that comparative law as such attained significant 
success through adopting a distinguished framework of knowledge, it is sometimes 
suggested that it failed in several respects. For instance, some perceive that it failed to 
develop an established and comprehensive discipline. In addition, it hardly evidenced its 
ability to produce an in-depth approach to the ―general interest‖. This may be 
demonstrated in respect of aspects such as the structure and development of legal 
systems or the link between ―law‖, ―society‖, and ―culture‖ whether on regional or 
global basis
83
. 
 
Moreover, according to Reimann, the failure of comparative law evolution may be 
discerned in various respects. First, the majority of literature tends to give too much 
attention to the approach developed by European scholars throughout the preceding 
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Century. Such approach focused to a large extent on the ―Country‖ and ―Western 
tradition‖ i.e. from a Western Legal Systems perspective84. In addition, it is argued that 
the development of comparative law failed to adopt a body of empirical methods or, in 
other words, statistics of legal systems for the purposes of conducting comparisons. The 
lack of empirical data as such makes observations and conclusions on comparative law 
studies based on individual presuppositions and assumptions that may undermine 
credibility
85
. Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is perceived that the comparative law 
methods that exist nowadays may be fruitfully deployed in the present study.  
 
2.2.2 Identification of the legal systems under scrutiny – Can a comparative 
study take place between entirely different systems?  
―The comparatist will always be haunted by this memorable and magical expression: 
‗incomparables cannot be usefully compared‘‖86. 
 
The above quotation arguably serves as a guiding principle for comparative studies. 
Nevertheless, as Platsas writes, sensing comparability is in itself a complicated process. 
One should give attention to the wording ―usefully‖. However, some comparatists use 
terminologies other than usefully. For instance, terms such as ―sufficiently comparable, 
reasonably comparable, fruitfully comparable or meaningfully comparable‖ are 
commonly used
87
. Sacco argues that at the very outset of conducting any comparative 
study, a vital question should be raised. Is it possible to carry out a comparative study 
between two legal systems that are substantially distinct? An instant answer according 
to him was that there must be a common denominator between the two legal systems for 
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a study as such to take place
88
 or as Platsas indicates: Legal systems that have ―some 
sort of unifying language of application; by some common denominator‖89. 
 
―We are in the habit of positing a single form for each plurality of things to which we 
give the same name‖90. 
 
Referring to the afore-mentioned quotation, Plato‘s theory of ‗one-over-many‘ entails 
―that human thought is unitary in essence; yet the implementation of the Denken might 
differ in practice‖. To put Plato‘s theory in a simpler manner, Platsas provides an 
example that compares horses. Despite the comparison involves horses that are different 
in colour and quality, yet comparing the same category of species, from a Platoian 
perspective, these differences are more or less meaningless on the basis of his belief 
that: ―A unitary, eternal, indivisible and unchangeable essence is found beneath variable 
qualities of the same thing‖91. The theory of Plato as such is easily applicable in the 
field of comparative legal studies. If we come to conduct a comparative study of the 
competition rules of two different legal systems, we may find that the rules of one 
system may be more or less developed than the other, yet protecting the same issue: The 
competitive process
92
. Are the EU and Egypt two usefully comparable legal systems? 
Put differently, do they share a common denominator?  
 
Patently, the EU and Egypt are distinct legal systems in two major respects. First, the 
EU, on the one hand, is an Economic and Political Union comprised of 27 Member 
States. Egypt, on the other hand, is a single state. It is on this basis that one may ask 
why the present comparative study is conducted between two legal systems that 
function in a different manner and have different objectives (in general), rather than, for 
instance, comparing the French Competition Law with the Egyptian one. Second, it is 
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unquestionable that the EU‘s legal system and institutional structure are far more 
developed than the Egyptian ones
93
. 
  
Nevertheless, however distinct the EU and Egyptian Legal Systems are, one may 
consider the EMAA as a common denominator of the comparative study. In fact, it is on 
the premise that the agreement was concluded between the EU and Egypt that the 
present comparative study between their competition rules commenced in the first place. 
Apart from subjecting the EMAA‘s competition rules to both systems, the common 
denominator factor appears in that the Association Council shall adopt the 
implementation rules on competition that ought to be followed by the Association 
Committee in future competition disputes (so long as they affect trade and in turn fall 
within the scope of Article 34 of the EMAA). Hence, one may submit, pursuant to 
Zweigert and Kotz‘s criterion, that the EU and Egypt may be comparable legal systems 
and may thus be usefully compared.         
 
2.2.3 The subject of the comparative study: An investigation of similarities 
or differences? 
 
Determining whether a comparative study will tackle the similarities or differences or 
will obtain a balance between both is essential for the purposes of certainty and 
transparency. The inquiry of whether to favour similarities over differences or vice 
versa in comparative studies is subject to debate. While history has shown that the 
literature on the ius commune European legal culture somehow accepted similarities by 
default (integrative approach) and focused more on the differences, this ideology seems 
to have faded away
94
.  
 
The framework of comparative studies experienced an alteration in the 18
th
 Century by 
Montesquieu who attempted to obtain a balance between the value of similarities and 
differences. Yet, when it came to making a choice of either, he favoured comparison of 
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differences. According to him, there are some factors that decide on the appropriateness 
of the law at stake for the country: ―Climate, geographical, cultural, religious, 
economic, moral and political factors‖. This is to say, according to him: ―It is unlikely 
that the laws of one nation can suit another‖. Furthermore, he recommends: ―Not to 
consider as similar cases with real differences or to overlook differences in those which 
appear similar‖95.  
 
In fact, the philosophy of presuming similarity in comparisons or in Latin terms: 
―praesumptio similitudinis‖ is quite relevant to the arguments developed by Sacco and 
Platsas on the common denominator factor or as the latter scholar often names: 
―Common intellectual denominator of legal thought‖96. To enable the comparability of 
legal systems and indeed its usefulness, the comparatist should fulfil a prerequisite 
relating to the commonality of some concepts/rules in the legal systems under scrutiny. 
While this process (i.e. sense of commonality of concepts) usually takes place prior to 
conducting a detailed comparative study, through a superficial overview with the aim of 
determining whether the legal systems are comparable in the first place, the comparatist 
will resort to the praesumptio similitudinis
97
. However, the conception of praesumptio 
similitudinis in itself is subject to criticism. 
 
For instance, Gutteridge is a comparative law scholar who promotes emphasis on the 
differences. While opting for the legal system to be compared, he, interestingly, 
suggests that one should select systems similar in terms of the stage of ―legal‖, 
―political‖ and ―economic development‖. This is to evade ―illusionary comparison‖98. 
Moreover, Ancel adopted the conception of ―comparaison contrastee‖; one which gives 
more attention to contrasts and divergences rather than similarities and convergences. 
According to him, dissimilarity is regarded as the starting point to which a comparative 
practitioner would notice while studying legal systems. Furthermore, he prudently 
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argues that studying fundamentally distinct legal systems is likely to provide many 
results, in contrast with a study involving resembling legal systems
99
.  
                       
In fact the emergence of Ancel‘s conception as such arguably led to the evolution of 
more ideas; most notably, functionalism. For instance, Frankenberg advised 
comparative practitioners ―to recognize that they are participant observers‖ to whom 
their role was to review foreign legal systems from their domestic legal system‘s 
standpoint – a context which disables them to be as ―neutral as functionalists would like 
to see them‖100. The similarities presumption, hence, should ―be abandoned for a 
rigorous experience of distance and difference‖101. However, some anti-functionalist 
scholars disagree with the fact that it (functionalism) focuses on results. For instance, 
according to Hyland, ―all levels of difference among legal systems – whether in terms 
of concepts or results – should be acknowledged rather than suppressed‖102. Thus, as 
noted by Dannemann, this entails a presumption of ―dissimilarity‖103.   
 
To decide whether the thesis will focus on the similarities or the differences, or 
otherwise obtain a balance between both methods, one should thoroughly consider the 
demands of the present study. In other words, what is more important? Is it the inquiry 
of similarities or is it the differences that are more important? While the present study is 
initially based on the EMAA, it may be essential to focus not only on the differences; 
but also on the similarities that may indeed encourage EU/Egypt trade and that arguably 
reflect the influence of EU Competition Rules (and Islamic principles on some 
occasions) on Egyptian Competition Law. In addition, employing functionalism (as will 
be discussed in the following part) provides the comparatist to focus on the similarities 
for the purposes of investigating ―equivalents‖ between the legal systems under 
comparison
104
. More to the point, if a comparatist is to adopt Montesquieu‘s vision of 
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comparison (who favours differences over similarities) in the present study, he will be 
sacrificing the need and essence of functionalism (i.e. law in theory and practice). For 
this reason, it would be prudent to deploy a balance between similarities and 
differences. 
      
2.2.4 Contextualizing the importance and relevance of functionalism 
 
―The vibrant heart of the comparative method in the most dynamic branch of law, 
comparative law, dances to the tune of functionality of comparisons. By all means, if 
there is one principle that the method adheres to, it is functionality‖105. 
 
Some argue that comparative law should endorse a ―functional approach‖106. But what 
is meant by a ―functional approach‖ to comparative law? A ―functional approach‖ is an 
approach which emphasises that the comparison of laws should not merely examine 
what they address, but should also explore what they intend to tackle in their own legal 
system. This is in addition to the vision of how the rules are implemented in practice
107
. 
However, as Michaels notes, it would be irrational to say that there exists only a single 
functional method. Thus the foregoing definition represents a very generic idea of 
functionalism
108
. 
  
Comparative law scholars seem to agree on some common characteristics of 
functionalism. First, given that a functional approach is more concerned with the 
―effects‖ of the rules rather than the rules themselves, the object of comparative studies 
largely target judicial decisions. In other words, comparative studies intend to primarily 
tackle the case law of the legal systems at glance. Second, the role of a functional 
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approach is to unite its ―factual approach with the theory that its objects must be 
understood in the light of their functional relation to society‖109.  
 
This means that functionalism acknowledges the relationship between law and society 
but concurrently splits it. Third, functionalism acts as ―tertium comparationis‖. This 
signifies, according to Michaels, that ―institutions, both legal and non-legal, even 
doctrinally different ones, are comparable if they are functionally equivalent, if they 
fulfil similar functions in different legal systems‖110. The question that lies beneath this 
is to what extent does this third characteristic relate to the present study? And how can 
it be applied? Tertium comparationis is an imperative Latin term to which one must 
consider when conducting comparative studies. It is an indispensable component of the 
comparative method
111
. The terminology refers to the starting point of comparisons or, 
as Reitz names: ―the common point of departure for the comparison‖. It signifies the 
value to which, say, two concepts of two legal systems may have in common
112
.  
 
The meaning of tertium comparationis as such is closely linked to the arguments 
favouring the common denominator factor. In this respect, Platsas argues that although 
legal functionalism may not comply with the Platoian approach entailing that humans 
are broadly characterised by ―unity of thought‖, unless the praesumptio similitudinis 
was applicable
113, comparative law‘s functionalism of nowadays somehow adheres to it. 
More specifically, functionalism as such resembles Plato‘s ‗one-over-many‘ theorem in 
the sense that ―both seek similarities in the main‖. Therefore, the criterion for the 
usefulness of comparisons, similar to Plato‘s approach in humans, is attained in 
functionalism in legal studies
114
.          
 
Furthermore, it is inevitable as Reitz submits that tertium comparationis in 
comprehensive comparative study ought to cover all of the following probabilities or, at 
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least, consider the existence of one or more. The possibilities may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 The two legal systems share ―the same legal rule or legal institution‖ (‗the first 
possibility‘); 
 They stipulate ―different rules or institutions‖ yet serving ―the same function‖ (‗the 
second possibility‘); 
 They produce distinct outcomes for a single event/case (‗the third possibility‘); 
 The said event/case is not covered by one of the legal systems under comparison 
(‗the fourth possibility‘)115.  
 
Putting the above-mentioned possibilities in context signals the indispensability of 
considering tertium comparationis. The first possibility is prone to be covered by the 
study, whether with respect to the ‗same legal rule or legal institution‘. With regards to 
the ‗legal rule‘, this is evident from the fact that both the EU and Egypt are subject to 
Article 34 of the EMAA, so long as they affect they ―may affect trade‖ between both 
parties
116. With respect to the ‗legal institution‘, in the same vein, the Association 
Committee in respect of anti-competitive practices scrutinizes both parties. The second 
possibility will, moreover, be covered by the study. The EU and Egypt implement 
distinct rules that nevertheless serve the same purpose or function: the protection of 
competition.   
 
Furthermore, given that the Egyptian system already employs an effects-based approach 
to abuse of dominance, and while the EU is arguably still in transition (although the 
Commission intends to employ this approach in the future – as will be developed in 
chapters 3 and 4), this may lead to different judgements of disputes of the same kind
117
. 
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This is to say that the third possibility is covered, at least at the present stage. And 
finally, while there may be practices that are not regulated under the Egyptian law like 
the practice of excessive pricing, as opposed to the EU system (although investigated 
only under exceptional circumstances)
118
, this means that the fourth possibility is also 
considered. Yet the question that should be raised in this respect: how does tertium 
comparationis function in comparative studies? As Reitz indicates, first, it serves as the 
guiding method for comparisons. In other words, it consistently keeps the comparatist 
on track with the comparison (preventing him from losing focus). Second, it stresses the 
significance of inquiring about ―functional equivalence‖ in comparisons119.  
 
2.2.5 The rules of legal translations and their relevance 
Comparative studies are likely to require translations. Since it is assumed that the 
researcher concerned is confronted by two or more legal systems with different 
languages - as is the case with respect to the present study (English and Arabic). In fact, 
it is prudent to submit that most of the ―legal rules and institutions‖ adopted nowadays 
were not initially formulated by legislators, but are merely those used in other 
jurisdictions. These rules are usually accompanied by a translation on the basis that they 
originate from countries using different languages. Legal translation is the job of a 
jurist. Since the process of translation provides the translator to ascertain the meaning of 
the related sentence/term and subsequently explore an equivalent to it in the other 
language
120
.  
 
However, in a legal system like the Egyptian, legal translation may either be the job of 
the legal researcher/practitioner or the competition authority itself. In fact, the Egyptian 
Competition Authority (‗ECA‘) translated the provisions of Law No. 3/2005 and its 
Executive Regulations incorporated in this thesis. Thus, the task of the practitioner may 
appear either within the scope of competition law practice, given that the ECA does not 
usually translate its decisions, or with respect to other relevant laws or reports that are 
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yet to be translated. It is however, inevitable, as suggested by Sacco, that the translator 
will either encounter difficulties or easiness in this process. This probably depends on 
how closely correlated the two languages are. For instance, a translator may encounter 
obstacles when one or more words do not linguistically have their corresponding in the 
other language
121
.  
 
If one takes English and Arabic as comparable languages, it will be found that in many 
respects, they may not be closely correlated. Hence, it may be advisable to consult an 
approved legal translation agency, in the event of encountering hurdles in the process. 
Moreover, as Sacco further submits, a ―complete permanent correspondence between 
two expressions belonging to two different languages can be created only artificially‖. 
According to him, ‗artificial‘ entails that persons who have ―authority‖ in a certain 
jurisdiction agree that a term shall have a certain meaning or shall be similar to a 
corresponding term in another jurisdiction
122
.  
 
2.3 THE EGYPTIAN LEGAL SYSTEM – AN INFLUENCE OF 
FRENCH LAW, ISLAMIC LAW OR IS IT A MIXED SYSTEM? 
The Egyptian legal system is a civil law system. It is questionable, however, as to where 
the influence of its civil code derives. In other words, is it of French law influence, or is 
it based on Islamic law? Or is it a mixture of both?
123
 In order to investigate this 
inquiry, it may be worthwhile reviewing the history of the Egyptian Legal System. 
Providing an answer to the inquiry will follow this. While this part will establish that 
the Egyptian Civil Code is a mixture of Islamic and French laws, the need to 
conceptualize the notion of mixed legal systems will then follow.          
 
2.3.1 An overview of the history of the Egyptian Legal System: The rising 
influence of Islamic and French Laws 
 
Before the advent of Islam in 641 A.D., Roman law administered Egypt. The influx of 
Islam was followed by the introduction of Islamic law, which remained about 1100 
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years
124
. While in power as the leader of Egypt during the early 1800s, Mohamed Ali 
somehow obtained the impact of French Law on Egypt. In 1875, Egypt experienced the 
introduction of the regime of ―mixed courts‖ that was set to apply to disputes between 
foreigners or foreigners and Egyptians, whether in respect of criminal, penal, civil or 
procedural codes; namely ―mixed codes‖. For instance, the 1875 Civil Code of Egypt 
was ―modelled‖ on the French Civil Code that was in force at the time. Indeed, an 
approval of a code as such had to be acquired from the occupational foreign powers 
(notably the British and French) that had a ―privileged status‖ in the country. However, 
the regime of mixed courts did not last for long. A system of ―national courts‖ was 
instead introduced in 1883. These Courts governed disputes (commercial, penal, civil, 
etc.) between Egyptians, while Islamic law and courts focused on family law issues 
between Muslims or Muslims married to non-Muslims, leaving other family law matters 
concerning non-Muslims to distinct courts
125
.      
 
The regime of mixed courts and Shari‘ah courts was brought to an end in 1949 and 
1955 respectively. Disputes that used to be settled by these courts were then referred to 
national courts that were named as ―ordinary courts‖. Consequently, the system of 
―mixed codes‖ was substituted by ―national codes of universal application‖ which 
applied to both Egyptians and non-Egyptians. The 1949 Civil Code was an important 
component of them. It is no wonder why Tefley refers to the Egyptian system as ―an 
intriguing mixed legal system, blending civilian rules fashioned, in style, structure and 
content, on the model of the French Civil Code of 1804, with the law of Islam and, in 
family law areas (such as marriage, divorce, filiations and alimentary obligations), with 
a variety of religiously-founded personal laws‖126.        
 
2.3.2 Islamic Law v. French Law – The Case of Egypt 
At the outset, it is necessary to define Islamic law as one of the main sources of law in 
the Middle Eastern region in general. ―Islamic law‖ in essence means ―Shari‘a‖ 
(‗Shari‘ah‘). Islamic Shari‘ah (or as pronounced in Arabic: ―Al-Shari‘a Al-Islamiyya‖) 
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is ―sacred law, that is a compilation of opinions and interpretations of religious legal 
scholars who studied the sacred texts of Islam during the first centuries of its existence‖. 
Although in principle it is composed of four schools of thought: ―Hanafi‖, ―Malaki‖, 
―Shafi‖ and ―Hanbali‖, the reliance on them in practice is not exclusive. Account is 
given also to the ―decrees of rulers, and in part on simple custom‖127.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Egypt Legal System was significantly influenced by the 
advent of Islam during the early ages. Nevertheless, Western scholarship took the stance 
that either the Egyptian Civil Code is partly Islamic or is not of an Islamic influence at 
all. For instance, Anderson appears to have downplayed the ―Islamicity‖ of the code128. 
In addition, he dismisses any view contemplating it as ―European‖ in terms of origin; 
but rather a code that bears a ―slight‖129 ―debt to Islamic law‖130. More specifically, 
Anderson, in his empirical study on the Egyptian Civil Code, attempted to calculate the 
number of provisions that were rooted from Islamic law. Yet according to Shalakany, 
this approach was problematic in the sense that Anderson did not adopt a dividing line 
on how a ―legal document‖ can be contemplated as ―Islamic‖ from how it cannot. In 
fact, Islamic law is often taken into consideration by the Egyptian government while 
drafting its laws and regulations. A good example for this assertion is the 1949 Civil 
Code. This Code was found by the Egyptian Jurist Abdel-Razzak Al-Sanhuri who is 
often described as: ―The master re-builder of Arab law in the twentieth century‖131. 
  
Sanhuri was a legislator and a researcher at the same time. His vision over the 
―Islamicity‖ of the Civil Code appears to have substantially changed throughout the 
period between 1942 and 1962. More specifically, Sanhuri in the Egyptian Senate has 
disclosed two stances in 1948. First, he contended that 3/4 or 4/5 of the code is merely 
based on the Egyptian case law. Later on, he stressed that the whole Civil Code‘s 
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provisions are Islamic
132
. In fact, Sanhuri‘s approach in the Civil Code reflected 
Islamism. It specified that Shari‘ah ought to be applied in courts by stating in Article 1 
that: ―In the absence of a provision of a law that is applicable, the judge will decide 
according to customs and in the absence of custom in accordance with the principles of 
the Islamic Shari‘ah. In the absence of such principles the judge will apply the 
principles of natural law and the rules of equity‖133. 
 
Furthermore, the Islamic law influence on the Egyptian Legal System is not only 
envisaged from the Civil Code. Even more importantly – as highlighted in the preceding 
chapter - Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution explicitly indicates the function of 
Islamic law in the Egyptian system by stipulating that: ―Islam is the religion of the state 
[...] and the principles of the Islamic Shari‘ah are the major source of legislation‖134. On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that French Law has had an impact on the Egyptian 
Legal System. In fact, Watson, in an interesting study conducted in 1920, compared the 
Egyptian Civil Code with the French, French Canadian and English rules. 
 
Particularly, Watson‘s conclusion may be summarised as follows: ―The articles upon 
obligations in the Egyptian Code are merely an abridgment of those in the French Code 
with modifications in details, and the Egyptian Courts, unless they have already a 
settled jurisprudence of their own, naturally turn for guidance to the French 
commentators and to the decisions of the French Courts [...] any commentary on the 
Egyptian Code must, therefore, be, in effect, a commentary on the French Code 
indicating the points where the Egyptian legislator has introduced modifications‖135. 
However, one must not forget that the circumstances of nowadays may substantially 
vary from that during the 1920s.  
 
Duplicating foreign law is not the case nowadays - although rules that are mere 
abridgments of European codes may remain unchanged from the old ages. The trend is 
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rather taking the path of drafting laws with different or mixed influences. In fact, 
Sanhuri insists that the Egyptian Civil Code demonstrates a mixture of French and 
Shari‘ah influence. As he stated before the Senate Committee of Civil Law where 
elaboration on the suggested code took place: ―three-quarters or five-sixths of the 
provisions of this law are based on the decisions of Egyptian courts and on the existing 
legislation [which was substantially of French inspiration] ... I assure you that we did 
not leave a single sound provision of the Shari‘ah which we could have included in this 
legislation without doing so ... we adopted all from the Shari‘ah that we could adopt, 
having regard to sound principles of modern legislation‖136.  
 
In other words, as Liebesny writes: ―The period since World War II has been 
characterized in the Arab countries by intense codifying activities ... in the new 
codifications two main tendencies have made themselves felt: a trend toward synthesis 
of Islamic and Western legal ideas in fields such as contracts, and eclecticism in the 
selection of sources. The codes, including those that were based exclusively on Western 
law, no longer followed one specific European enactment, but took principles and rules 
from a variety of statutes‖137. More to the point, to further evidence that Egypt has a 
mixed legal system, the University of Ottawa conducted an interesting study in 2005 
which found that the Egyptian system in particular is among ―MIXED SYSTEMS OF 
CIVIL LAW AND MUSLIM LAW‖, apart from finding that about half of the legal 
systems around the globe are ―mixed‖ in general138. This in turn raises the importance 
of conceptualizing the classification of ‗mixed legal systems‘. 
 
2.3.3 The concept of mixed legal systems in context  
Traditionally, the terminology ―mixed‖ in the context of legal systems encompasses 
only legal systems that are comprised of a mixture between civil and common law 
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systems
139
. As Plessis states: ―LEGAL systems generally are ‗mixed‘ in the sense that 
they have been influenced by a variety of other systems‖140. According to him, ―legal 
families‖ are a set of legal systems that have ―certain shared features‖. While 
comparative lawyers have distinct visions in respect of classifying legal systems, they 
concurrently adopt different approaches in relation to what these ―shared features‖ 
are
141
.  
 
Moreover, comparative lawyers may view the conception of mixed legal system from 
different perspectives. First, one cannot do anything to ―attribute these systems to the 
‗right‘ family‖. In other words, so long as these systems do not share similar 
characteristics as those of a certain family do, they remain in a ―classificatory limbo‖. 
Yet Reid argues that ―traditional mixed legal systems‖ that have a ―political autonomy 
and a developed legal literature‖ may attain an ―equilibrium‖ that would thereby refute 
their attribution to ―constituent systems‖142.  
 
Second, according to Örücü, the concept of mixed legal systems should not be viewed 
from the perspective that a legal system need not be classified as sharing the same 
characteristics of a legal family and hence, joining its category. In other words, not 
every mixed legal system that shares the same characteristics with a particular legal 
family may necessarily fit therein. Instead, Örücü favours the adoption of a ―new 
‗family trees‘ approach‖ - one which takes into consideration that almost all mixed legal 
systems are mixed; yet to different levels. That said, systems will then be ―regrouped‖ 
pursuant to the dominance of their ―ingredient sources‖143. 
  
Third, some suggest that the conception of ―extensive mixture is such a distinctive 
feature of certain systems that they deserve to be regarded as a family in their own 
right‖. The range of this ―new category‖ would then be relative to the strictness of the 
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―criteria for admission to other families from which the mixes derive are applied‖. In 
other words, the more lenient the application of the criteria for admission is, the lesser 
the number of legal systems that are classified under the new ―family or mixed 
systems‖, or indeed vice versa144.  
 
While the foregoing approaches make sense in terms of classification, they seem to 
neglect the imperativeness of ―historical development‖ and ―specific techniques of 
adjudication and legal doctrines‖ of the legal systems at stake, as Plessis suggests in 
relation to the University of Ottawa classification
145
. For instance, Egypt and Algeria 
are classified under the category of ―MIXED SYSTEMS OF CIVIL LAW AND 
MUSLIM LAW‖. Indeed, they are commonly mixed in the sense that their legal 
systems employ both Civil and Islamic Laws. However, the classification is abstract 
enough not to take into account issues such as economic development, the timing of 
privatisation, etc. Hence, this is to submit that one cannot categorize mixed legal 
systems around the globe without avoiding superficiality; otherwise a study as such 
would last for years. 
 
2.4 RECEPTIONS, HARMONIZATION AND TRANSPLANTATION 
OF LAWS: THE CASE OF THE EU AND EGYPT IN CONTEXT  
2.4.1 Evolution of the concept of harmonization 
―Borrowing‖, as Watson suggests, constitutes ―The most fruitful source of legal 
change‖. Harmonization or unification of laws indeed represents a form of legal 
borrowing in the sense that one legal system borrows a rule(s) from another. According 
to Boodman, ―harmonization, or the process of bringing about harmony, implies a state 
of consonance or accord; the combination or adaptation of parts, elements or related 
things, so as to form a consistent and orderly whole‖146. 
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The English etymology provides that ―the earliest sense of harmony arises in relation to 
music and refers to the combination of musical notes, so as to produce a pleasing 
effect‖. In other words, successful harmony is decided by the impact or result which the 
combination provides. Harmonization, in this sense, has three elements. First, it 
assumes the existence of a difference between the objects under consideration. Second, 
the constituents of harmonization concerned comprise a new and multifaceted ―musical 
sound‖. And, third, is that which relates to ―consonance‖. While some find the sound of 
harmonized music as pleasurable, others may not
147
. While the foregoing elements are 
initially concerned with harmonization of music, they still, to some extent, correspond 
to the process in law. Similar to the first element, harmonization of laws presupposes 
that the laws at stake are divergent in the first place. Second, when a legal system 
harmonizes its laws with another, this comprises a new and multifaceted set of rules. 
Third, harmonized laws may or may not be successful when converged. But how can 
legal harmonization precisely be defined? 
 
Harmonization of laws, according to David, signifies: ―Effectuating an understanding 
about the significance of certain concepts, on certain modes of rule formulation, and on 
the recognition of authoritative sources‖148. Goldring, on the other hand, explains 
harmonization as a process where ―the effects of a type of transaction in one legal 
system are brought as close as possible to the effects of similar transactions under the 
laws of other countries‖149. While the present study intends to consider both definitions, 
it will focus more on the latter. This is because Goldring‘s conception seems to endorse 
a functionalistic approach to comparative law in the sense of giving attention to the 
effects of the rules. 
 
2.4.2 Do Legal borrowing and legal transplants really exist? 
The success of legal borrowing and legal transplants is a debatable matter among 
comparative law scholars. To Watson, ―transplants‖ exist and are deemed a source of 
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utmost importance to the ―Western legal tradition‖150. Conversely, Legrand believes that 
―legal transplant‖ is not a likely event and thus, comparative lawyers should not waste 
their time analyzing them
151. This is because the meaning of a rule is only ―meaningful‖ 
to its culture. Hence, a ―meaningful ‗legal transplant‘ can only occur [...] when both the 
propositional statement as such and its invested meaning – which jointly constitute the 
rule – are transported from one culture to another‖152. Therefore, legal transplantation 
may be worthless if the culture of the country exporting the legal rule was not 
transferred (alongside the rule itself)
153
.  
 
Moreover, reformers often resort to copying the transplanted law (as it stands) either out 
of convenience or for actual efficiency purposes. This is similar to the situation where 
foreign scholars quote others rather than using their own wording. In fact, applying 
Legrand‘s argument in practice may denote that ―meaningful‖ transplants are more or 
less impossible. Plessis proposes a more realistic formula: ―The more foreign the new 
cultural environment (and especially legal culture), the greater the possibility that a rule 
will lose its meaning in such a new environment. But where the cultural conditions – 
and especially legal cultures – are similar, the argument that only a ‗meaningless form 
of words‘ is transplanted, loses force‖154.         
 
In fact, Plessis heavily criticises Legrand‘s notion of ‗meaningless form of words‘ in the 
sense that it assumes that law reformers in the importing country always resort to 
copying the law as it stands. He believes that the similarity of cultures is a matter of 
―degree‖ rather than ―absolutes‖. Hence, if ―cultural differences‖ are substantial, 
transplantation may not be straightforward. Interestingly, he argues that culture, similar 
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to rules, may be transplanted. This is based on the premise that ―culture is not genetic, 
and can be learnt‖155.  
   
2.4.3 Arguments countering transplants and receptions 
The notion of transplantation and reception of laws is subject to criticism. For instance, 
the prospect of transplantation/reception of foreign law encounters a patent challenge by 
legal positivists. This is premised on the belief that transplants and receptions generally 
undermine the concerned state‘s ―sovereign power‖ by simply responding to the 
prerequisites of the foreign law in question with no control thereof. Yet this argument 
may be countered on the grounds that the state may have found that, by transplanting 
foreign law, it would for instance, accelerate its economic development and will do so 
by its own will
156
. While some transplants proceed merely on the premise that the 
foreign transplanted law has ―proven itself elsewhere‖ (most probably in the country of 
origin) and with possibly no aftermath predictions and prospects, some other transplants 
may be an outcome of well-estimated results
157
.        
 
Moreover, it is often argued that transplantation/reception of foreign law may not 
adhere and correspond to the ―mores and culture‖ of the country considering it. Yet, this 
argument may be countered on the basis that the culture of a society represents only one 
of many factors that affect the substance of law
158
. Montesquieu is one of the 
challengers of transplantations and receptions. According to Secondat and Montesquieu, 
in an event where the rules of one country overlap with another, this may represent no 
more than ―a great coincidence‖. Yet, Graziadei believes that Montesquieu‘s argument 
on transplants is not well supported. Particularly, it does not seem to address the 
drawbacks of transplants, thus, it is merely a ―normative‖ argument rather than it is 
―descriptive‖ one159.     
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However, the early 19
th
 Century‘s prospects among scholars experienced a drift towards 
Montesquieu‘s philosophy, especially the one on the correlation between law and 
society carried out by Savigny. Yet again these studies were challenged for preventing 
their readers from looking at the ―reality around them‖. Later on, this led many to fade 
away from Montesquieu and Savigny‘s approach. One thought is that the culture of the 
society would tune itself to the transplanted foreign law
160
.     
 
2.4.4 The rationale behind receptions and transplants  
Receptions and transplants usually happen for a reason. Graziadei sets out the likely 
reasons that cause them. First, a foreign law may be imposed forcefully; second, a 
country may apply/transplant a foreign law for prestigious purposes; and finally, a 
country may apply/transplant a foreign law for economic development purposes. 
Pressure and ―military expansion by Islamic rulers‖ had its significant role in diffusing 
Islamic law in several regions. There are two forms of legal change in this respect: one 
is temporary and the other is infinite. In case of the former, the nation at stake would 
have the choice of whether or not to proceed with the foreign law. The latter occurs 
where the nation is forced to apply the foreign law due to ―permanent political or 
military control of the dominating power‖161. 
 
On other occasions, legal change takes place because the country at glance believes that 
it is prestigious to apply the foreign law in question. Inevitably, this presumes that such 
country considers the foreign law as ―superior‖. In fact, prestige resembles the first form 
of legal change ―dominance‖ in the sense that they are both accompanied by ―social 
stratification‖. The difference, however, between both is that while dominance may not 
provide an instant complementation to ―cultural models‖ due to the force used, in the 
case of prestige, such complementation element may be satisfied. Moreover, in contrast 
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with the latter, the former is primarily driven by the force of relevant rulers and, as such, 
may vanish accordingly
162
.        
   
Furthermore, as Graziadei stresses, it is indispensable for a research on legal transplants 
to tackle the correlation between ―economic performance‖ and ―legal institutions‖. The 
major controversy in this respect is whether the process of transplantation can enhance 
economic performance through guiding the transplanting country at stake to introduce 
―more efficient legal institutions‖. Some in fact submit that the process of 
transplantation often eases or leads to the emergence of ―efficient legal institutions‖. 
Indeed levelling the playing field of legal institutions may inherently reduce transaction 
costs
163
. While it is true that the adoption of economic policies with a view to economic 
development throughout the 20
th
 Century did not contemplate ―institutional settings‖ on 
the basis that the market would be capable of correcting itself, following some 
unsuccessful events, this viewpoint started fading away. In other words, there is now 
more focus on the institutional settings than was before
164
.                  
 
2.4.5 The receptivity of foreign law in Egypt: Comparing the past with the 
future 
 
The success of legal transplants usually rests on receptivity of the law in question in the 
transplanting state. ―Receptivity‖, according to Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards, is ―the 
country‘s ability to give meaning to the imported law‖. According to them, 
transplantation may appear in two forms: Transplantation due to ―occupation‖ and 
―voluntary‖ transplantation. Indeed, this classification is closely related to Graziadei‘s 
rationalizations in the sense that his first ‗imposition of law by force‘, on the one hand, 
is considered as transplantation for the purposes of occupation. On the other hand, 
Graziadei‘s second classification (for prestigious purposes) and third (for development 
purposes) are classified as voluntary transplantation. Receptivity varies according to the 
form of transplantation involved
165
.  
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Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards argue that when a country is involved with a ―voluntary 
transplant‖, this boosts receptivity, especially when that transplanting country 
formulates ―significant adaptation‖ to the transplanted country of origin‘s formal legal 
order in accordance with its national circumstances. In fact, they believe that ―changes 
in the transplanted rules or legal institutions‖ denote that the transplanting country is 
adapting the law to its own legal order. Furthermore, one sign of receptivity is the 
―familiarity with the legal system‖ (i.e. legal system of origin) from the part of the 
transplanting country. According to Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards, ―common legal 
history‖ between two or more countries may, moreover, produce good receptive 
transplants with minimal space for justifying adaptations
166
.  
 
Nonetheless Montesquieu argues that the laws of each country are closely related to the 
state‘s ―type of government, geography and climate as well as religion, history and 
culture‖. Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards, however, counter this argument by suggesting 
that nowadays this theme has changed. Many countries across the globe have 
―converged‖ with Western laws and traditions (whether in terms of constitution, 
commercial, civil etc.). They stress, however, that such convergence exists only in 
respect of the ―law on the books‖. It is inevitable that the practice will vary 
substantially; possibly depending on the level of development reached by the ―legal 
institutions‖ concerned by the application of the law167. Given the foregoing literature, 
several questions should be raised in relation to the present research. Was the French 
law receptive in Egypt? If so, how may this compare with the prospect of transplanting 
EU rules on competition? In other words, does it provide evidence that the reception of 
the EU rules in Egypt would necessarily be receptive, given that France is part of the 
EU?    
 
Egypt‘s reception of the French Code, on the one hand, is classified under Graziadei‘s 
first rationale: ‗The imposition of law by force‘ (or occupational according to 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards). The relationship between the EU and Egypt, on the 
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other hand, in the event where the latter opts for transplantation of the former‘s rules 
may be classified under Graziadei‘s third rationalisation: ‗Reform for the purpose of 
improving economic development‘ (or voluntary according to Berkowitz, Pistor and 
Richards). It may not be surprising, except for Berkowitz, Pistor and Richards, to 
submit that the reception of French Law in Egypt as of the early 1800s was receptive. In 
fact, the French influence on the Egyptian Legal System is present until today. For 
instance, Sanhuri, in his speech before the Senate Committee of Civil Code, indicated 
that the 1949 Civil Code (which is still nowadays applicable) has a French influence, 
aside of its Islamic law one. This may indeed imply that Egyptian practitioners, at the 
time, were able to give meaning to the French Law and transpose it to the following 
generation.  
 
However, this does not necessarily imply that Egypt‘s transplantation of EU rules on 
competition will be receptive for two reasons. First, the circumstances are 
unequivocally different nowadays. The gap pertaining to the level of development 
among nations has substantially increased. The EU occupies a major part of the 
developed world, while Egypt is still a developing country. More to the point, given the 
correlation between monopoly and economics, competition law is the kind of field that 
requires extensive knowledge on economics (i.e. economic expertise) – an area of 
expertise that the majority of the developing world seems to lack at this stage. That said, 
Montesquieu‘s argument on the inevitable link between law and its culture may not be 
the only obstacle, if at all, in the field of antitrust. In fact, it is the degree of economic 
expertise in Egypt (compared with the EU) that lies at the heart of this thesis‘s dilemma 
in relation to legal transplantation.  
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2.5 CONCLUSION  
The study of comparative law is helpful to this thesis. This is quite evident from the 
third part of this chapter on comparative methods. In fact, this part demonstrates that the 
study pertains to a comparable subject – one that may be usefully investigated, at the 
very least, given the common denominator that the EU and Egypt share: The EMAA. 
Moreover, the chapter demonstrates the importance of functionalism to the present 
study. This is particularly the case due to the likely gap between law in theory/books 
and in practice. Thus, it is vital not to rely merely on study the rules of both systems, but 
also to explore how they apply in similar circumstances – an aspect which connects 
with the common denominator factor in comparative studies.  
 
Furthermore, the present study will obtain a balance between similarities and 
differences rather than focussing on one or the other. This is because employing a 
functionalistic approach to comparative law inherently requires an investigation of 
similarities to some extent - given the argument observing that functionalism is 
primarily based on the praesumptio similitudinis. In fact, aside from the study of the 
influences of EU and Islamic rules on the Egyptian legal treatment of abuse of 
dominance in general (as will be discussed in chapter four), chapter five will investigate 
the similarities between the EU‘s approach to excessive pricing and that of South Africa 
with the objective of discerning the receptiveness of the former in the latter. 
Specifically, the outcome of this similarities study will arguably decide the 
receptiveness of the EU approach of excessive pricing in Egypt at this stage. That said 
investigating the similarities of legal systems remains as important as the differences.          
 
The success in receptivity of French Law (transplantation classified as the imposition of 
law by force) does not necessarily imply that the transplantation of EU rules (classified 
as reform for the purpose of improving economic development) would be receptive. This 
is notwithstanding that the latter category of transplantation would be voluntary in this 
case (given the arguable lack of legal transplantation obligation in the EMAA), while 
the reception of French Law was rather compulsory (or of an occupational nature). To 
conclude, the receptivity of French Law in Egypt is not an analogy for receptivity of EU 
rules on competition in Egypt, since the level of economic development (and in turn 
legislative development) of the EU surpasses Egypt. Not least, economic expertise plays 
  
62 
a vital role in competition-related dispute settlement. In this sense, the EU‘s legislative 
development may have potential institutional settings implications when it comes to 
transplanting EU rules in Egypt.    
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF THE 
ORIGINS AND VALUES OF EU AND EGYPTIAN 
COMPETITION LAWS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The enactment of competition law in the EU has been substantially influenced by the 
Ordoliberal principles and thought. The Ordoliberal framework emerged in Germany at 
a time when the market was substantially distorted by the use of economic power and 
cartels from well-established industries. Inevitably, the existence of social and economic 
inequality hastened the evolutionary process of the Ordoliberal agenda. However, the 
EU Commission‘s increasing desire to employ a more economic-based approach - since 
the millennium - may raise the debate over the continued influence of the Ordoliberal 
thought.  
 
The introduction of competition law in Egypt, on the other hand, was arguably 
influenced by the relevant Islamic law principles (―Shari‘ah‖). Particularly, the fact that 
monopoly in itself is strictly condemned and prohibited under Shari‘ah may have 
triggered the enactment of Egyptian Competition Law. It is imperative to understand the 
relevant Shari‘ah principles on monopoly and determine whether they are compatible 
with the application of Egyptian Competition Law. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the similarities and differences of EU and Egyptian Competition Law origins 
and values.  
 
The chapter is divided into three core parts. The first part will address the EU 
Competition Law‘s Ordoliberal origins and the arguable movement towards a more-
economic based approach. The second part will discuss Egyptian Competition Law‘s 
Islamic law origins and economic values. It will determine how Egypt values economics 
and whether or not the recent developments exemplify that it is moving in parallel with 
the EU or influenced by its approach. The third and final part will evaluate the 
differences of the EU origins and values with those of Egypt. This evaluation will be 
carried out in light of the comparative law methods set out in chapter two.     
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3.2 THE ORIGINS AND VALUES OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
3.2.1 Historical background of the evolution of the Freiburg and Austrian Schools: 
The road to Ordoliberalism and social market economy 
The road to Ordoliberal thought evolved through two different eras; the Weimar 
Republic era during the 1920s and the Nazis era during the 1930s in Germany. The 
Weimar Republic was established following World War One. However, many Germans 
were against its adoption on the basis that many of its leaders were to be held 
responsible for the Wilhelmine Reich‘s military defeat and consequential losses. This in 
turn led to the lack of credibility of both its laws and institutional structure. 
Consequently, the latter was perceived as a ―tool of power‖ rather than a credible 
―social institution‖168.  
 
In the same vein, the economy was not in its best form; given the abnormal inflation 
rates that prevailed up to the mid 1920s. The economy then collapsed in spite of some 
attempts to re-gain stability by the global depression in 1929.The German market was 
mostly ―cartelized‖. Local companies‘ preferred to agree among each other rather than 
to compete and – most likely – be driven out of the market. The cartelization of the 
market as such was strongly condemned by many German intellectuals. In fact, such 
form of market distortion forced a rapid change
169
.  
 
In 1933, the Nazis succeeded the Weimar Republic. The Nazi era traversed the 
evolution of the Freiburg School; thanks to the equilibrium of thoughts reached by 
economist Walter Eucken and lawyers Franz Böhm and Hanns Grossmann-Doerth who 
thoroughly re-considered the demise of the Weimar era and how to deal with it. They 
commonly observed that the lack of credibility of the laws and institutional structure led 
to the collapse of Germany at both the economic and political spheres. They, moreover, 
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found that the major concern was that individual freedoms were substantially impeded 
by the exploitation of economic power
170
. 
 
Given Germany‘s increasingly cartelized market – even during the post-Second World 
War era; and whilst the U.S. Government imposed a condition of withdrawal of its 
military provided the adoption of an ―economic policy‖, the Freiburg‘s initiative of the 
protection of individual freedoms notably shone. Such anti-nazism initiatives were 
compatible with the U.S.‘s pre-requisites of withdrawal171. Americans sought to impose 
a policy that would decartelize the German economy. In this sense, the objective was to 
substitute the ―Organized Capitalism‖ which prevailed during the 1920s by a capitalism 
that is free from misuse of economic power and influence of concerned ―interest 
groups‖172.                          
 
Although views of the Freiburg‘s intellectuals varied when it came to detail, they 
seemed to overlap from the very broad perspective. This equilibrium of thought was 
known as ―Ordoliberalism‖173. In this respect, it is worth highlighting some of the 
imperative approaches that generally prevailed at the time. One of the ideas that were 
found by economist Alfred Muller-Armack and adhered to thereafter by the German 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, was that of ―Social Market Economy‖ 
(‗SME‘). Founded in 1947, the SME consists of ―economic‖ and ―political orders‖ that 
are premised on the precepts of ―market economy‖. This is accompanied by 
―institutionalized‖ ―social complements‖ situated to prevent the likely restrictive 
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impacts of a ―free market economy‖ whilst enriched by a ―legislative‖ mechanism that 
is capable to combat misuses of economic power
174
. 
  
The framework of the SME derived first and foremost from the experience gained from 
the ―industrialization process‖ in Germany. The objective of the SME was to benefit 
from the efficiency in the market in a manner that safeguards ‗individual freedom‘ that 
was hindered throughout the Weimar era. Adherers to the SME coincided with the 
views of Ordoliberals; particularly with regards to the need to adopt an economic 
policy
175
. Another interesting approach was that of Friedrich Von Hayek of the Austrian 
School. Hayek‘s thoughts overlapped with those of Eucken in respect of the need to 
protect the process of free competition and in relation to the ―interdependence of 
orders‖ (―Ordnungen‖), but diverged regarding state intervention. More specifically, 
Hayek suggested that the government should not intervene in the competitive process 
based on the assumption that the market would maintain itself; what is also named as 
―spontaneous order‖ – an order that need not be formed by a ―central authority‖176. This 
was often known as ―pure‖ or ―classical‖ liberalism177.   
 
According to Hayek, market competition is construed as a data system that synchronises 
―dispersed knowledge‖ through the instrument of prices. Competition in the Hayekian 
view is deemed as a ―discovery procedure‖. Barry concisely explains Hayek‘s theory: 
―The market is not merely an allocative device, by which factors are assigned to their 
most important uses, it is a discovery procedure through which economic agents try out 
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new techniques, experiment with different use of resources and exploit new 
opportunities‖178. Hence, the difference between Eucken and Hayek is that the former 
deemed ―dispersed knowledge‖ the key role of market competition; while the latter 
perceived ―power‖ as the major concern that ought to be tackled (i.e. misuse of 
economic power whether by individuals, states or interest groups). Thus, Eucken, along 
with Böhm, aimed at tackling such power in order to secure ‗individual freedom‘. He 
strongly criticised Hayek‘s self-corrective approach of the market; claiming that it may 
undermine the competitive order
179
.         
 
3.2.2 Objectives of the Ordoliberal framework 
The circumstances during the Weimar and Nazi eras were certainly not ideal neither in 
terms of economic nor political awareness. It was on this basis that Ordoliberals opted 
for a new beginning – one that would develop on its former framework. In other words, 
as Gerber writes, Ordoliberals sought to discourage the previous approaches of society 
and instead suggest a ―third way‖ that balances between ―democracy‖ and 
―socialism‖180. More specifically, the Ordoliberal framework seemed to highly prioritize 
―humanist values‖ over ―efficiency‖ and other economic considerations. Hence, it 
would make sense to suggest that Ordoliberals sought to adopt a framework that would 
generate a liberal awareness of the values of having a ―humane‖ culture that would 
ensure that individual freedoms are protected from any impediments
181
.  
 
Furthermore, Ordoliberals gave considerable attention to the function of an economy. 
They argued in favour of the indispensability of competition to the society and the vital 
link between economic and political freedoms. In essence, they believe that 
governmental intervention is not the only risk for distorting individual freedoms. The 
risk might also mount from other individual powers – a matter which they had 
experienced throughout the Weimar and Nazis eras
182
.   
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Ordoliberals, further, stressed the importance of achieving ―social‖ aims. According to 
Eucken, ―social security‖ and ―social justice‖ are contemplated as: ―The greatest 
concerns of our time‖. In fact, some believed that social welfare might be improved if 
the market is free from any interventions on the basis that this latter cause would 
automatically advance economic development. Ordoliberals such as Eucken and Böhm, 
on the other hand, took a much more liberal approach to justice than this latter. They 
argue that for a market to attain justice, it must ensure that the overall society equally 
participate in the market. In fact, this closely links to their notion of ―strong state‖ 
whereby all laws and regulations are to be equally followed
183
. Ordoliberals, 
furthermore, perceived that competition leads to economic development that would in 
turn maintain ―political‖, ―humanist‖ and ―social justice‖ considerations. This, however, 
cannot be accomplished, as they argue, without having an ―economic order‖ to which its 
core objective is to maintain competition
184
.                            
 
3.2.3 Understanding the function of economic constitution and competition law 
within the Ordoliberal framework 
The method to tackle the misuse of economic power and protect ‗individual freedom‘ 
and other fundamental rights, to Ordoliberals, is the adoption of an economic 
constitution that complements political constitution. Such constitution ought to 
recognize a ―competition order‖ that complies with the rule of law (―Rechtstaat‖) 
through disciplining ―private‖ and ―public economic powers‖. In fact, it is worth 
mentioning in this respect that what distinguishes Ordoliberals from the Hayekian 
approach (as well as the ―laissez-faire‖ of Adam Smith) is that the former declares 
private economic power as the main risk for distorting ‗individual freedom‘, while the 
latter primarily deems public power as the major peril
185
.            
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According to Ordoliberals, the effectiveness of an economic constitution very much 
rests on whether or not the legal system adheres to it in terms of structure of laws and 
regulations. To put this more into perspective, as Gerber clarifies, ―when a political unit 
chose a transaction economy in its economic constitution, for example, that choice 
required the development of governmental policies designed to create and maintain that 
system‖. This is what Ordoliberals named as ―Ordnungspolitik‖ or an ―order-based 
policy‖186. Eucken formed the notion of Ordnungspolitik during the closing phases of 
the Weimar Republic. Given the substantial degree of market concentration 
accompanied by the rising role of ‗interest groups‘ in the market, Eucken was negative 
about the success of a competitive order to the extent that he described the role of the 
government during the mentioned era as a ―play ball (spielball)‖ of interest groups. 
Thus, Eucken sought for ―small but strong government‖ that would provide least but 
valuable intervention that is free of any interest groups‘ pressures187.            
 
More specifically, in the context of competition, this process is straightforward. In the 
event where economic constitution provides for a ―transaction economy‖, the 
Ordnungspolitik would subsequently requisite the legal system to be shaped accordingly 
in order to adopt the form of ―complete competition‖188. According to Ordoliberals, this 
would ensure an effective execution of the economic system
189
. Nevertheless, attaining 
the objectives of a transaction economy per se remains conditional to satisfaction of 
some pre-requisites in relation to the role of the government. More specifically, the 
Ordnungspolitik is not meant to enable the government to intervene or be involved in 
the economy freely or in a discretionary manner. The role of the government is merely 
to enforce rules of the economic constitution and its involvement in the economy would 
strictly be limited to the implementation of these rules
190
.              
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Endeavours pertaining to the initiative to protect the process of competition were under 
contemplation since the last decade of the 1800s
191
. However, these attempts eventually 
collapsed. What followed was cartel legislation during the early 1920s in some of the 
European countries (including Germany)
192
. Yet this legislation focussed more on 
cartels and the imposition of ―administrative controls‖ rather than the idea of protecting 
competition in itself
193
. Ordoliberals expressed some reservations in relation to this 
initiative – not merely because of its focus on cartels but rather due to the conceivable 
outcome of empowering an ―executive branch‖ to monitor and control cartels; given the 
likelihood of influencing the power of such branch from ‗interest groups‘ at the time194. 
This in turn leads to the questions of: what is the conception of competition in 
Ordoliberal thought? How would competition law operate under such system?   
 
In a comprehensively explained manner, ―competition policy [according to 
Ordoliberals] serves to protect the evolutionary process of competition as such, and to 
prevent the concentration of private power to the detriment of the competitive and the 
political processes. Consequently, competition constitutes a value in its own right, 
which goes well beyond efficiency considerations. In this view, the economic 
constitution serves, first, to guarantee the basic equality of individuals as economic 
subjects; second, to back up the private law society by public authority; and third, to 
protect civil liberties‖195. This signifies that protecting the process of competition is not 
the ultimate objective of Ordoliberals, but is a process through which one may secure 
―equality of individuals‖ and safeguard ―civil liabilities‖196. Given the rising use of 
economic power and cartels, as history has shown in the Weimar era, Ordoliberals 
perceived that competition law would stand as a tool for prevention of the ―degeneration 
of the competitive process‖. They believed that the idea of ―complete competition‖ 
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would set out the precepts that would then be applied by an ―independent monopoly 
office‖. In fact, this demonstrates a clear adherence to the idea of Ordnungspolitik, as 
Gerber suggests
197
.  
 
The model of ‗complete competition‘ as such – besides the application of competition 
law – would avoid acquiring monopoly powers, eliminate present ones, or, where this is 
deemed unlikely, maintain some sort of control towards them. According to 
Ordoliberals, there are two categories of monopoly to which competition law should 
aim to combat. First, the market power acquired through agreements between 
competitors i.e. cartels – a position which widely existed during the Weimar era. And 
second, monopoly power acquired by a ―single firm‖. While the prohibition of 
monopoly power through agreements is more or less straightforward to Ordoliberals, 
prohibiting ‗single firm‘ monopoly requires the failure to satisfy a specific standard. 
According to Ordoliberals, firms which have economic power are required to behave 
―as if they were subject to competition‖, or, in other words, behave ‗as if‘ they did not 
have economic power. As Gerber stresses, the Ordoliberal rationale behind the ―as if‖ 
standard is twofold. It is to avoid the likely detrimental effects from ―private economic 
power and state intervention‖198. 
 
In another interesting model, Nipperdey, while enforcing the German law combating 
―unfair competition‖, considered the importance of comparing ―performance 
competition (Leistungwettbewerb)‖ and ―impediment competition 
(Behinderungswettbewerb)‖ – a comparison which Ordoliberals were aware of its 
essence to their own model. ‗Performance competition‘ is a practice which makes the 
product ―more attractive to consumers‖. This may be the case by either enhancing the 
product itself or by reducing its price. ‗Impediment competition‘, on the other hand, is a 
practice which distorts the ability of competitors to ―perform‖199. Ordoliberals believe 
that ‗performance competition‘ represents their ideal competition model where a firm 
would be capable of profiting from its practice. ‗Impediment competition‘, on the 
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opposed hand, would contradict with their competition model by driving competitors 
out of the market – the form of conduct that should be prohibited. In fact, one may 
submit that the ―as if‖ standard seeks to prevent such form of conduct200.  
   
3.2.4 The influential role of Ordoliberals in Europe 
Having adopted their own principles, the concern of Ordoliberals switched to the 
question of how to enforce these principles in Europe
201
. Remarkably, the influence of 
Ordoliberalism was reflected from the process of ―European unification‖. For instance, 
the German representative, Walter Hallstein, was the first European Competition 
Commissioner, aside of being one of the founders of the European Communities. He 
was initially linked to Ordoliberalism since the 1940s and more or less upheld Eucken‘s 
thoughts. Hallstein‘s views on legal matters, in general, were consistent with the 
Ordoliberal theme
202
. A further key person closely linked to Ordoliberalism whilst 
being involved in such process was Hans Von Der Groeben. He was one of the key 
drafters of the ―Spaak Report‖ of 1956. As a draft that constituted the premise of the 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the ‗Spaak 
Report‘ addressed the aspects of cartels and abuse of dominance under a part entitled 
―monopolies‖. Although the ‗Spaak Report‘ did not comprise a precise shape of future 
competition rules, it predicted their general theme
203
. 
  
                                                          
 
200
 Gerber (1994), op.cit., p.53; Akman, P. (2009), op.cit., pp.274-275 
201
 This includes Germany where Ordoliberals significantly influenced its Law against Restraints on 
Competition (GWB) that was introduced in 1957 after gaining support from the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU). For further detail on the inspiration of Ordoliberalism on German Competition Law, see 
Feldenkirchen, W. (1992) ―Competition Policy in Germany‖ 21(2), Business and Economic History, 
Business History Conference     
202
 Gerber (1994), op.cit., pp.71; Giocoli, N. (2009) op.cit., p.776 
203
 It also provided that these rules shall be applicable in member states and have supremacy over national 
laws. In addition, it provided that these rules shall be construed by the Commission. The EU court will 
have the role of building on them by adopting new rules and principles through case law. The latter 
exemplifies how EU law leans more to common law traditions that value case law – in contrast with civil 
law traditions like Egypt, which perceives legislation as the main source of law. See Schweitzer, H. 
(2007) ―Parallels and Differences in the Attitudes towards Single-Firm Conduct: What are the Reasons? 
– The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC‖ EUI 
Working Paper LAW No. 2007/32, available from: 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093248) accessed 21-7-2010, p.10; Akman, P. 
(2009) ―Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC‖ 29(2), Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
pp.277-282  
  
74 
The formulation of competition rules of the Treaty of Rome was subject to intense 
debate among member states. The controversy was primarily confined to two directions; 
German and French. The former delegation that included Groeben stressed the necessity 
to adopt a ―common market‖ that is premised on the precepts of ―market economy‖. 
The latter‘s delegation adopted an approach that leaned towards a higher degree of 
involvement of member states in the ‗common market‘; although they seemed to have 
upheld the German approach of adopting a ―market economy‖. The debate that further 
arose between the two delegations was whether to prohibit both anti-competitive 
agreements and abuse of dominance under a single provision with a general exemption 
rule that is applicable to both, or, otherwise prohibit them under separate provisions. 
While the French delegation favoured the former approach, the German delegation 
proposed the latter one
204
.  
 
However, the German approach prevailed and the two prohibitions featured separately 
under Articles 85 and 86 EEC (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). In fact, some argue 
that these provisions were drafted under Ordoliberal influence since some Ordoliberal 
figures (as identified above) were among the founders of the European Communities
205
.     
The questions that should then be raised for the purposes of this chapter: what is the role 
of competition in the EU? Does it reflect Ordoliberal views and objectives? Is it any 
different nowadays since the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU and the consolidated version of 
the TEU) came into force in December 2009 than it was in the past?
206
       
 
Competition was contemplated as a core objective of the EU by virtue of Article 3(1)(g) 
EC [originally Article 3(f) EEC]. Particularly, it provided: ―A system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted‖. Article 3(1)(g) as such deemed 
competition an integral goal of the Community (now Union) to the extent that it was 
                                                          
 
204
Schweitzer, H. (2007), op.cit., pp.10-13; Akman, P. (2009), op.cit., pp.283-285 
205
 See Gerber, D. J. (1987) ―Law and the Abuse of Economic Power in Europe‖ (62), Tulane Law 
Review, Tulane University Law School, p.85 
206
 However, the Ordoliberal influence was not merely confined to the drafting process of the Treaty of 
Rome, but had also (arguably) extended to the application of Article 102 TFEU on some occasions. This 
will be explored in greater detail in parts 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2.1 (chapter four). However, the argument that 
will develop later on in the present chapter is that the Ordoliberal influence is starting to fade away. This 
argument will be further reflected in part 4.5.1 (chapter four).        
  
75 
often cited in practice
207
. Moreover, Article 4(1) EC (now Article 119 TFEU) further 
stressed the significance of competition by providing that economic policies within the 
[EU] shall be carried out ―in accordance with the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition‖208.  
 
According to Giocoli, the need to protect competition as an objective stipulated under 
the original Article 3(f) EEC as such reflected the influence of Ordoliberalism on the 
drafting process of the EEC Treaty
209
. In contrast with this view, Akman and Kassim 
seem to argue that since Ordoliberals seek to protect competitors, and particularly, their 
individual freedoms, rather than the process of competition, the treatment of 
Competition Policy within the EU is not of Ordoliberal influence. They suggest, instead, 
that drafters of the EEC Treaty favoured economic efficiency
210
. For instance, the fact 
that Article 86 EEC (now Article 102 TFEU) does not prohibit the ―accumulation of 
power‖ (i.e. dominance in itself) but rather the abuse of such position entails that 
drafters were in favour of ―increasing efficiency‖211. 
 
However, the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) modified the position of 
competition to the extent that some may doubt on the continued contemplation of 
competition as one of the objectives of the EU. Particularly, with the persistence of 
Sarkozy‘s French government, Article 3(1)(g) EC was removed from the EU‘s new and 
consolidated Treaties (TFEU and TEU respectively). Arguably, nonetheless, Protocol 
27 on the Internal Market and Competition provides a parallel stipulation by stating 
that: 
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―THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
CONSIDERING that the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted,  
HAVING AGREED that:  
To this end, the Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions of the 
Treaties, including under Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union‖212. 
 
However, as Jones and Sufrin note, it may still be too early to decide on whether or not 
the omission of Article 3(1)(g) EC will change the role of competition in the EU. The 
first impression, nevertheless, is that competition will remain as one of the objective of 
the EU - even though its role was moved to Protocol 27. This is essentially based on 
two grounds. First, Protocol 27 still upholds competition as one of the objectives of the 
EU; given that Article 352 TFEU (ex. 308 EC) indicates that the Union may, if 
necessary, proceed ―to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties‖213. Moreover, 
Article 51 TEU stipulates that Protocols of EU Treaties: ―Shall form an integral part 
thereof‖214. This signifies that Protocols and Annexes are equated with Treaty 
provisions in terms of importance. 
    
Aside from the foregoing, Article 3(3) TEU provides an important characterisation of 
the internal market. According to Article 3(3), ―The Union shall establish an internal 
market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment [...]‖. This stipulation seems to uphold 
the Ordoliberals‘ emphasis on SME. Indeed, as noted above, it may still be too soon to 
decide on how Article 3(3) will be applied and whether or not it will reflect the 
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philosophy of Ordoliberals
215
. That aside, some, however, doubt on the continued 
influence of such philosophy since the post-Millennium era.   
 
For instance, Gerber believes that the Ordoliberal themes become more and more 
―outdated‖ over time. He argues that these insights initially emerged to combat an 
―extra-ordinary situation‖ i.e. the highly cartelized German market during the Weimar 
era‘s predicaments. It is only a minority of new generations who share similar 
mentalities to those of the first quarter of the last decade in Germany. Thus, addressing 
and imposing the Ordoliberal discipline to the majority of modern society may be 
worthless, aside of causing a sense of unfamiliarity among them. This is apart from the 
increasing lack of confidence and belief in Ordoliberal themes – especially those linking 
―economic structures‖ with ―human values‖216. 
 
Moreover, the Ordoliberal thought is beginning to fade away from the ―economic 
reality‖ of nowadays. In fact, it is only the minority of well-established markets that 
represent the competition model which Ordoliberals aim to achieve. This is to submit 
that the idea of ―complete competition‖ is relatively farfetched nowadays. This is in 
addition to the fact that Ordoliberals assumed that competition would only derive from 
national competitors and hence, stressed on the observation that ―economic power‖ 
would lead to detrimental outcomes. Nowadays, it is not as vital to focus on such 
observation on the basis of likely ―international competition‖. In the same vein, sceptic 
views are expressed over the Ordoliberal vision of government intervention. It is 
nowadays far from hard to believe that laws and regulations are sufficient to prevent the 
necessity of governmental interventions
217
. 
 
The Commission is nowadays shifting from a per se approach in relation to the 
implementation of Article 102 TFEU to an effects-based approach
218
 – an approach that 
provides a higher degree of discretion than what Ordoliberals argue in favour of. The 
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per se approach employed by the EU‘s investigating authorities was criticized by the 
Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (‗EAGCP‘) in 2005. The EAGCP 
argues in favour of an effects-based approach to Article 102 TFEU
219
. The question that 
should be raised in this respect: what does an effects-based approach entail? What is the 
difference between such approach and a rule of reason test? Do the EU and Egyptian 
approaches vary in this respect?  
 
3.2.5 Conceptualizing European and Egyptian rule of reason
220 
At the very outset, it is important to draw a distinction between two forms of legal 
treatment of practices/agreements. First, where the practice inherently generates anti-
competitive effects in manner that need not require further analysis – hence declared 
―illegal per se‖. Put differently, these practices are subject to per se approach221. And 
second, where the ―competitive effects‖ of the practice or agreement may not be 
discerned except through analysis of its effects. Whether the practice is classified under 
the first or the second form, the objective, as Steindorff writes, is to shape a judgment 
that outlines the ―competitive‖ consequences of such practice. It is neither to determine 
whether a ―policy‖ supporting competition is in the ―public interest‖, nor is it in favour 
of ―members‖ of the ―industry‖. In this sense, judgements (and indeed competition 
authorities‘ decisions) are not intended to identify whether competition in general is 
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―good‖ or ―bad‖ for the market – as this is usually the role of policy-makers. The 
inquiry rather rests at the heart of the competitive effects of the practices at stake
222
. 
 
Patently, the present debate is only confined to the second classification. However, such 
debate is not straightforward. In fact, some seem to confuse between a rule of reason 
test and a mere effects-based approach (or imply that they are identical notions)
223
 
although the two approaches (arguably) vary in terms of process. In general terms, 
while the former test involves balancing between anti-competitive and pro-competitive 
effects of the agreement/practice; the latter inquires about whether the practice at stake 
harms (or is likely to harm) competition and consumer welfare
224
, and if so, whether it 
may be objectively justified
225
. This signifies that, unlike a rule of reason test, the 
practice may not be prohibited not merely because pro-competitive effects outweigh 
anti-competitive ones; but rather because the incumbent(s) was able to provide an 
objective justification for its practice.  
 
A further (arguable) difference lies in the burden of proof. In the case of rule of reason, 
it is up to competition authorities to prove that the practice‘s anti-competitive effects 
outweigh its pro-competitive ones. In relation to objective justification, while the 
burden of proof tends to lie on the competition authority (or claimant) to initially prove 
that the incumbent‘s practice is anti-competitive, it is up to the latter to provide an 
objective justification for its practice. Notwithstanding these differences, it should be 
stressed that the two approaches (generally speaking), on some occasions, are likely to 
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reach similar conclusions: the practice at glance may not be prohibited even though it 
was committed and may have produced some anti-competitive effects. This indeed 
contrasts with a per se approach where the practice is prohibited once detected i.e. no 
need to investigate effects.         
 
However, it must be stressed that the debate over whether or not rule of reason is (or 
should be) followed under EU and Egyptian Competition Laws seems to merely be 
confined to agreements restrictive of competition (i.e. it does not seem to extend to 
abuse of dominance – as will be discussed below)226. Nonetheless, it is highly 
controversial whether Article 101 TFEU – and precisely 101(1) - tolerates a rule of 
reason approach in the first place. In fact, there exists no unequivocal conceptual 
underpinning to this approach under EU Competition Law in general. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, in National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. U.S., referring to Mitchel 
v. Reynolds, suggested that what distinguishes rule of reason in Europe from that in the 
U.S. is that European Courts are not led by ―any legal tradition‖, as is the case with 
respect to the U.S. where such notion ―has remained constant‖. This is to say, in other 
words, that understanding rule of reason in Europe is like sailing in ―unknown waters‖, 
as Steindorff describes
227
. That said, while some argue that investigating authorities 
employ a rule of reason approach (or should employ) under Article 101(1); others, on 
the opposed hand, argue that this is not the case.              
 
                                                          
 
226
 However, this is in exception to horizontal agreements (agreements between competitors) in Egypt 
where Articles 6 of Law No. 3/2005 and 10 and 11 of its Executive Regulations do not stipulate any 
criteria on effects of the agreement which, in turn, implies that they require the investigator to follow a 
per se approach – as Article 12 of the Executive Regulations does in relation to vertical agreements (as 
will be highlighted below). See for instance, Report of the Egyptian Competition Authority on the Cement 
Market; Judgement of the Egyptian Court of First Instance on Misdemeanours Nasr City (2900/2008) 
August 25, 2008; Appeal in East Cairo (22622/2008). Former Executive Director of the Egyptian 
Competition Authority also confirmed this understanding. See Attia, K. (2009) ―Introducing Competition 
Law and Policy - The Case of Egypt‖ (1), Mediterranean Competition Bulletin, available from: 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/mediterranean/mcb_1.pdf) pp.15-16.  
In contrast with this, however, it will be argued that silence in relation to the approach of some of the 
abusive practices stipulated under Article 8 of Law No. 3/2005 does not necessarily imply a per se 
prohibition. This will be discussed briefly below in the present part and in further detail in part 4.5.2 
(chapter four).      
227
 National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679 (1978), p.688, as cited by Steindorff, F. 
(1984) ―Article 85 and the Rule of Reason‖ (21), Common Market Law Review, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp.639-640 
  
81 
The Commission, in its White Paper on Modernisation of the rules implementing 
Articles [101 and 102 of the TFEU]; commenting on the way Article 101 is structured, 
stated that: ―It would in a way mean interpreting Article [101(1)] as incorporating a 
"rule of reason"‖228. It added that ―If more systematic use were made under Article 
[101(1)] of an analysis of the pro and anti-competitive aspects of a restrictive 
agreement, Article [101(3)] would be cast aside, whereas any such change could be 
made only through revision of the Treaty. It would at the very least be paradoxical to 
cast aside Article [101(3)] when that provision in fact contains all the elements of a 
"rule of reason"
229
. This implies that the Commission refuses to employ a rule of reason 
approach within the context of Article 101(1) TFEU largely because it does not feel the 
need to do so – given the conceivability that the agreement at stake may be exempted 
under Article 101(3)
230
. 
 
In fact, the Commission‘s view (above-mentioned) seems to overlap with the insights of 
EU Courts. Commenting on the process of weighing anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects, the General Court (‗GC‘), in Metropole and Others v. Commission 
– where the agreement‘s impact was to disallow market access to other broadcasters - 
stated that: ―[Article 101(3)] would lose much of its effectiveness if such an 
examination had to be carried out already under [Article 101(1) TFEU]‖. It added that 
the fact that Courts have been ―more flexible‖ in construing Article 101(1) in the past 
does not in itself entail that they have employed a ―rule of reason‖ approach. On the 
contrary: It contended that the flexibility in judgments exemplify that decisions are 
based on an in-depth analysis rather than an abstract one. That said, the GC importantly 
stated that the Commission: ―Was not obliged to weigh the pro and anti-competitive 
effects of those agreements outside the specific framework of [Article 101(3) TFEU]‖. 
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As such, the GC made clear its intention not to consider a rule of reason analysis 
(defined in pro/anti-competitive effects balancing) under Article 101(1)
231
.  
 
In a more controversial case, the CoJ in Wouters v Algemene Raad Van De 
Netherlandse Orde Van Advocaten (‗Wouters‘) suggested that not every restriction of 
the ―freedom of action‖ of one of the parties to the agreement would essentially fall 
within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU and that the whole context of the agreement in 
question should be taken into consideration. It added that: ―Account must be taken of 
[the agreement‘s] objectives, which are to be connected with the need to make rules 
relating to organizations, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability, in 
order to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound 
administration of justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to 
integrity and experience […] It has then to be considered whether the consequential 
effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives‖232.  
 
The CoJ also stated that the rule at stake would not fall within the scope of Article 
101(1) TFEU if it were vital for ensuring that the legal profession is practised properly. 
That said; it is undisputable that the CoJ took into account the ‗legal profession‘ - a non-
competition concern - and balanced it with the restrictiveness of competition – a 
competition concern - in light of the impact on consumers of legal services. Albeit 
restrictive of competition, the CoJ gave preference to the ‗non-competition concern‘ to 
ensure that the legal profession is undertaken in the correct way and in the benefits of 
consumers
233
. The fact that the CoJ declared Article 101(1) as inapplicable without 
considering the exemption under Article 101(3) – though the practice was restrictive of 
competition – raised the controversy over whether or not a rule of reason was employed.     
 
According to Monti, the CoJ in Wouters seems to draw on the Reisburo Broede case
234
 
where it was held that a non-discriminatory German rule of legal profession, though fell 
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within the scope of Article 56 TFEU on the freedom of services, was justified by public 
interest – often named by some as ―rule of reason‖. This so-called ―European rule of 
reason‖ was applied within the context of Article 101 in Wouters where paragraph 1 
was declared as inapplicable, notwithstanding the unequivocal restriction on 
competition. This approach exemplifies that anti-competitive agreements that protect a 
national ―public policy‖ concern may be used as a tool to evade the restriction under 
Article 101(1)
235
. This signifies that European rule of reason denotes balancing 
between competition and non-competition concerns and, as a result, favouring one over 
the other depending on which concern outweighs the other; all of which to be made 
within the context of Article 101(1) TFEU.                    
 
The conception of Egyptian rule of reason, on the other hand, seems to be fairly more 
straightforward. Article 7 of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits anti-competitive vertical 
agreements (i.e. agreements between a producer and distributor or retailer) based on a 
―rule of reason‖ approach236. Article 12 of the Executive Regulations sets out a four-
tiered test as follows: 
 
1. ―The effect of the agreement or contract on the freedom of competition in the 
market; 
2. The existence of benefits accrued to the consumer from the agreement or 
contract; 
3. The considerations of preserving the quality of the product, its reputation, 
safety, and security requirements, in a manner that do not harm competition, 
and; 
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4. The extent of compliance of the conditions of the agreement or the contract with 
established commercial customs in the activity subject to examination‖237.  
 
The Egyptian legislator as such seems to have favoured a rule of reason approach to 
suspected anti-competitive vertical agreements over an exemption mechanism. 
Particularly, the first two steps of the above test provide the ECA and Courts to weigh 
the agreement‘s anti-competitive effects with its pro-competitive benefits. The third 
step, in essence, analyses the benefits that may be passed on to consumers; while the 
fourth step relates to the compatibility of the agreement at stake with commercial 
customs. The Egyptian rule of reason as such seems to somehow borrow from the U.S. 
rule of reason. Particularly, the Egyptian legislator appears to have borrowed Justice 
Brandeis‘s approach in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S. where it was held that 
anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects should be balanced in pursuit of the ‗net‘ 
competitive effect
238
. 
 
The EU system, on the opposed hand, adopts an exemption mechanism. Exemptions are 
classified under two categories. First, block exemptions, and; second, individual 
exemptions within the scope of Article 101(3) TFEU. If the vertical agreement in 
question does not satisfy prerequisites of the (new) 2010 Block Exemption Regulation 
(‗BER‘)239, it may still have the chance to be exempted individually by virtue of the 
exceptions provided under Article 101(3) – if it is caught under Article 101(1)240. 
However, exempting agreements through an exemption mechanism does not mean that 
investigating authorities do not analyse the effects of vertical agreements. On the 
contrary, the CoJ, in Javiso v. Yves St. Laurent regarding an export ban that was 
imposed on distributors in both Russia and Ukraine, did not find the agreement as 
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restrictive of competition by object and instead analysed its effects
241
. In 
GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission, the GC, following an analysis of effects, indicated that 
the indirect export ban at stake did not affect competition
242
. However, the CoJ, later on, 
overruled this decision and held that the agreement at stake was restrictive of 
competition by object and indicated that, in principle, agreements that are aimed at 
restricting or limiting parallel trade have as their object the prevention of competition
243
.               
 
The debate over the approach of analysis of abuse of dominance, on the other hand, 
does not involve rule of reason (or a separate provision for exemption) neither under 
European nor Egyptian Competition Laws. The controversy rather rests on whether or 
not an effects-based approach is applicable. Shortly following the EAGCP‘s 
consultation paper, or perhaps as a positive response to it, in its Discussion Paper on the 
Application of Article 82 EC to Exclusionary Abuses (‗Discussion Paper‘), the EU 
Commission implied the need for an effects-based approach within the context of 
Article 102 TFEU – although the latter adopted a much more rigorous approach244. It 
particularly stated that: ―The central concern of Article [102] with regard to 
exclusionary abuses is thus foreclosure that hinders competition and thereby harms 
consumers‖245. This means that foreclosure and consumer harm lies at the heart of the 
Commission‘s priorities within the application of Article 102.  
 
Moreover, the EU Commission, in its Guidance on the Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings 
(‗Guidance‘), stressed that its objective is to: ―Ensure that dominant undertakings do not 
impair effective competition by foreclosing their competitors in an anti-competitive 
way, thus having an adverse impact on consumer welfare [...]‖. Particularly, the 
Commission appears to contemplate ―anti-competitive‖ foreclosure as analogy for 
intervention. But what is anti-competitive foreclosure? The Commission indicated that 
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it occurs when the exclusion of competitors may enable the incumbent to profitably 
increase prices in a manner that harms consumers. In this sense, as Jones and Sufrin 
note, anti-competitive foreclosure is analysed by investigating two factors: first, the 
exclusion of actual or potential competitors, and; second, the detrimental effects on 
consumers
246
.  
 
Furthermore, despite Article 102 TFEU does not contain a third paragraph addressing 
criteria for exemption on the basis of efficiency, as Article 101 does have [101(3)], this 
may not exclude the possibility that a dominant firm may defend its practice through an 
objective justification. However, defending a conduct that is believed to be abusive by 
investigating authorities is by no means easy. In fact, Advocate-General (‗AG‘) Jacobs 
in Syfait stated that: ―The very fact that conduct is characterised as an ‗abuse‘ suggests 
that a negative conclusions has already been reached‖. To this end, some would 
reasonably doubt on whether or not abusive practices are justifiable in the first place. 
Perhaps a more precise entailment of objective justification, according to O‘Donoghue 
and Padilla, could be that: ―Certain types of conduct on the part of a dominant 
undertaking do not fall within the category of abuse at all‖247.         
 
In fact, it is argued that the defence of objective justification lacks clarity and that the 
case law provides no more than a puzzling perspective of its scope
248
. The GC, in 
Atlantic Container Lines, indicated that the scope of objective justification is slim and 
that its aim is merely to: ―Enable a dominant undertaking to show not that the practices 
in question should be permitted because they confer certain advantages, but only that 
the purpose of those practices is reasonably to protect its commercial interests in the 
face of action taken by certain third parties and that they do not therefore in fact 
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constitute an abuse‖. This signifies, according to O‘Donoghue and Padilla, that 
investigating authorities would be concerned with the defensive methods developed by 
the dominant firm in question. Nonetheless, they argue that the investigator is not only 
concerned with these methods, but also with the circumstances of the case at stake
249
.            
 
The Egyptian Competition Law regime, on the other hand, does not seem employ a 
consistent approach for appraisal of abusive practices stipulated under Article 8 of Law 
No. 3/2005. While Article 13 of the Executive Regulations provides for an effects-based 
approach to some abuses, on the one hand, it did not stipulate any terms on effects in 
relation to other abuses, on the other hand. Arguably, this implies that the Egyptian 
legislator had left it open for investigating authorities to choose between a per se 
approach or effects-based analysis
250
 – perhaps depending on the circumstances of the 
case and conduct. This may also rest on whether or not the practice in question has no 
other purpose but to restrict competition or that may otherwise be objectively justified.  
 
In this sense, as will be argued in chapter four, the Egyptian approach to abuse of 
dominance seems to fairly coincide with the EU system; given that the latter does not 
appear to exclude the likelihood that abusive practices may be objectively justified 
(although the modernization of Article 102 TFEU still remains in transition at 
present)
251
. However, whether competition authorities and courts – in general - should 
opt for an effects-based analysis or a per se approach in case settling is subject to 
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debate. While some, including some Ordoliberals, argue that investigating authorities 
should avoid employing an effects-based approach (and rule of reason test); others 
argue in favour of such approach.       
 
3.2.6 Arguments for and against rule of reason and effects-based approaches to 
Competition Law
252
 
The problems and potential consequences underlying market intervention by 
governments were given vast attention by constitutional economists Brennan/Buchanan 
in 1985 and Vanberg in 1994 along with Ordoliberals such as Eucken in 1952. They 
argue that economic policy should be concerned with adopting and applying a 
framework of a ―rule of law‖ that involves as less perusal to practices as possible. This 
argument is based on three major grounds
253
. First, that a given rule of law should 
obtain predictability and legal certainty. Employing rule of reason (and indeed effects-
based) analysis would demote such legal certainty. Competition laws should provide 
market players with the information necessary to enable them to know what is 
prohibited from what is not. If rules do not provide such systemic information, 
―efficiency‖ in a ―market economy‖ may be thereby diminished254. In fact, commenting 
on legal certainty of the per se approach, the Court in U.S. v. Topco Assocs., stated that 
―without the per se rules, business men would be left with little to aid them in predicting 
in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal [...]‖255.  
 
Second, according to Ordoliberals and constitutional economists – through experience – 
removing the ―wide discretionary scope‖ from governmental authorities may reduce the 
influence of ―interest groups‖ in the decision-making process. While employing a rule 
of reason may facilitate such influence. Third, Hayek, Heiner and some other scholars 
assume that the relevant governmental authorities – even if not entitled to the mentioned 
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discretionary powers – may not have the necessary ―knowledge‖ to rationally resolve 
matters
256
. Even more intriguing, as Easterbrook writes
257
, firms that essentially select 
the practices themselves ―may or may not know what is special about [them]. They can 
describe what they do, but the why is more difficult. Only someone with a very detailed 
knowledge of the market process [...] as well as data needed for evaluation would be 
able to answer that question. Sometimes no one can answer it‖. He, moreover, added: 
―What can be conveyed in the corporate board room is hard to articulate in a trial, when 
the judge and jury lack economic training and business expertise‖258.        
 
This means that, in contrast with firms, the lack of knowledge and economic expertise 
of Courts – and arguably the ECA – may declare rule of reason and effects-based 
approaches as formidable and thereby risky. Not only, however, is knowledge the sole 
problem. The process of discerning the welfare effects of practices often lies ―beyond 
our ken‖. The inquiries that these approaches seek to obtain are often farfetched or, as 
Easterbrook describes, ―empty‖. In fact, in U.S. v. Topco Assocs., the Court, while 
favouring a per se approach instead of rule of reason on the basis of inability, stated 
that: ―Courts [and arguably the ECA at this stage] are of limited utility in examining 
difficult economic problems [...] (they are) ill-equipped and ill-suited for such decision-
making (and cannot) analyse, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests 
and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such decisions‖259.               
 
One should distinguish between two types of errors that judges (or competition 
authorities) may commit in antitrust disputes: First, falsely ignoring or not condemning 
practices that may be anti-competitive (‗type I errors‘) – also known as ―false 
negatives‖ and second, erroneously condemning practices that yield pro-competitive 
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benefits (‗type II errors‘). This category is also known as ―false positives‖. The question 
that lies beneath this classification: given the likely inevitability to avoid errors; what 
type of errors is more favourable (or less costly) over the other? Irrespective of which 
type is favoured over the other, the decision-maker in question should not disregard the 
fact that by choosing one type (say type II) the inevitable implication would be that 
he/she accepts the costs of the other type of errors (type I in this example); no matter 
how detrimental the effects of these errors are
260
.  
 
According to Easterbrook, decision-makers should opt for judicial errors that do not 
condemn ―questionable practices‖ - type I errors – essentially based on the premise that: 
―The economic system corrects monopoly [type I errors – unpunished anti-competitive 
practices] more readily than it corrects judicial [type II] errors [pro-competitive 
practices falsely punished]‖. Put differently, Easterbrook favours excusing practices that 
may be anti-competitive on the basis that the market will maintain itself in a hastening 
manner; particularly because the incumbent‘s high prices may attract 
competitors/potential entry
261
.  
 
Although he does not seem to endorse the ―empty‖ rule of reason, Easterbrook, 
similarly, slams the ―shrinking‖ per se approach. According to him, this latter approach, 
despite often used as the correct method (arguably) for countering the dreadful costs of 
information and litigation, erroneously condemns the ―whole‖ category of practices – 
whether or not beneficial remains irrelevant to the investigator. This unequivocally 
signifies that type II errors – falsely condemning pro-competitive practices - are 
inevitable under a per se approach. The ―empty‖ rule of reason (and effects-based 
approach), nevertheless not the most favourable approach to Easterbrook, seems to 
comply more with his framework; given the chance that type II errors are more likely to 
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be avoided in this case. The question that should follow is what then are the arguments 
that are in favour of an effects-based approach?
262
          
 
Advocates of an effects-based approach, as opposed to those of a per se approach, argue 
that the ―accuracy‖ which this approach offers may somehow outweigh the potential 
effects underlying the lack of ―legal certainty‖ of the process. However, this argument is 
questionable on the basis of two premises provided by Hayek and Heiner. First, 
although they agree on the idea that a case-by-case analysis may enhance accuracy to 
the part of a given competition authority - in which case an effects-based approach 
would be favourable - they argue that such assumption of perfectionism is implausible. 
In other words, and akin to Easterbrook‘s view, competition authorities will likely 
commit errors in carrying out welfare tests
263
. In this sense, one should carry out a 
comparison between the prototypes of decisions taken under an effects-based approach 
and those taken under a per se approach. Put differently, the comparison should focus 
on the ―rate of errors‖ committed under each approach. The result of the comparison 
will – to a large extent – rely on the ―fallibility or error-proneness‖ of the given 
competition authority on the one hand, and the ―fallibility or imperfectness of the rules‖ 
on the other hand
264
. 
 
While proponents of the effects-based approach, on the one hand, argue that the 
―analytical and statistical‖ methods used in modern industrial economics are sufficient 
to enable competition authorities to adeptly reach their decisions, opponent of such 
approach on the other hand are reluctant of the competency of the decision making 
process on basis of the high degree sophistication in determining welfare effects – a 
degree that is beyond human capabilities – as Easterbrook similarly suggests. In fact, 
Hayek argues that the capability of human beings to validly predict in economics is 
restricted to ―explanations of the principle‖ aside of ―pattern predictions‖. More to the 
point, an effects-based approach – to Hayek - requires discussing and predicting the 
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effects of a given case where a mere explanation of a principle and pattern predictions 
may be insufficient
265
.  
 
In fact, the debate over the capability of an effects-based approach to enhance 
competition authorities‘ efficiency in taking decisions, as Vanberg writes, is (nowadays) 
intertwined with two controversies. First, the necessity to resort to economic expertise 
while enforcing competition rules in specific disputes. And second, the controversy over 
the need to rely on economic expertise to clarify competition rules that are ―too 
simple‖266. With respect to the first issue, it is prudent to suggest that competition law – 
in many occasions – involves a ―complex process of interpretation‖ of rules, which may 
require considerable knowledge in economics. In this sense, the advice of economists to 
competition authorities is worthy. With regards to the second issue, one need not doubt 
on the indispensability of economics in refining competition-related rules – even from 
proponents of a per se approach. That said, the need to enhance economic expertise 
whether in the EU or Egypt remains a must; should they wish to employ an effects-
based approach
267
.           
 
3.2.7 Economic expertise in the EU Commission: A departure from the 
Ordoliberal theory of market intervention? 
The EU Commission‘s insights on competition law started taking a different stance 
about a decade ago. Mario Monti, former EU Commissioner, in one of his closing 
speeches on what he perceived as one of his central accomplishments, stated that: ―A 
major trend of this mandate has been to ensure that competition policy is fully 
compatible with economic learning. Furthermore, competition policy is an instrument to 
foster economic growth, promote a good allocation of resources and to strengthen the 
competitiveness of European industry for the benefit of the citizens‖268. The attention on 
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the indispensable correlation between competition law and economics and the necessity 
of making the former comply with the latter‘s standards has long been recognised by the 
Office of the Directorate General for Competition in the Commission (‗DG Comp‘). 
Economic models are, hence, given substantial consideration. In fact, former EU 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes (who succeeded Mario Monti) indicated that economic 
reforms to the approach to competition law are the Commission‘s initial priority269. 
 
Current EU Commissioner, Joaquín Almunia, also recognizes the significance of 
economics within the application EU Competition Law. In a speech entitled ―EU 
Antitrust policy: the road ahead‖, he stated: ―What we can see is a modern approach to 
antitrust enforcement, which focuses on preventing or putting an end to consumer harm, 
rather than protecting ―competitors‖ as such‖. He added that for infringements like 
abuse of dominance in specific: ―A modern approach to competition enforcement means 
that our investigations must be based on sophisticated economic analysis, but also on a 
qualitative knowledge of the market realities and on a good understanding of customer 
demands. This enables the Commission to focus its enforcement efforts to where they 
matter most‖270. 
 
Röller and Buigues interestingly question the justifications behind this path of thinking. 
They believe that the Commission opted for this approach on the basis of three reasons. 
First, they argue that the desire to adopt competition-related decisions based on 
economic rationalizations may be justified by the Lisbon Agenda‘s stress on 
―competitiveness‖ in a manner that may necessitate the investigation of economic 
gains
271
. Second, the necessity of demonstrating economic evidences from the part of 
the Commission was raised by the GC. More precisely, in Airtours v. Commission, the 
GC commented on the Commission‘s report by stating that it was: ―Far from basing its 
prospective analysis on cogent evidence, is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment 
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as to factors fundamental to any assessment of whether a collective dominant position 
might be created‖. The GC then demonstrated the necessity of satisfying three 
conditions for firms to be considered as collectively dominant – conditions that Röller 
and Buigues regard as adhering to an economic approach. And, finally, collaborating 
with other jurisdictions – most notably the U.S. – may have hastened this process 272. 
 
The use of economics in EU competition law may be envisaged in several respects; 
among which is market definition. The EU system seems to have borrowed the so-called 
Small but Significant, Non Transitory Increase in Price Test (‗SSNIP‘) from the US 
Merger Guidelines. The SSNIP test attempts to answer the question; in the event of an 
increase in the product‘s price by 5-10%, would consumers switch to other products? If 
so, these products that consumers have switched to are to be included in the relevant 
product market
273
. To approach this question, investigating authorities are patently 
expected to undertake some empirical research that mostly involves economic
274
. 
  
In fact, the initiative to employ economists for the purpose of employing an economic-
based approach to EU Competition Law existed ever since former EU Commissioner 
Mario Monti was in office. More specifically, in a conference speech in October 2002, 
he stated that: ―We are increasingly confronted with the need to investigate complex 
cases, which require in-depth fact-finding and rigorous economic and/or econometric 
analysis. The [GC] Judgements confirm this need. We are therefore discussing measures 
aimed at further strengthening the economic expertise capabilities of the Competition 
DG [...]‖275. To this end, a Chief Competition Economist (‗CCE‘) was finally appointed 
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by the Commission in July 2003 with effect in September, 2003. The office of the CCE, 
as noted by Röller and Buigues is comprised of approximately ten economists all of 
which have acquired a PhD in the field of industrial organisation – a specialisation to 
which an economic approach to competition would inevitably be premised on
276
.       
 
The roles of the CCE are generally twofold. First, is to contribute with the case team on 
day-to-day disputes by providing the necessary economic analyses – whether or not 
detailed depends on the importance of the given dispute - which is named as the 
―support function‖. And second, is to provide the Commissioner and/or the Directorate 
General with an opinion prior to the closing decision, one which is known as the 
―check-and-balances‖ function277. The CCE is also assigned to some other activities. He 
is in charge of any on-going economic debates. In this sense, collaboration with 
academics would be deemed necessary. In this respect, the CCE coordinates with the 
EAGCP – an ideal illustration for that is the consultation report entitled ―an economic 
approach to Article [102]‖278. 
 
Some notably argue that the appointment of the CCE reflects a response to the CoJ‘s 
criticisms in Airtours (as discussed above)
279
. In fact, it may be argued that such 
appointment implies a demise of Ordoliberal influence on the application of EU 
Competition Law based on some assumptions. Former DG Comp, Philip Lowe, despite 
once unequivocally admitting the vast influence of Ordoliberalism on EU Competition 
Law
280
, suggested that the current and future approach lies at the very heart of consumer 
welfare and efficiency: ―Consumer welfare and efficiency are the new guiding 
principles of EU competition policy. Whilst the competitive process is important as an 
instrument, and whilst in many instances the distortion of this process leads to consumer 
harm, its protection is not an aim in itself. The ultimate aim is the protection of 
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consumer welfare, as an outcome of the competitive process‖281. This view was also 
supported by the case law. In GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission, the GC stated that: ―The 
objective of the [Union] competition rules is to prevent undertakings, by restricting 
competition between themselves or with third parties, from reducing the welfare of the 
final consumer of the products in question [...]‖282. Nonetheless, on appeal, the CoJ 
stressed that the aim is not only to protect the interests of competitors or consumers, but 
also ―the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such‖283.  
 
The philosophy that discerns the necessity for intervention within the scope of Article 
102 TFEU, as a priority, according to former Commissioner Kroes, is that: ―It is 
competition, and not competitors, that should be protected. Ultimately, the aim is to 
avoid consumer harm. Competition on the merits by firms which are dominant should 
not be discouraged or undermined, even if it may hurt competitors‖284. These guiding 
principles seem to contrast with Ordoliberal principles. While the latter appears to 
endorse a ―rights-based approach‖; as Gormsen names, the former – primarily based on 
consumer welfare – seems to promote a consequentialist or one may recall; effects-
based approach.  
 
Put differently, what distinguishes Ordoliberalism from the economic-based approach 
desired by the Commission is that the former aims to protect individual freedom as a 
value in itself and not economic efficiency. This latter is rather perceived as a tool for 
growth and development and not the ultimate aim. If achieved whilst protecting 
individual freedom, then that is a plus. If not then Ordoliberals will not chase it. The 
economic-based approach desired by the Commission, on the opposed hand, aims to 
maximise consumer welfare. Inevitably, this necessitates adopting – at the very least - 
an effects-based approach to competition law. It, thus, becomes evident that the 
objectives of both approaches are dissimilar and may at times be incompatible
285
.     
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3.3 THE ORIGINS AND VALUES OF EGYPTIAN COMPETITION 
LAW 
As discussed earlier in chapter one, apart from the external pressures pertaining to the 
enactment of competition law, the Egyptian government has been keen to follow 
Islamic principles within the framework of its legal system by virtue of its long-term 
constitutional provision under Article 2 of its Constitution that contemplates Islamic law 
as the main source of legislation
286
. Monopoly, in essence, is unequivocally condemned 
and well articulated under Shari‘ah. Despite the absence of direct evidence that it is 
mandatory for relevant Egyptian Authorities/Courts to follow the Shari‘ah principles, 
arguably, Article 2 represents an implicit desire to comply with these principles. Hence, 
it remains imperative to understand the nature, sources and objectives of Shari‘ah as 
well as its principles on monopoly in order to discern the degree of influence of these 
principles on the Egyptian treatment of abuse of dominance or otherwise the methods to 
Islamise this treatment.  
 
Is Shari‘ah merely a religious law? Badr was one of the few scholars who questioned 
whether Shari‘ah is a ―religious law‖. This may be rationalised by the fact that the 
mainstream of the literature seem to believe that it is merely a religious law primarily 
because of its name. This is in addition to the fact that Islamic law encompasses 
―religious‖ issues that are not addressed by other legal traditions; such as common law. 
Islamic law is generally divided into two parts; first, ―Ibadat‖ and, second, 
―Mu‘amalat‖. The former part is strictly confined to religious matters (praying, fasting, 
etc.); while the latter part - in resemblance with other laws - addresses only 
―transactions‖ among the society287. Moreover, as Badr writes, the Quran – though 
explicitly addresses some legal matters – may not be contemplated as a ―legal code‖. In 
fact it is estimated that only 3% of the Quran are legal provisions; nonetheless mostly 
dealing with family law and inheritance matters. The part on Mu‘amalat (subject of this 
thesis) is strictly considered as a ―man-made law‖ with mere reflections on ―moral 
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considerations‖ and rationalisations behind prohibitions (as extracted from the sources 
of Islamic law). Hence, contrary to many doubters, Islamic law is not entirely a 
religious law – it is only the part addressing Ibadat that is manifestly divine288. 
 
3.3.1 The sources of Islamic Law 
As commonly agreed amongst the Islamic community, there are three source of 
legislation of Islamic law; first, the ―Quran‖; second, the ―Sunnah‖ and; third, the 
―Ejtihad‖. The Quran is more or less the core source and premise of legislation in 
Islamic-law countries. It contains some very explicit condemnations and prohibitions. 
According to the Quran, a country and its nationals shall act with reasonable degree of 
―economic justice‖ to ensure that transactions are carried out with ―fair play‖ and that 
no means of ―economic exploitation‖ prevail among the society289. The Sunnah may be 
defined as the acts and statements of the Prophet Mohammed. A written statement of 
Sunnah is called ―hadith‖. The process of approval of each hadith is believed to be quite 
rigid. A series of substantial analysis is carried out in relation to the ―content‖ and 
―transmission‖ of each hadith in order to discern its ―validity‖ and reliability for future 
reference
290
. 
 
Ejtihad, on the other hand, may feature in various forms. Nevertheless there exists only 
one form that may be relevant to competition law; namely ―Qiyas‖. Qiyas is a well-
recognized term under Shari‘ah. It is a process that provides a methodical analogy that 
reaches an indirect result. Dabbah describes it as a process of ―systematic inference or 
analogy‖. For instance, while the Quran stresses the importance of ―Zakah‖ (i.e. 
donation) through using Qiyas, this may imply that the Quran supports charitable 
people. This may, correspondingly, be applied to the case of economic power and 
exploitation. Hence, applying the Qiyas would declare the Islamic community as liable 
to prohibit any detrimental economic practices
291
. In fact, Dabbah argues that the only 
relevant sources to competition law in this regard are the Quran and Ejtihad. While it is 
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true that the acts of the Prophet may not be of much relevance – except for those issues 
pertaining to price intervention/control – some of his Ahadith292 (or statements) remain 
central to the conception of monopoly under Shari‘ah (as will be envisaged from the 
subsequent parts). Hence, the Sunnah may be partly an indispensible source that one 
should not overlook
293
. 
 
3.3.2 The objectives of Islamic Law (“Maqasid Al-Shari’ah”) 
In generic terms, Islamic law aims to yield ―benefits‖ and avoid ―harm‖. In Shari‘ah, 
this is called ―maslahah‖. Linguistically, maslahah means ―benefit‖ or ―interest‖. It 
may also entail obtaining equilibrium between ―private interests‖ and the broader ambit 
of ―public interests‖294. While public interest signifies the aims to attain the objectives 
of a given set of rules, maslahah is the form of such achievement. In fact, the 
correlation between maslahah and competition may be envisaged from an example 
provided by Hasan with particular reference to the price regulation (―tas‘ir‖). Assume 
that the Ministry of Trade of a given state issues a regulation that prohibits suppliers 
from selling food products at high prices and forbids monopolising the market; 
otherwise they will be subject to a penalty. This regulation as such protects the public 
from incurring high prices. It attains public interest through limiting inflationary prices 
and preventing detrimental public harms and as such constitutes a maslahah within the 
meaning of Shari‘ah295. 
 
A further example illustrated by the Islamic jurisprudence (―figh‖) is that which relates 
to a sales agreement between a city dweller and a desert dweller. In the ages before 
Islam, it was more or less a custom for city merchants to move to the borders of the city 
in order to find desert dwellers and sell them their products. While a city dweller tends 
to be much more experienced in terms of market prices; a desert dweller is not. Hence, 
the trend was for city dwellers to exploit the lack of experience of desert dwellers; either 
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through buying their goods at substantially low prices or charging them excessive 
prices. The Prophet and Islamic law stringently condemn this form of conduct as it 
harms the society of desert dwellers
296
.  
 
That said; Maslahah is an indispensable factor of any ruling under Shari‘ah. The 
mainstream of jurists categorise maslahah into three major categories: first, the 
―daruriyyat‖ (―essentials‖); second, the ―hajiyyat‖ (―complements‖) and; third, the 
―tahsiniyyat‖ (―embellishments‖)297. The protection of these categories is of utmost 
importance and as such, fulfils the objectives of Shari‘ah. In other words, maslahah is 
the ultimate objective of Shari‘ah. Consequently, any legal rule that is incompatible 
with any of the above categories shall not be valid and thus annulled. This means that 
laws and regulations adopted in Islamic law countries are ought to reflect the objectives 
of Islamic law. The same also applies to legal rulings in disputes. It should be noted, 
however, that daruriyyat is the only relevant category to this thesis. It is composed of 
five interests: ―din (religion), nafs (life), aql (intellect), nasl (progeny), and mal 
(property)‖. Particularly, the prohibition of monopoly lies under the last category: mal 
(property)
298
. 
 
3.3.3 The conception of monopoly under Islamic Law 
The relationship between competition law and Shari‘ah is one that has not been given 
adequate attention throughout the literature. This is perhaps because it is widely 
perceived among commentators that competition law could barely be linked with 
Shari‘ah. The origin of competition law in Islam may be drawn back to the Seventh 
Century. Yet the idea of introducing a competition law as such did not prevail among 
the Islamic Community at the time. It was not until the twentieth century when the 
initiative of enacting competition law began to emerge from the Western community in 
a manner that arguably inspired Middle Eastern Countries; particularly those that are 
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trading partners to the EU - like Egypt - to adopt their own law. This rationalizes the 
lack of literature on this underlying relationship
299
.    
 
While the concept of monopoly (―ihtikar‖) is often contemplated as one of the forms of 
blocking (―sadd al-dharai‖) under Shari‘ah, it may be useful to address the latter‘s 
relevant prohibited practices. ―Sadd al-dharai‘‖ essentially means ―unfair competition‖ 
posed by one person or more through ―blocking‖. The analysis of the precept of 
blocking under Shari‘ah involves an assessment of the effects of the conduct – 
including its final outcome. If its effects are harmful, then the conduct is strictly 
prohibited. If it leads to many benefits, then the conduct becomes rather attractive and 
would therefore not be prohibited. The precept of sadd al-dharai‘ may be envisaged 
from the prohibition of monopolisation (―ihtikar‖). The prohibition of monopoly may 
be seen from the Prophet‘s hadith entailing that god will upset whoever monopolises. 
As illustrated by Hasan, in a further hadith reported by Al-Tirmidhi, the Prophet urged 
that: ―Who monopolizes is not but a wrongdoer‖300. But what is prohibited monopoly 
under Shari‘ah?   
 
As indicated in chapter two, there exists four schools of thought in Islamic 
jurisprudence; Hanafi, Malikis, Shafi and Hanbali; all of which often reach different 
opinions and interpretations. The Hanafi School defines ―ihtikar‖ (i.e. monopoly) as a 
situation where a person withholds food until it gets more expensive and then sells it. 
The Malikis School believe that ihtikar is monopolising the markets of food, cotton, oil 
and all other essential products in a manner that prevents the society from gaining 
possession thereof. The Shafi School defines monopoly as buying grain at periods when 
its prices are high, withholding it and then selling it at higher prices with the intention to 
harm others. The Hanbali School states that prohibited monopoly is that which satisfies 
three conditions: first, a person buys; second, the product bought is grain, and; third, 
that the person, through buying, causes harm to others
301
. 
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In this sense, monopoly under Shari‘ah is composed of two core elements; hold and 
withhold a commodity. If the person holds a commodity and restrains others from it 
primarily to satisfy family needs, in theory, this does not form a prohibited monopoly 
under Shari‘ah. The analogy for prohibition rather appears to be based on holding a 
commodity for the purposes of trade, and withholding it until its value increases. Sahih 
Al-Halabi reported a narrative where he asked Abi Abdullah Al-Sadek: ―A person who 
monopolises food [or in other words, withholds its supply]; is this legitimate? He 
replied: ―If the food is plenty and enough to the people; then that is acceptable. If the 
food is little and not enough to the people; then that it will be condemned to monopolise 
food and thereby leave people without food [...]‖. The imperative question that should 
then be raised in this respect: does Shari‘ah prohibit monopoly in food only; or does 
such prohibition extend to other products/commodities?
302
                     
 
It is commonly perceived that the prohibition of monopoly under Shari‘ah is not only 
restricted food. This is based on some grounds, according to El-Din. Limiting the 
prohibition of monopoly to food only inevitably means that monopoly in all other 
essentials (or ―daruriyyat‖); such as medication at periods of life-threatening diseases, 
heaters at severe weather conditions, etc. is permitted. As such restricting the 
prohibition to food only i.e. excluding other essentials would stand as strictly a religious 
prohibition. This contradicts with the objectives of Shari‘ah (―maqasid Al-Shari‘ah‖) 
that are primarily based on generalised principles such as the principle of ―no-harm‖303.  
 
Moreover, most Shari‘ah principles, aside of being general, are applicable to all people, 
periods and places. In this sense, it would be irrational to assume that such prohibition is 
restricted to one part or seen from a certain perspective of human life and society. In 
fact, the rationale behind articulating the prohibition of monopoly through food rests on 
the ideology that the majority of monopolies at the early stages of Islam were food-
related. In addition, and in contrast with many other commodities, food is a commodity 
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that is used on daily basis; hence monopoly in that market is usually detrimental; 
especially to the poor or people who earn limited income. Further evidence that 
prohibited monopoly is not merely restricted to food is the statement reported by 
supporters of Islam (―daaem Al-Islam‖) from Imam Al-Sadek which mentioned that 
―each monopoly that harms people and increases prices on them is faithless‖. The term 
―monopoly‖ in this statement is patently generic. Therefore, the prohibition of 
monopoly extends to all other products and commodities that are essential for living
304
.  
 
That said, the definition of prohibited monopoly that is commonly perceived, according 
to Zaki, is that which signifies withholding an essential product with a view to 
eventually sell it at a higher price. This definition takes into account the objectives of 
Shari‘ah – the prohibition of monopoly in all its forms in order to protect the public 
from injustice (―zulm‖) and harm (―darar‖) to others. The Islamic perspective of 
monopoly as such contemplates not only the content of monopoly, but also its effects
305
.  
In fact, as Zaki writes, there are some situations where modern economics - and indeed 
many jurisdictions - consider practices as prohibited while Shari‘ah may not. This is 
because Shari‘ah is primarily concerned with the situation where harms and detrimental 
effects are in fact caused rather than merely likely to be caused
306
. The definition of 
monopoly as such exemplifies a fine example of zulm – one that is strictly prohibited in 
Shari‘ah and indeed contravenes its objectives. In one hadith, the Prophet states: ―My 
people, I have prohibited zulm to myself, and made it prohibited among you, so please 
do not engage in zulm‖. Another hadith states: ―A monopolist will be disappointed if 
God decreases prices and will be happy if God increases them‖. These statements 
provide a clear understanding that monopoly is a form of zulm, and zulm is condemned 
in Islam and hence, prohibited
307
. 
 
Furthermore, Sadd Al-Dharai‘ may appear in the form of ―hoarding‖ of a product or 
property (―iktinaz‖) – one that in fact many competition laws seem to prohibit. Iktinaz in 
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essence happens when a person stockpiles many products and declines their supply or 
distribution in a manner that leads to a shortage in market. The rationale behind this is 
to deprive the market from the product until the hoarder feels the urge from its seeker 
who then buys it at an excessive price. This is clearly a prohibited and undesirable 
conduct under Islamic law
308
. In the hadith reported by Ibnu Majah, the Prophet said: 
―He is a criminal who hoards grain to sell it at higher price‖. In another hadith he 
mentioned: ―Who also keeps back grain from sale for forty days only to sell it at higher 
prices ... is not aware of the existence of God or that God has cut himself off from 
him‖309. The precepts of Sadd Al-Dharai‘ as such constitute the foremost rationalisation 
of the enactment of competition law – given that its application would reduce harm in 
the society. This patently links and indeed complies with the objectives of Shari‘ah. In 
fact, as Hasan writes, the conception of Sadd Al-Dharai‘ corresponds to the common 
expression of ―prevention is better than cure‖310.     
    
3.3.4 Market intervention/price control under Islamic Law  
The debate over the degree of government intervention on the market emerged in the 
literature on Islamic law and economics during the 1950s. Yet prices of products in the 
market were verified as early as the pre-Islamic era, since the start of the indirect 
exchange. Although the Shari‘ah more or less approved such setting, it sought to 
incorporate some changes and adjustments in a manner that would comply with the 
Shari‘ah‘s precepts and standards. In fact, the Prophet already discussed the issue of 
market imperfections on many occasions. Jurists or the fiqh, on the other hand, took 
care of the adoption of the precepts of price regulation in light of these discussions. The 
precepts laid down by the jurists were more or less premised on two aspects
311
.  
 
First, the hadith reported by Anas, which narrated that: ―One person came to the 
Prophet and requested him to fix prices in the market but he refused. Another man came 
and made the same request; the Prophet said it is Allah [God] who pushes prices up or 
down, I do not want to face him with a burden of injustice‖. Second, the report on 
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market intervention adopted by Caliph Umar, as reported by Imam Malik on the 
following story: ―Umar bin Khattab passed by Hatib bin Balta‘ah who was selling dried 
grapes in the market. Umar told him either to raise the price or leave the market‖. Yet, a 
different report by Dawud Bin Saleh, as reported by Imam Shafi‘i, was put in place. It 
mentioned that Umar Bin Khattab, after re-considering the matter, told Hatib: ―That 
whatever I told you was neither an expert‘s opinion nor a verdict. It was only a personal 
concern for welfare of people. So, you can sell it at whatever rate you like and wherever 
you like‖. However, Imam Shafi‘i declared that his narration was not contrary to that 
reported Imam Malik; it was just that the latter‘s did not provide the full story312. 
 
More to the point, the Islamic Jurisprudence carefully contemplated the controversy 
over the legitimacy of price control. Proponents of the Shafi‘i and Hanbali schools 
challenge the ideology of controlling prices in markets on the basis that richness or 
poorness is rather a ―divine phenomena‖. Hence, in the event where the price of a 
product rises due to ―natural causes‖, it would do ―injustice‖ from an authority to 
intervene in the market and fix sellers‘ prices. Jurists of the Maliki and Hanafi schools, 
in contrast, argue that there is nothing that should restrict market intervention. In 
addition, they suggest that such intervention does not always constitute an ―injustice‖ 
practice
313
.             
 
The Hanbali Jurist, Imam Shamsuddeen Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, on the opposed hand, 
believes that the government is not entitled to intervene in market‘s prices on the basis 
of a hadith reported by Anas. He argues that, in accordance with the hadith, though 
encountered many pressures from the public, the Prophet did not, as a matter of fact, ask 
sellers to change their prices; otherwise it would have been legal to do so. On the 
contrary, the Prophet assured the public that ―price control‖ is equivalent to ―injustice‖ 
(―zulm‖). And ―injustice‖ is inherently ―forbidden‖ by the Shari‘ah314. In a similar vein, 
Al-Maqdisi believes that the ideology of price control generates several detrimental 
consequences on the society; such as the increase in prices, the decrease in imports; all 
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of which leads to ―hoarding‖ and puts a lot of burden on the society. In fact, he argues 
by virtue of some economic analysis that price control may lead to ―black 
marketeering‖ in the case of shortage in supply of a particular product; apart from the 
consequence that consumer needs may not be entirely fulfilled
315
.  
 
However, according to Bashar, Al-Maqdisi‘s reference to the hadith as such addresses 
only one circumstance in particular: when grain was imported to the Medina during a 
period of scarcity; which meant that prices of grain were already high elsewhere. Thus, 
the declination from the part of the Prophet to control price in this case made sense. 
What if prices elsewhere were low; while those in Medina were high due to ―hoarding‖? 
Would state intervention be justified? According to Imam Ibn Taimiyah, the Prophet on 
the basis of ―injustice‖ inherently prohibits ―hoarding‖. This is because a ―hoarder‖ 
purchases scarce grain with a view to selling it at a later stage at inflated prices. In an 
event as such, the hoarder is forced by the state to sell his product according to ―market 
price‖. This is indeed the view of most jurists. In fact, Ibn Taimiyah claims that in 
events where, for instance, the seller prevents the trader from ―Undue profiteering‖, 
state intervention would not merely be allowed; but would become rather compulsory. 
In his conclusion, he writes that: ―When people‘s needs and necessities cannot be 
safeguarded without a fair price control, then a price control based on justice will be 
implemented for them - no more, no less‖316. 
 
Similar to the Malikis approach, proponents of Imam Abu Hanifa of the Hanafi School 
believe that state intervention in respect of prices should not be permissible unless 
otherwise detrimental to the interests of the society. The Hedaya provides the position 
of Hanafi as follows: ―The Sultan has no right to fix prices for people. (Because) the 
Prophet said Allah is the price-giver... also because declaration of price is the right of 
the seller [...] so the Imam should not interfere except in a condition where welfare of 
the people demands it [...]‖. With regards to ―hoarding‖, the judge (―qadi‖) ―will order 
the hoarder to sell what is in excess of his needs that will usually be assessed in a 
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generous manner. The qadi will warn him to refrain from that act. If he is caught again 
for the same offence, he will be imprisoned, and punished in a way deemed necessary to 
prevent him from wrongdoing and save the public from harm‖.  In an event where the 
trader or seller is persistent to sell at higher prices and the ―qadi has no other means of 
safeguarding people‘s welfare except by controlling prices, then he can do so by 
consulting wise councellors‖317  
 
In any event, however, market intervention/price control under Islamic law shall be 
guided by two core principles: First, the principle of no-harm and, second, the principle 
of maslahah
318
. The principle of no-harm signifies that: ―No action whatsoever, 
deliberate or unintentional, will be used to cause harm on oneself, another person or the 
society‖319. The principle of ‗no harm‘ as such may have an imperative implication in 
relation to the application of competition law in Islamic law countries. It implies that 
governments – and more precisely competition authorities - shall not intervene in the 
market or control prices unless harm is inflicted on the society by virtue of prevailing 
market prices. This in turn means that Shari‘ah does not seem to endorse the 
deployment of a per se approach to the application of competition law. It appears to 
rather require competition authorities and courts to carry out an analysis of effects of the 
practices at stake (in this respect, pricing) on the society; a patent effects-based 
approach within the framework delineated earlier.  
 
The above implication is premised on the assumption that the principle of no-harm 
primarily derives from the hadith where the Prophet stated: ―No harm and no inflicting 
of harm‖. To understand this hadith, one should divide it into two parts: First, ―no 
harm‖ and, second, ―no inflicting of harm‖. While the former means that one should 
neither harm him nor others; the latter entails that one should accept the harms inflicted 
on him by another person and should not attempt to harm this latter in response. This 
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thesis, however, is only concerned with the first part of the hadith; and particularly 
harm caused to others only. More to the point, the meaning of no-harm within the 
context of monopoly and price control is that governments should not prohibit 
monopoly; or otherwise any pricing practices unless there is actual harm on the society 
thereby
320
. In fact, this implication is supported by the inquiry asked by Sahih Al-Halabi 
regarding the legitimacy of monopoly in food (as mentioned earlier); where Abi 
Abdullah Al-Sadek answered: ―If the food is plenty and enough to the people; then that 
[monopoly] is acceptable. If the food is little and not enough to the people; then that it 
will be condemned to monopolise food and thereby leave people without food [...]‖321.                     
 
The principle of maslahah - as one of the main objectives of Shari‘ah - as described by 
Bashar (in this particular aspect), is one that provides that ―when a situation arises 
where procuring one interest implies the loss of another, then greater interest should be 
pursued in preference to the lesser. With regard to loss or injury reverse will apply, i.e. 
the greater will be avoided by tolerating the lesser. In this sense, maslahah is about 
securing greater interest‖. It is indeed understood that the aims of Shari‘ah are initially 
directed towards avoiding and/or eliminating any harm. In the event where injury is 
inevitable, the principle of maslahah shall be enforced in a manner which balances the 
possible consequences of price control with those of the injury and opt for whichever 
provides lesser harm
322
.  
 
3.3.5 The evolution of economic expertise in Egypt 
The ECA, arguably inspired by the EU Commission‘s initiative, is in the process of 
attaining economic expertise. By accessing its website, it was found that the ECA is 
currently looking to appoint two economists – one of whom to act as a senior.  In fact, 
in the first line of its advertisement, the authority mentioned that it is seeking to employ 
economists with a view to deploying economic analysis in disputes. Particularly, 
                                                          
 
320
 In this sense, if an abusive practice is merely likely to cause harm to the society, it does not suffice for 
market intervention. To this end, it is argued that for the purpose of Islamising the treatment of abuse 
practices, the ECA (and courts) should not prohibit abusive practices unless they cause actual harm to the 
society (effects-based approach). 
321
 EL-Din, M. M. S. (1997) ―Al-Ihtikar fi Al-Shari‘ah Al-Islamia‖ (Monopoly in Islamic Shari‘ah), 
International Institution for Studies and Publication (Beirut, Lebanon) [Book in Arabic], p.93, emphasis 
added 
322
 Bashar (1997), op.cit., p.41     
  
109 
according to the ECA, ―We are looking for dynamic and motivated economists to carry 
out economic analysis in multidisciplinary inquiry teams‖. The advertised positions are 
for a ―senior economist‖ and an ―economist‖ (who presumably will assist the former 
and the rest of the presently employed team)
323
. 
 
For eligibility as ―senior economist‖, among other pre-requisites, the ECA seeks 
candidates who hold PhD in Economics; and particularly in antitrust and competition 
policy, industrial organization or regulatory economics with good knowledge of 
standard applied quantitative methods, in particular with regards to 
statistics/econometrics. The ECA as such seems to follow the EU Commission‘s 
approach in appointing an economics specialist – especially given the fact that it 
requires the candidate to hold a Ph.D. in fields like industrial organisation. The 
qualifications of the candidate economist seem to correspond to those of the CCE
324
.              
  
Apart from seeking economic expertise in competition law from the part of the ECA, 
the Egyptian government in general is moving towards increasing economic expertise 
and awareness in the practice of competition law (among other fields of practice). For 
the first time, it opted to introduce a law that establishes courts exclusively dedicated to 
settling disputes of economic nature. The course of introducing a law as such remains 
an outcome of considerable debate whether within the business or judicial 
community
325
. The pressures which the Egyptian government has encountered through 
criticism from the investors community on the present bureaucratic process of 
commercial litigation in terms of its slow speed of settling disputes and the deficiency 
of specialisation of judges has been substantial but arguably, of a positive impact. More 
to the point the debate has experienced many doubts as to whether or not the 
introduction of economic courts would certainly enhance the commercial dispute 
settlement process in general
326
.      
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In May 2008, the Egyptian Parliament agreed to introduce the Law No. 120 of 2008 
issuing the Law establishing Economic Courts (‗Law No. 120/2008‘). Article 2 of Law 
No. 120/2008 requires ordinary courts to automatically refer the disputes at stake to 
economic courts. The disputes which will be referred to economic courts must be those 
of economic nature which are listed in particular therein Law No. 120/2008
327
. 
Competition law is one of the fields that fall within the ambit of these courts‘ 
competences
328. Article 4 provides that: ―First instance and appeal degrees in economic 
courts have the exclusivity in settling disputes which contravene the terms of ... 14- the 
Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prevention of Monopolistic Practices‖329. 
 
An imperative advantage of the Law No. 120/2008 is the fact that Articles 8 and 9 
entitle economic courts to obtain advice from experts in competition law whenever it 
finds the necessity to do so. These experts may be from the academic or any other 
community, as long as they are University graduates
330
. Distinctly rephrased, expertise 
in this respect does not have to derive from government employees. This is a unique 
feature that has never existed in any other law in Egypt. The Egyptian regime usually 
relies on experts appointed by the Ministry of Justice. Whilst reliance on the latter has 
proven to be useful in many disputes, their expertise in competition law may be limited 
due to the generic experience in civil and commercial law matters they tend to hold. 
Indeed, this is what distinguishes Law No. 120/2008 from any other
331
.         
 
The Law No. 120/2008 as such clearly is a remarkable advancement towards increasing 
economic expertise in the field of competition law in Egypt. It complements the desired 
                                                          
 
327
 Article 2, Law No.120 of 2008 issuing the Law establishing Economic Courts, Official Gazette, 
Volume 21(subsequent), 22
nd
 May, 2008 
Note that this law came into force on October 1
st
 2008.     
328
 Other fields which fall within the scope of economic courts pursuant to Article 4 include: Company 
Law, Capital Market Law, Investment Law, Financial Leasing Law, Mortgage Finance Law, Intellectual 
Property Protection Law, Banking Law, Investment Companies Law, protection from Bankruptcy 
provisions in the Code of Commerce, Investor Protection Law Communication Regulation Law, 
Insurance Supervision, Securities Depository, Antidumping Laws and Electronic Signature Law.  
329
 Article 4, Law establishing Economic Courts, Official Gazette, Volume 21(subsequent), 22
nd
 May, 
2008     
330
 On 20
th
 August, 2008, the Minister of Justice has issued the Ministerial Decree 6928/2008 which sets 
out the rules on the registration of Experts of the Law establishing Economic Courts.    
331
 See Articles 8 and 9, Law Establishing Economic Courts, Official Gazette, Volume 21(subsequent), 
22
nd
 May, 2008. For a discussion on the reliance of experts in disputes in Egypt, see Egypt Legal Update 
(2008) ―Composition and Fast Track Procedures‖ July issue, Nile Research and Training, p.9 
  
111 
expertise of the ECA. In fact, it ensures that the modern economic approach of 
competition law might not only be reflected from ECA decisions, but also through final 
court decisions. Moreover, the initiative of having a group of judges who specialise 
solely in competition law matters – among other related fields - will certainly increase 
economic expertise in Egypt.  However, the aftermath of such law will not in any way 
be instantaneous. Judges of the economic court will need some time to gain the 
necessary experience in economic analysis in competition-related disputes; especially 
given that it is a new field in Egypt.      
     
3.4 INVESTIGATING THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
OF THE ORIGINS AND VALUES OF EU AND EGYPTIAN 
COMPETITION LAWS 
The similarities and differences of the Ordoliberal and Shari‘ah origins of EU and 
Egyptian Competition Laws may be demonstrated in relation to five issues: First, the 
justifications behind the emergence of each origin; second, the objectives and rationale 
behind protecting competition; third, the degree of market intervention; fourth, the 
degree of influence of each origin on the enactment of competition law, and; fifth but 
not least, whether or not the legal systems at stake are obliged to follow their origins in 
relation to the application of competition law.      
 
At the outset, it is vital to note the general difference between Ordoliberalism and 
Shari‘ah. Ordoliberalism is not in fact a law. It is merely an approach that arguably 
influenced the process of enacting a law. Shari‘ah, on the other hand, is indeed a law. 
Yet – as some commentators argue – Shari‘ah is merely a religious law that may not be 
considered as an ordinary law, since it addresses divine matters and is not in fact 
codified. Nevertheless, as Badr argues, Shari‘ah should not be contemplated as such 
and hence should be treated as any other ordinary law. In this sense, the present 
evaluation of similarities and differences involves two subjects that are at different 
levels (political thought vs. law). 
 
Although the Ordoliberal theory and Shari‘ah both evolved at periods when markets 
were experiencing anti-competitive behaviours – the former during the Weimar 
Republic and Nazi eras and the latter when the ignorance of desert dwellers was 
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exploited by city dwellers - the justification behind their emergence is different. 
Ordoliberal thought, as Gerber argues, evolved for the very purpose of imposing a new 
beginning in Germany following the disastrous eras. It hence emerged with the aim of 
changing a particular situation. More specifically, its evolution was aimed at making the 
public give substantial attention and value to individual freedoms through protection of 
the process of competition from economic power, cartels and market intervention. 
Shari‘ah, on the other hand, did not emerge merely to resolve a particular situation; 
otherwise it would have solely addressed the issue of exploitation. It rather emerged to 
send a divine message that discerns what is prohibited or condemned from what is 
desired in day-to-day life. 
           
Economist Alfred Muller-Armack opted for an SME – one that would ensure that 
growth from the market is equally distributed among the society. This raises the 
question of whether or not the notion of SME coincides with the concept of maslahah 
developed in Shari‘ah. As is understood, the concept of maslahah aims to attain 
equilibrium between private and public interests; and, in the event where this is 
inconceivable, priority would be given to the latter. In this sense, public interest in 
Shari‘ah remains the core objective. The ideology of an SME, on the other hand, is to 
routinely attain public interest through equal distribution of market growth.  
 
In fact, the Ordoliberal and Shari‘ah‘s notions of fairness provide a sound 
correspondence to the above-mentioned. The objective of the former‘s approach is to 
protect the freedom of competition for ‗humanist values‘ and to achieve ‗social security‘ 
and ‗social justice‘. To Ordoliberals, justice in itself would not be accomplished unless 
it is ensured that the overall society equally participates in the market. Under Shari‘ah, 
on the other hand, ‗injustice‘ (or zulm) is strictly condemned and prohibited. More to 
the point, the competitive process seems to be protected from monopolistic conducts 
under Shari‘ah for the ultimate objective of protecting people from injustice and harms. 
In this sense, one may write that the rationale and objectives of the protection of 
competition under both approaches overlap
332
.                
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As for market intervention, the narrowest model was that of Hayek of the Austrian 
School who argues that interventions in the competitive process should not be enabled 
on the basis that the market will maintain itself in the event of any distortions; namely 
the principle of ‗pure liberalism‘. While this model seems to coincide with the Shafi and 
Hanbali‘s views of Islamic jurisprudence on price control in the sense that they 
collectively argue against market intervention, one should stress that this vision does not 
represent the prevalent model in Shari‘ah. Government intervention under Shari‘ah is 
rather guided by the two principles of no-harm and maslahah.  
 
If the pricing structure of a firm (assumedly high price) harms the society, then market 
intervention becomes inevitable. Ordoliberals, on the other hand, focus on protecting 
humanist values in themselves. Hence, the protection of consumer welfare, unlike 
Shari‘ah, comprises not more than an indirect objective. Apart from the difference 
between Ordoliberalism and Shari‘ah in terms of whether or not intervention should be 
permitted, the reasons that justify non-intervention seem to vary. Ordoliberals often 
argue that empowering the government to intervene may lead to market distortion on 
the basis that the government may be influenced by well-established market players (or 
‗interest groups‘) – a justification that is not merely premised on fairness considerations. 
The Shari‘ah, on the other hand, seems to stress more on the maintenance of justice and 
equality and would hence – if at all – prevent market intervention solely for fairness 
rationalizations
333
. 
             
Ordoliberals have had a vast influence on the introduction of competition law in 
Europe. The initial objective was to protect the competitive process through the 
adoption of a competition law (as part of economic constitution) and to enforce an SME 
in Germany to tackle the tough economic condition. However, such initiative patently 
extended to the process of European unification. For instance, Hans Von Der Groeden 
was one of the major drafters of the ‗Spaak Report‘ to which the Treaty of Rome was 
based on. It should be emphasised, however, that EU Commission and Courts are not 
obliged to follow the Ordoliberal theories in relation to the implementation of 
competition law. As explored earlier in the chapter, there does not seem to be any 
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constitutional underpinnings for Ordoliberalism in relation to competition
334
. In this 
sense, the EU Commission and Courts are free to adopt whichever approach they deem 
appropriate.       
  
The Egyptian legislator, likewise, seems to have been inspired by some of the principles 
of Shari‘ah. This may be envisaged from the fact that the Egyptian Competition Law is 
entitled: ―Law on the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic 
Practices‖ (―Qanoun Himayet Al-Monafsa Wa Mane‘ Al-Momarasat Al-Ihtikaria‖)335. 
In fact, if the legislator was to ignore the Shari‘ah terminology of monopoly (ihtikar), 
the law would have been named as ‗competition law‘ or ‗competition act‘; as is indeed 
commonly used elsewhere. 
 
Ordoliberalism and Shari‘ah as such have both (arguably) influenced the process of 
enactment of the EU and Egyptian Competition Laws. The only difference, however, in 
this respect is where Ordoliberalism does not appear to have any constitutional 
underpinning in EU. Hence, relevant EU Authorities/Courts are not bound to follow 
Ordoliberals approaches. Shari‘ah, on the other, has a constitutional underpinning under 
the Egyptian system (Article 2 of the Constitution). Nevertheless, there appears to be no 
explicit direct evidence that Egyptian Authorities/Courts are obliged to follow Islamic 
principles in their approach. However, it is argued that Article 2 represents a desire from 
the Egyptian government to comply with Islamic principles within its legal system.   
 
While it is recognized that the EU and Egypt took the initiative of adopting a more 
economic-based approach to competition law through increasing economic expertise, 
this development seems to raise some interesting questions in relation to the compliance 
with their origins. Will the deployment of a more economic-based approach function in 
contradiction with the Ordoliberal and Shari‘ah origins? In other words, by virtue of 
this modernized approach, can competition-related decisions take a different path? If so, 
will the new approach lead to more lenient/flexible or rather more restrictive decisions? 
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By moving towards an economic-based approach as such, the EU Commission and 
ECA (by virtue of Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations) seem to take into 
consideration the arguments favouring an effects-based approach. This appears to be in 
contrast with the Ordoliberals‘ theories and some views of the Islamic jurisprudence in 
relation to price control. Particularly, the EU Commission‘s appointment of a CCE 
exemplifies a departure from Ordoliberal views that primarily focus on the protection of 
individual freedoms and the limitation of market intervention rather than consumer 
welfare per se. The method of assessment appears to vary. Specifically, Ordoliberals 
favoured minimum degree of market intervention (arguably compatible with a per se 
approach) seems to contrast with an effects-based analysis. If applied in practice, one 
may submit that the former method is more rigid than the latter one.   
 
In the same vein, the Egyptian government - through Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive 
Regulations - seems to depart from the fairness considerations perceived by the Shafi 
and Hanbali schools regarding the restriction of price control. This is clear from the 
adoption of economic courts and the intent to increase economic expertise in the 
ECA
336
. However, in contrast with the EU, Egypt, by employing this interventionist 
approach, reflects its origins – so long as the principles of no-harm and maslahah are 
given substantial account when intervening in the market. In this sense, the Shari‘ah 
seems to take a less restrictive method of assessment of practices compared with 
Ordoliberalism – one that seems to coincide with an effects-based approach.  
 
To this end, the EU Commission, by moving towards a more economic-based approach, 
would be departing to a less restrictive approach than that adopted by its Ordoliberal 
origins. However, given the lack of a constitutional commitment to follow Ordoliberal 
theories, investigating authorities are free to move to a more or less restrictive approach. 
Egypt on the other hand, inspired by the EU in this context, and assuming that it will 
follow its economic-based approach, would be arguably employing more or less the 
same approach provided by Shari‘ah. It is indeed this equilibrium that constitutes the 
common EU and Egyptian values of competition law. Whether or not, however, the EU 
and Egypt will employ a modernized economic-based approach in practice – as the 
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former explicitly claims - will remain to be discussed in chapters four and five of this 
thesis. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Ordoliberal theories and thought constitute a core source and origin of 
EU Competition Law. However, the durability of such influence remains highly 
questionable. This is based on two imperative intertwined assumptions. First, the 
Commission and Courts alike are not obliged to follow the Ordoliberal origins on 
competition on the basis that there appears to be no constitutional underpinning for this. 
Second, and as a result of the first assumption, the EU Commission is nowadays 
moving to a more-economic based approach to competition law – one that may not (at 
least entirely) correspond to Ordoliberals theories and thought (specifically in relation to 
market intervention).  
 
The influence of Shari‘ah on the introduction and implementation of Egyptian 
Competition Law, on the other hand, so far appears to be reasonably moderate. Even 
though there exists a constitutional underpinning of Shari‘ah under the Egyptian 
system, there is no direct or explicit evidence that obliges the Egyptian government to 
adhere to the Islamic principles in practice. Particularly, the influence o Shari‘ah may 
be envisaged from the Egyptian system‘s approach to the analysis of monopolistic 
practices that seems to favour an effects-based approach in line with the initiative of the 
EU Commission.  
 
However, Egypt (whether at ECA or Courts level), in contrast with the EU, arguably 
lacks the necessary economic expertise to conduct economic analysis in competition 
law at this stage. Consequently, in the event of employing an effects-based approach to 
abuse of dominance, the risk of committing judicial errors – whether type I or type II – 
is high. This is perhaps the reason why the ECA, arguably inspired by the EU 
Commission‘s initiative, is nowadays seeking to increase expertise in this field. 
Likewise, the Egyptian government enacted the law establishing economic courts. 
When, however, Egypt will be ready to employ such approach remains to be 
investigated in the forthcoming chapters four and five.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INFLUENCE OF EU AND ISLAMIC LAWS ON THE 
TREATMENT OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE UNDER 
EGYPTIAN COMPETITION LAW: INVESTIGATING 
THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS IN EGYPTIAN 
RULES   
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The prohibition of abuse of dominance constitutes an integral part of any competition 
law system; given the fact that abusive practices may generate detrimental effects on the 
process of competition and, in some instance, consumers. This is why the (arguably) 
distinctive features in the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition 
Law may be critical to the extent that they may eventually harm its economy. The 
distinctive characteristics that may or may not imply the influence of EU rules or 
Islamic principles (depending on circumstances) may traverse in two forms. First, where 
the Egyptian Competition Law does not regulate or discipline certain abusive practices, 
and, second, where the ECA employs a method of analysis that may not be suitable to it 
at the current stage – whether or not the concerned competition law stipulates this 
specific approach may be irrelevant.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to determine the degree of influence of EU rules and Islamic 
principles on the legal treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition 
Law and, as such, to investigate the distinctive characteristics in the latter system. It is 
believed that in order to discern the EU rules‘ influence in particular, a determination of 
whether or not the Egyptian rules function equivalently with them is deemed necessary. 
That said the chapter should provide a study on the EU rules on abuse of dominance, 
aside from the Egyptian ones. The objective here is not, however, to address all forms 
of abusive conducts and compare them under both systems. The aim is ultimately to 
explore the distinctive characteristics in the Egyptian treatment of abuse of dominance 
that may raise Islamic law concerns and could eventually generate potential effects in 
the economy. In this sense, the chapter adopts a selective approach in relation to the 
study of abuse of dominance under EU and Egyptian Competition Laws.              
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The chapter will start off by conceptualizing dominance in terms of definition, legality 
and determinants under EU and Egyptian laws. It will then move on to investigate the 
recognition of the abuse of excessive pricing under these laws and determine the 
Islamicity of the Egyptian treatment in this respect. It will further discern the legal 
treatment of margin squeeze under EU and Egyptian Competition Laws and investigate 
the gaps under the latter system as well as the degree of their compliance with Islamic 
law. Finally, it will investigate the similarities and differences in relation to the method 
of appraisal of abuse of dominance under EU and Egyptian systems and determine the 
degree of influence of the former as well as Islamic principles on the Egyptian law. 
       
4.2 CONCEPTUALIZING DOMINANCE UNDER EU AND 
EGYPTIAN COMPETITION LAWS 
4.2.1The concept of dominance: definition and rationale for legality  
The EU‘s definition of dominance varies from that of Egypt. However, both approaches 
- broadly speaking – function equivalently in the sense that dominance in itself is not 
prohibited and that a firm that is dominant in EU and Egyptian jurisdictions is restricted 
from exercising certain conducts. The distinction rather lies in how and when a firm can 
be classified as dominant. Having set out these assumptions, some questions should in 
turn be raised prior to defining the concept of dominance under each system: Why is 
dominance in itself not prohibited under the EU? Why does Egypt follow the same 
pattern? Does the lack of prohibition of dominance reflect EU and Egyptian origins of 
competition law?      
 
4.2.1.1 Dominance under EU Competition Law                      
While some believe that the legality of dominance in itself in the EU is based on some 
efficiency considerations rather than Ordoliberalism, others argue that the notion of 
‗special responsibility‘ attached to dominant firms demonstrates a sound adherence to 
Ordoliberalism. For instance, Akman argues that the fact that Article 102 TFEU does 
not prohibit dominant positions in themselves remains justified by a desired degree of 
―efficiency‖337. It may be the case that drafters of Article 102 perceive that dominance – 
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so long as it is not accompanied by any form of abusive practices – raises wealth within 
the EU and in turn develops its economy. In fact, it is on such basis that Akman argues 
that Article 102 was drafted from an efficiency angle and not through the lens of 
Ordoliberalism
338
. 
  
Furthermore, according to Akman, by not prohibiting dominant positions, Article 102 
TFEU constitutes a solid departure from ―Classic Ordoliberalism‖; given that the latter 
would have taken the initiative of prohibiting them in order to avoid conduct control 
and intervention. In fact, drafters of Article 102 TFEU had the opportunity to initially 
prohibit dominant positions – an initiative that was supported by the French but 
importantly declined by the German Delegation who were said to often provide an 
Ordoliberal vision
339
. 
 
Further evidence that Article 102 TFEU is not Ordoliberal is that it aims to provide a 
protection mechanism, not to a dominant‘s competitors or their economic freedom, but 
rather to the ―customers‖ who deal with it. This is clear from the negotiations conducted 
by Von Der Groeben who stressed the issue of exclusion of rivals and observed that 
exclusionary practices do in fact maintain competition as long as they do not comprise 
an ―unfair competition‖ practice. According to him, drafters did not seem to have 
viewed that a dominant‘s harm to rivals equates with the distortion of competition. They 
perceived that if a protection mechanism to competitors was to be introduced, it would 
do so through a separate set of rules - the law on ‗unfair competition‘340. 
 
On the other hand, it is argued that the way the notion of ―special responsibility‖ 
attached to dominant firms is treated under the EU system reflects an Ordoliberal 
nature. For instance, Ahlborn and Padilla compare the narrow interpretations of special 
responsibility - whereby dominant firms have stricter responsibilities under Article 102 
TFEU than non-dominant ones - with its broad perspectives - whereby dominant firms 
should not exercise conducts which may augment market power and hinder competitors 
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irrespective of efficiency gains. More to the point, they believe that this notion is rooted 
from the Ordoliberalists‘ ―as if‖ rule (meaning that while they are not entitled to 
exercise certain conducts, dominant firms should act as if they are not dominant)
341
.  
 
Article 102 TFEU does not explicitly define dominance. The EU‘s definition of 
dominance derives from its case law. In United Brands - as subsequently reflected in 
Hoffmann-La Roche and Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand - the CoJ defined dominance as: ―A 
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power 
to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers‖342. 
 
The EU Commission‘s Discussion Paper and Guidance seem to uphold the United 
Brands‘ definition. Pursuant to the Discussion Paper, the definition is comprised of 
three constituents. First, a market must have a position for economic power. Second, 
this power must be strengthened adequately in a way that would enable 
―undertaking(s)‖ at stake to disable ―effective competition‖ in the market and third, 
empowering it to act ―independently to an appreciable extent‖343. In contrast to this 
understanding, some argue that the CoJ‘s definition per se appears to have only two 
constituents; the first and second constituents‘ together, while the third should be 
contemplated separately
344
.  
                      
Some, however, suggest that the CoJ intended to define dominance in an undividable 
manner in the sense that the definition should be read as an entire statement. Indeed, it 
would be unusual if the EU‘s investigating authorities at stake neglect any of the 
mentioned constituents. With respect to the definition itself, several issues remain 
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questionable. It is irrational to believe that acting independently would stand as an 
appropriate analogy for determining dominance. Regarding the issue of independence 
from competitors, an undertaking is to some extent restricted by the acts of its 
competitors who may collectively have an influence on a demand fall for instance and 
may therefore raise their prices. The undertaking in question in a situation as such 
would accordingly raise its price to a level not exceeding that of its competitors, for 
profitability purposes. Thus, independence may not exist in this case
345
.  
 
Regarding independence from customers - say distributors and ultimate consumers - 
how can it be said that an undertaking (presumably a manufacturer) acts independently 
whereas it is committed to certain production and distribution volumes that are set to 
match the demand side of distributors and ultimate consumers? Put differently, firms - 
whether efficient or not - conduct market research to identify similar existing products 
in the market, and determine demand levels, prices etc. This process is usually 
undertaken prior to supplying these products to the market. Hence, it should not be 
suggested that undertakings act independently
346
. Furthermore, the Discussion Paper 
defined market power – a term that is often associated with dominance347 - as: ―The 
power to influence market prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods and 
services, or other parameters of competition on the market for a significant period of 
time‖348. This definition resembles the neoclassical approach; according to which 
substantial market power would mean a firm‘s capability to set its prices above the 
competitive level in a profitable manner and thereby, reduce this market‘s output for a 
substantial period of time
349
.       
 
Nevertheless some may contest adherence to the neoclassical definition of market 
power in practice. In fact, it is argued that if a neoclassical approach was to be followed 
in United Brands and Hoffmann La Roche, these latter firms may have not been found 
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dominant. This is because a neoclassical approach seems to substantially narrow the 
scope of firms by requiring, not only the ability to raise prices above the competitive 
level and reduce output, but also for a ‗significant period of time‘. On the other hand, 
the definition provided by the CoJ required neither of them
350
. But what does the 
‗significant period of time‘ criterion entail? In other words, how does it function in 
practice? The Commission‘s Guidance explicitly clarified this matter. According to the 
Guidance, the satisfaction of the ‗significant period of time‘ criteria ―will depend on the 
product and on the circumstances of the market in question, but normally a period of 
two years will be sufficient‖351.   
 
4.2.1.2 Dominance under Egyptian Competition Law  
The fact that the Egyptian legislator did not prohibit dominance in itself is (arguably) 
not incompatible with Shari‘ah. Neither of the definitions of prohibited monopoly 
provided by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence – as discussed in the preceding 
chapter - seems to prohibit dominance. The definitions appear to associate the concept 
of ‗abuse‘ with that of ‗dominance‘ rather than the latter in isolation. Truth be said, the 
precepts and objectives of Shari‘ah may somehow coincide with dominance or market 
power. The well-established rule that a practice should not be prohibited unless it 
generates harm to others may apply in the case of gaining dominance in a given 
market
352
. Put differently, dominance or market power – so long as not accompanied 
with abusive practices – is not usually harmful. This is aside from the fact that 
dominance is not a practice but is rather a position that may generate a practice.  
 
The effects of dominance without abuse, except on the structure of the market, may be 
relatively minimal. It is perhaps on this basis that the Egyptian legislator does not 
prohibit it. In fact – on the contrary - encouraging firms‘ progress in markets is one of 
which the objectives and principles of Shari‘ah may overlap with. The principle of 
maslahah signifies ‗benefits‘, ‗interests‘ or obtaining equilibrium between ‗private 
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interests‘ and the broader scope of ‗public interests‘353. A firm that acquires market 
power – though not constituting the best of market structures – may increase market 
efficiencies and consumer welfare gains through low prices (public interest). 
Discouraging market power, on the other hand, may mean discouraging firms‘ progress 
– one that may be incompatible with the principles and objectives of Shari‘ah.      
 
As opposed to Article 102 TFEU, Articles 4 of the Law No. 3/2005 and 7 and 8 of its 
Executive Regulations provide, not only provide a definition, but also an elaboration on 
dominance. Article 4 of Law No. 3/2005 provides that: ―Dominance in a relevant 
market is the ability of a person, holding a market share exceeding 25% of the 
aforementioned market, to have an effective impact on prices or on the volume of 
supply on it, without his competitors having the ability to limit it. The Authority shall 
determine the situations of dominance according to the procedures provided for in the 
Executive Regulations of this Law‖354. The definition of dominance as such seems to 
have missed some of the main features of the concept such as economic power and the 
hindrance of effective competition to which the EU case law deems necessary. 
However, the last sentence of Article 4 indicates that there is still more to be added to 
this definition. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Executive Regulations, dominance provides 
the existence of three elements. First, the person must hold a market share of more than 
25% of the relevant market for a certain period of time. Second, the person should have 
the ability to influence prices or volume of products supplied in that market and third, 
the inability of competitors to restrict his or her influence on prices or volume of these 
products
355
.  
                                         
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Executive Regulations, by stipulating that: ―The person 
shall have effective impact on the prices of the products or the quantity supplied in the 
relevant market if this person has the ability, through his/her individual acts, to 
determine the prices of these products or the quantity supplied in that market where 
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his/her competitors do not have the ability to prevent these acts [...]‖ does somehow 
resemble the definition provided by the CoJ in United Brands. The wording individual 
acts correspond to the terminology independently. The latter may seem, however, 
narrower in scope. More specifically, the Executive Regulations‘ wording seems to 
extend the scope of dominance to a degree that is broader than that of the EU. A firm 
that acts individually may or may not behave independently; but a firm that behaves 
independently would solely act individually
356
.  
 
In fact, a neoclassical approach – in line with that reflected in the Commission‘s 
Discussion Paper and Guidance – may somehow be envisaged from the wording of 
Article 8 which states that: ―The person shall have effective impact on the prices of the 
products or the quantity supplied in the relevant market if this person has the ability, 
through his/her individual acts, to determine the prices of these products or the quantity 
supplied in that market where his/her competitors do not have the ability to prevent 
these acts [...]‖357. However, one should not say that the Egyptian legislator extracted a 
strict neoclassical perspective to the Egyptian Law and Regulation for several reasons. 
First, Article 4 of Law No. 3/2005, by providing that an undertaking is ―[…] To have an 
effective impact on prices or the quantities supplied […]‖ and Article 7(2) of its 
Executive Regulations providing the ―[…] effective impact on the prices of the products 
or on their quantity […]‖ may seem, at first sight, broader than the neoclassical 
approach – as upheld by the Commission - in scope358.  
 
More specifically - as previously highlighted – substantial market power from a 
neoclassical perspective entails a firm‘s capability to set its prices above the competitive 
level in a profitable manner and thereby, reduce that market‘s output for a substantial 
period of time. This approach intends to require an undertaking to have the ability to 
increase prices and reduce output in order to qualify as a market power acquirer. 
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However, raising prices inherently reduces the volume of output in a given market
359
. 
Thus, the sufficiency of proving the ability to raise prices above the competitive level 
from the part of the ECA would make sense; although in practice, it appears to prove 
both (even if it reaches a finding that either is satisfied)
360
. 
 
4.2.2 The determinants of dominance 
Given the potentially restrictive consequences of finding dominance, its determination 
is an important process
361
. Whilst there may exist several determinants of dominance in 
any dispute, this chapter discusses only two of them; first, market share thresholds and 
second, market barriers. This selection is based on two assumptions/justifications. First, 
market share thresholds represent the starting point for competition authorities and 
courts in respect of the determination of dominance. Second, market barriers are 
deemed to play a relatively decisive role in dominance findings.  
 
4.2.2.1 Determining dominance under EU Competition Law 
Market share threshold is the percentage quantifying the volume of sales that a firm 
attains in the relevant market
362
. Following identification of the relevant market, 
investigating authorities in almost all jurisdictions tend to start off by estimating the 
market share threshold of alleged dominant undertakings. However, it is controversial 
whether or not one should rely on these thresholds in determining dominance, since 
their significance varies from market to another. For instance, in bidding markets, 
notwithstanding the presence of high market shares, competition may remain fierce and, 
hence, one cannot consider them as strong indicators of dominance in a situation as 
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such. This is because these markets depend more on the capability to put forward the 
best bid
363
.  
 
Moreover, in a market where both entry and exit are profitably facilitated, not even a 
dominant firm would be able to price excessively, as there will always be the possibility 
of new entrants pricing below its price. This is not, however, to say that investigating 
authorities should not rely on market shares, but rather to suggest that they should treat 
them with extreme caution and employ other indicators as well, even in the case of high 
market share thresholds
364
. Article 102 TFEU does not provide for a minimum threshold 
as a basis for determination of dominance. The threshold is rather derived from the case 
law. Generally speaking, the EU case law contemplates market shares of below 25% as 
conclusive evidence that the concerned firm is not dominant. The Commission, in 
Grundig, did not reach a dominance finding, where it had at hand market shares of 23 
and 33% of two of the leading German TV Market. In contrast, in Virgin/British 
Airways, the Commission found British Airways holding a market share of 39.7% in a 
dominant position
365
. Market shares that lie between 40-50% do not usually provide a 
presumption for existence of dominance, as further evidence may be required. The CoJ, 
in Hoffmann-La Roche, did not uphold the Commission‘s finding of dominance when 
Hoffmann held a threshold of 43% in the Vitamin B3 market unaccompanied with 
additional evidence of dominance
366
.  
                      
Market shares that lie between 50-70% are considered under EU practice as substantial 
thresholds that do enable dominant position presumptions to a large extent. In Michelin 
I, it was held that market shares of 57 and 65 % were adequate for finding dominance, 
notwithstanding the lack of any supplementary evidences. The CoJ, in Akzo, took it 
even further when it stated that market shares that exceed the 50% create a rebuttable 
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presumption of dominance; in the absence of countervailing evidence
367
. The EU 
investigating authorities consider market shares that are above the 70% as a prima facie 
case of dominance. In Hilti, the CoJ adopted the Commission‘s view that a market share 
of 70-80% would not require any further investigation and so was the case in Tetra Pak 
where it had a 90% market share
368
. 
 
The above-mentioned cases exemplify the Commission and EU Courts‘ reasonable 
reliance on market share thresholds. Market shares, according to former EU 
Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kroes, provide a: ―Useful first indication of the 
overall market structure‖369. What perhaps makes EU rules on dominance more 
distinctive, as Ahlborn and Padilla write, is the threshold that necessitates intervention. 
The starting threshold for a dominance presumption is 50%, as the CoJ suggested in 
Akzo
370
. According to them, this relatively low threshold is proof that the approach to 
Article 102 TFEU intends to adopt the Ordoliberal standard of complete competition
371
. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in its Guidance, the Commission stated that: 
―Experience suggests that the higher the market share and the longer the period of time 
over which it is held, the more likely it is that it constitutes an important preliminary 
indication of the existence of a dominant position [...]. However, as a general rule, the 
Commission will not come to a final conclusion on the opportunity to pursue a case 
without examining all the factors which may be sufficient to constrain the behaviour of 
the undertaking‖372. This means that the degree of reliance on market share thresholds 
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will not take an excessive stance. In this sense, one should not necessarily say that this 
is an adherence to the complete competition standard of Ordoliberals, as Ahlborn and 
Padilla suggest.    
 
Indeed, Ordoliberals favour a market place whereby its players hold as equal thresholds 
as possible – one that satisfies the ultimate complete competition standard – rather than 
having large threshold difference that may indicate a case of impediment competition. In 
fact, Ahlborn and Padilla suggest that this desired standard may be envisaged in British 
Airways when the Commission stated that: ―Despite the exclusionary commission 
schemes, competitors of BA have been able to gain market share from BA since the 
liberalisation of the United Kingdom air transport markets. This cannot indicate that 
these schemes have had no effect. It can only be assumed that competitors would have 
had more success in the absence of these abusive commission schemes‖373.      
 
Investigating authorities in almost all jurisdictions determine the existence of barriers to 
entry and expansion present in the market under scrutiny. Indeed, the way and accuracy 
in which the outcome is reached varies from jurisdiction to another. The phenomenon of 
barriers to entry was closely analyzed and addressed by several economists. Bain 
defines entry barriers as: ―The advantages of established sellers in an industry over 
potential entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the extent to which 
established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without 
attracting new firms to enter the industry‖374. According to Bain, economies of scale, 
product differentiation, cost advantages and capital conditions may stand as barriers to 
entry
375
. The Bainian approach of entry barriers was however challenged by Stigler. 
While Bain contemplates economies of scale, product differentiation and cost 
advantages as barriers to entry, Stigler believes that neither of them should be 
considered as such. Instead, he defines barriers to entry as those costs ―which must be 
borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the 
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industry‖376. The difference between Bain‘s definition and that of Stigler, as Monti 
suggests, is that while the former perceives barriers to entry from the cost point of view, 
the latter takes them from easiness of market entry perspective
377
.           
 
The Commission‘s Discussion Paper defines entry and expansion barriers as: ―Factors 
that make entry impossible or unprofitable while permitting established undertakings to 
charge prices above the competitive level‖378. As indicated earlier, market share 
thresholds are not credible determinants of dominance, even in the case of 100% 
threshold, since market barriers may not be high
379
. Barriers - either to entry or 
expansion - may feature in a legal manner. More precisely, as the Commission indicates 
in the Discussion Paper, a state may adopt legislative measures granting exclusive rights 
to governmental entities that thereby, constitute market barriers and, perhaps, enable 
them to monopolize the market at a later stage
380
. Legal barriers may also take the form 
of tariffs that may be in favour of allegedly dominant firms, as reflected in the 
Commission‘s Discussion Paper, followed by its Guidance 381.  
 
Furthermore, an indispensable form of entry barriers that investigating authorities tend 
to take into account is sunk or irrecoverable costs. Sunk costs may be defined as: 
―Those costs that must be incurred in order to compete on a given market, and that are 
not recoverable upon exit‖382. Sunk costs – in other words – are the ―capital 
requirements‖ which a market necessitates for its entry383. Sunk cost is a recognized 
barrier to entry under EU law – though not explicitly stipulated under Article 102 
TFEU. The CoJ, in United Brands, stated that: ―The particular barriers to competitors 
entering the market are the exceptionally large capital investments required [...], the 
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introduction of an essential system of logistics [...], economies of scale from which 
newcomers to the market cannot derive any immediate benefit and the actual cost of 
entry made up inter alia of all the general expenses incurred in penetrating the market 
such as the setting up of an adequate commercial network, the mounting of very large-
scale advertising campaigns, all those financial risks, the costs of which are 
irrecoverable if the attempt fails‖. In fact, it is on the basis of these sunk costs that the 
CoJ found United Brands dominant
384
.   
 
4.2.2.2 Determining dominance under Egyptian Competition Law 
The elements necessary for determining dominance under the Egyptian system are 
stipulated under Article 4 of Law No. 3/2005, which provides that: ―Dominance in a 
relevant market is the ability of a person, holding a market share exceeding 25% of the 
aforementioned market, to have an effective impact on prices or on the volume of 
supply on it, without his competitors having the ability to limit it‖385. In this sense, for a 
firm to be found dominant under Law No. 3/2005, it has to satisfy the following pre-
requisites: 
1. It holds a market share threshold that exceeds 25% of the relevant 
market; 
2. It has the ability to have an effective impact on market prices or the 
volume of output; and 
3. The inability of competitors to limit such ability. 
  
It is important to note that the pre-requisites above-mentioned all ought to be satisfied. 
This means that if the ECA or court finds that the firm under scrutiny does not satisfy 
one of these pre-requisites, it shall not resume its analysis of the remaining criteria; and 
will thus not find that firm as dominant. However, the ECA has shown reluctance to 
rely on market share thresholds for dominance findings. For instance, in the Cement 
case, albeit finding Suez Group to have held a threshold of 30%, the ECA did not reach 
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a dominance finding on the basis of not satisfying other pre-requisites
386
. Moreover, in 
the Steel study, it found Ezz Group to have held a threshold of over 25% of the relevant 
market but only reached a dominance finding after a thorough analysis of the remaining 
pre-requisites
387
. In the same vein, in its study of the Vegetable Oil market, the ECA 
found that although one of the companies held 45.56% of the relevant market, it was not 
dominant on the basis of its inability to have an effective impact on prices
388
. This 
means that market share thresholds provide no more than a first indication that guides 
the ECA on whether to analyse the remaining criteria
389
.       
 
Article 8 of the Executive Regulations expands on the generic stipulation provided by 
Article 4. It provides that: ―The person shall have effective impact on the prices of the 
products or the quantity supplied in the relevant market if this person has the ability, 
through his/her individual acts, to determine the prices of these products or the quantity 
supplied in that market where his/her competitors do not have the ability to prevent 
these acts, taking into consideration the following factors:  
 
a) The person's share in the relevant market and his/her position in comparison to the 
remaining competitors; 
b) The conduct of the person in the relevant market in the previous period; 
c) The number of competing persons in the relevant market and its relative impact on 
the structure of that market; 
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d) The ability of the person and his/her competitors to obtain the raw materials 
necessary for production; and 
e) The existence of barriers facing other persons to enter the relevant market‖390 
 
The above-mentioned factors are collectively given due consideration in the analysis of 
dominance. However, Article 8 as such does not appear to define the form of market 
barriers needed for a dominance finding. Unusually the form and factors of market 
barriers were left to the case law to determine
391
. In its Steel study, the ECA found that 
Ezz Group had satisfied the effective impact on prices criterion, pursuant to Article 4, on 
the basis that its competitors (other Steel Rebar producers) were more or less forced to 
set their prices below it. The ECA also found that albeit such a price difference and 
while competitors may have had higher levels of demand, Ezz Group did not modify its 
prices. That said, the ECA found that Ezz Group had adopted its pricing policy 
individually i.e. without having to take into account the pricing policies of its 
competitors and thus found that Ezz Group had satisfied the effective impact on prices 
pre-requisite
392
.  
 
The question that should be raised in this respect: Does Ezz Group – by satisfying ‗the 
ability to have an effective impact on prices‘ pre-requisite – violate Shari‘ah? In other 
words, does it deserve intervention from the ECA from an Islamic law viewpoint? 
Indeed this inquiry roots from the legality of dominance in itself under Shari‘ah (as 
discussed earlier). However, it is important to take into account the ECA‘s appraisal for 
a more in-depth answer rather than merely depending on legal provisions. The 
definitions of prohibited monopoly provided by the Islamic jurisprudence mostly refer 
to food (and more precisely: Grain) or other essential products. Yet, Steel may arguably 
be contemplated as an essential product.  
 
Furthermore, these definitions seem to present mere illustrations and hence one should 
not consider dealing with products other than these mentioned in them (in 
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corresponding circumstances) as permitted under Shari‘ah. To this end, assuming that 
Steel is encompassed and applying these definitions in light of the ECA‘s analysis on 
Ezz Group‘s ability signifies that the latter is compliant with Shari‘ah (arguably) as 
long as it does not sell its Steel at inflated or below-cost prices (as will be discussed in 
parts 4.3.3.2 and 4.4.4 respectively). In fact, the ability to have an effective influence on 
prices in itself is not prohibited under Shari‘ah. It is ―a must‖ for Ezz Group to exploit 
such ability for its acts to violate Shari‘ah. Intervention in turn should not take place in 
respect of Ezz Group‘s ability. In fact, market intervention in a situation as such may 
contradict with Shari‘ah. It should, however, be stressed that the ECA, by determining 
Ezz Group‘s ability to have an effective impact on market prices for the purposes of 
assessing the existence of dominance is not considered as intervening – as intervention 
under Shari‘ah entails price control. Clearly the Egyptian legislator gave account to this 
aspect.    
 
Moreover, the ECA found that Ezz Group had satisfied the ability to affect the volume 
of output criterion on grounds that it acquired more than 50% of the market‘s total 
production, it occupied the highest volume of production capacity in comparison to its 
competitors; and, had privilege over its competitors in terms of obtaining the necessary 
raw material
393
. It should be noted in this respect that the ability of an incumbent to 
have an effective impact on the volume of output in a given market is well recognized 
under Shari‘ah. In fact, monopoly is not prohibited unless the incumbent ―withholds‖ a 
product for a certain period of time. Although the meaning of ‗withholding‘ varies from 
that of having the ability to affect the quantity of output, it somehow coincides with it.  
While on the one hand, a company which maintains the ability to have an impact on the 
volume of output of a specific product is able to eventually withhold it, on the other 
hand, a company that does not have such ability may not have the capacity to withhold 
that product for a given time. It is on this basis that one should not doubt on the 
Islamicity of providing the ability to influence the volume of output as a pre-requisite for 
dominance findings – similar to the ability to have an effective impact on market prices.  
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The ECA furthermore found that Ezz Group had satisfied the inability of competitors to 
have an effective influence on prices and output criterion. Particularly, it assessed the 
satisfaction of this pre-requisite through an investigation of two factors: Legal barriers 
and sunk costs (i.e. the ability to establish new industries). It found that imports of Steel 
Rebar were impeded by the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Nonetheless the ECA 
stressed that although these duties had terminated, imports of Steel Rebar did not 
exceed 1.5% of the total volume of output in the relevant market. In relation to the 
second factor (sunk costs), the ECA indicated that establishing a new industry for the 
production of Steel Rebar requires vast investments - despite the size of investment 
required varies according to the kind of industries or stage of production. Justifying 
such finding, the ECA contended that even though the market featured new entrants, 
they were merely rolling industries that were not capable of posing fierce competition 
towards Ezz Group. This is because these industries would incur costs that are higher 
than those incurred by finished industries – a factor that may make them ineffective in 
the market whether in terms of pricing or volume of output
394
.             
 
4.3 REGULATING THE ABUSE OF EXCESSIVE PRICING 
4.3.1 The practice of excessive pricing: Definition and arguments for and 
against prohibition 
In principle, markets are renowned to be at their highest degree of efficiency when 
prices are competitive. While consumers suffer substantially at high prices in a manner 
that may eventually deter total welfare of society, firms, likewise, endure the costs of 
significant investments at low prices that may lead to unsuccessful market entry or 
exist
395
. But how are excessive or unfair prices defined? Under EU law, the practice of 
excessive pricing is classified under the category of exploitative abuses
396
. The literature 
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does not appear to agree on a single or cohesive definition. Marxists economists argue 
that a price becomes fair when it equates with the ―value of labour‖ used for production 
of goods in question
397
. Neoclassical economists suggest that the fair price of goods or 
services rests on their competitive market price
398
. Modern industrial organisation 
theorists tend to perceive excessive prices as: ―Those which are set significantly and 
persistently above the competitive level as a result of the exercise of market power‖399. 
In general terms, and in light of these views, for a price to be contemplated as unfair or 
excessive, it should be set well above the competitive level in a manner.  
 
Despite numerous economists describing the ability to increase prices and reduce output 
as a strong reason for condemning monopoly, the conduct of excessive pricing has 
infrequently been challenged by competition authorities. This may be rationalized by 
several justifications; for instance, the power to charge high prices and, consequently, 
reduce output is generally contemplated as a core feature of monopoly. Hence, disputing 
monopolists on the premise of having such powers may presuppose that dominance in 
itself is incompliant with competition law and would thus necessitate intervention
400
. 
 
Moreover, regulating excessive pricing and disciplining firms that exercise such 
conduct may discourage innovation and cost reduction. In fact, in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, the U.S. Supreme Court 
interestingly stated that the ―Opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at least for a 
short period – is what attracts ―business acumen‖ in the first place; it induces risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth‖401. Furthermore, excessive pricing 
induces market entrants who attempt to under-cut prices of the dominant firm at stake in 
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pursuit of profit – often named as ―self-correction‖402. In this sense, jurisdictions that do 
not prohibit excessive pricing – most notably U.S. Antitrust Law - often deem 
intervention unnecessary
403
. However, in markets where entry barriers are quite high, 
excessive prices are likely to prevail for long periods. In fact, the controversy over 
whether or not the conduct of excessive pricing is self-corrective is vast
404
.  
 
The general theme developed in the literature is that excessive pricing induces market 
entry in a manner that undermines the ability of the dominant firm concerned to price 
excessively (self-corrective status)
405
. This signifies that a pricing structure as such does 
not necessitate an interventionist regime. In contrast, however, Ezrachi and Gilo suggest 
that excessive pricing does ―not attract entry‖ and thus ―non-intervention‖ should not 
be rationalized by self-correction
406
. They argue that potential entrants are mostly 
concerned with ―post-entry‖ prices rather than ―pre-entry‖ ones; to which proponents of 
self-corrective/non-interventionist approach seem to rely on. This is because ―pre-entry‖ 
prices are not important unless they provide an indication to potential entrants that the 
incumbent firm in question is ―inefficient‖ – an intuition that entry could be 
―profitable‖. Conversely, if the potential entrant obtains the necessary information on 
the incumbent‘s cost advantages and deems that the latter is more efficient, it may 
choose not to enter; even though the incumbent‘s prices are excessive. This is because 
as soon as entry takes place, the incumbent would reduce its prices in response to new 
entry
407
.  
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In addition, a determination of whether or not the price at stake is excessive, and thus 
abusive, is multifaceted. What ―standards‖ should the investigator embrace? Comparing 
the incumbent‘s price at stake with a ―hypothetical competitive price‖ could be 
irrational. Adopting a ―reasonable price‖ through adding an ―acceptable profit margin‖ 
to the ―actual cost‖ of the product in question would likewise not be pragmatic. For 
instance, it may be questionable whether the investigator should rely on ―historic‖ costs 
as an analogy for such simulation or instead on nowadays costs. Moreover, a large 
profit margin does not necessarily signify exploitative pricing; but may rather be based 
on efficiency of the firm in question
408
. In the same vein, competition authorities 
devising suitable prices would turn them into ―regulators‖ rather than dispute settlers409. 
 
Furthermore, some view that tolerating excessive pricing may enable the incumbent to 
invest extensively and develop new products. However, this argument was criticised on 
the basis that the society may have a restricted volume of output in return. This is in 
addition to the detrimental effects on consumer welfare. In fact, some argue that the 
monopoly rents incurred by consumers in this respect that are said to be invested in 
developing products may have been utilised in a more efficient manner that would have 
benefited the economy
410
.     
  
Notwithstanding the potency of these arguments countering the prohibition of excessive 
pricing, there exists a couple of intriguing arguments in favour of regulating these 
practices. First, excessive pricing represents the ―most direct violation‖ to the interests 
of consumers to which competition laws essentially intend to safeguard. It is, moreover, 
argued that market structure does not always preclude the success of excessive pricing. 
There may prevail in some ―exceptional circumstances‖ in which a given market 
structure could permit excessive pricing that would solely be cured by competition law 
intervention. Second, while it is relatively true that prohibiting excessive pricing may 
hamper investment incentives and new entry, it is argued that a thoroughly considered 
policy may overcome these complexities
411
.                 
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4.3.2 The recognition of excessive pricing under EU Competition Law: An 
investigative priority? 
Article 102(a) TFEU prohibits excessive pricing by dominant firms. More specifically a 
dominant firm is prohibited from ―directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions‖412. In essence, this means that a 
dominant firm may be caught under Article 102(a) if it sells at ―unfairly high prices‖; or 
otherwise purchases goods or services at ―unfairly low prices‖413. It should be noted, 
however, that Article 102(a) as such does not require the EU Commission to prohibit 
excessive pricing; it rather gives it the capacity to do so. The number of excessive 
pricing cases – whether at the EU or member states level – is quite minimal. 
Nonetheless, some suggest that the existing case law provides a clear guidance as to 
how excessive is treated in the EU
414
. The leading case is the decision in United 
Brands
415
.  
  
In United Brands, the Commission found United Brands, a well-established Bananas 
firm, to have abused, inter alia its dominant position through pricing excessively. It was 
found that the prices that United Brands sold its Chiquita bananas in Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Denmark and Germany were unfairly high
416
. The Commission 
investigated the price disparities between branded and unbranded bananas. It found that 
Chiquita bananas in general were vended at 30-40% to the unbranded bananas of United 
Brands
417
. The Commission then compared United Brands‘ prices in the EU. It found 
that bananas that were sold in Dublin, Ireland were the cheapest. It also found that the 
prices charged in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Germany were as double as 
those in Dublin. The Commission then held that United Brands‘ prices were excessive 
outside Ireland by 15%
418
. However, it did not to justify how it arrived at this margin. In 
addition, as Evans and Padilla suggest, the Commission did not provide an estimate of 
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United Brands‘ costs of production – relying mostly on the profit rates the company had 
attained from sales in Ireland
419
.  
 
On appeal, the CoJ found that the prices it charged were merely 7% higher than its 
competitors – a discrepancy which should not have been deemed excessive - and 
indicated that the Commission had abandoned United Brands‘ costs structure420. 
Instead, the determination of the excessiveness of prices should be based on a two-tiered 
test according to the CoJ‘s approach, as some suggest. First, it involves a comparison of 
the product‘s actual costs with its prices. Second, it necessitates a verification of 
whether a price is unfairly high or excessive in ―itself‖ or through a price comparison 
with competitors of the firm in question. The CoJ seemed to employ this approach when 
it pointed out the Commission decision‘s errors. At the outset, it indicated the 
Commission‘s abandonment of United Brands‘ cost structure. It also found that United 
Brands‘ price disparity in comparison with that of its competitors was not substantial so 
as to be excessive
421
.   
 
In General Motors, the Commission, applying the same approach employed in United 
Brands, held that the former had priced its vehicle conformity inspections excessively. 
Particularly, it found that General Motors had charged the same prices for conformity 
inspection of both European and American models; notwithstanding that European ones 
cost less
422
. More recently, in British Leyland, deploying the same economic value/costs 
correlation, the Commission found that the vehicle manufacturer had charged excessive 
prices for certificates for left and right-handed cars; despite that the costs of inspections 
were the same
423
. The question that should be raised in this respect: Are excessive 
prices objectively justifiable within the context of Article 102 TFEU? According to 
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O‘Donoghue and Padilla, such practice is capable of being objectively justified. This 
may be envisaged from the CoJ when it overturned the Commission‘s decision in 
General Motors on the basis that the firm presented ―an adequate explanation‖ for its 
prices
424
.          
 
It is vital to note, however, that the practice of excessive pricing, although constituting a 
prohibition under Article 102 TFEU, does not represent a priority for investigation by 
the Commission. While in office, Commissioner Kroes once stressed: ―It is wise in 
enforcement policy to give priority to so-called exclusionary abuses, since exclusion is 
often at the basis of later exploitation of customers‖. On a more recent occasion, the 
Commission in its Guidance stated that: ―For the purpose of providing guidance on its 
enforcement priorities the Commission at this stage limits itself to exclusionary conduct 
and in particular certain specific types of exclusionary conduct which, based on its 
experience, appear to be the most common‖. Indeed it may be questionable that the 
Commission seeks to prevent exclusionary abuses on the basis that they indirectly harm 
consumers (that is indeed the ultimate EU Competition Law objective) without giving 
priority to exploitative abuses that directly harm or exploit consumers
425
. However, one 
may argue that excessive pricing is not prioritized as such on the basis that it is difficult 
to assess and investigate
426
.            
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4.3.3 The lack of excessive pricing prohibition under Egyptian Competition 
Law 
4.3.3.1 The legality of high pricing in general under Egyptian Competition Law 
In contrast with Article 102 TFEU, the list of abuses stipulated under Articles 8 of Law 
No. 3/2005 is ―exhaustive‖. This means that abusive practices that are not stipulated 
therein are not prohibited. The list does not contain excessive pricing
427
. In fact, the 
ECA‘s former Chairperson, in her message in the Annual Report of 2006-2007, stated 
that: ―The increase in prices has become a major problem in the marketplace. Though 
[high] price is not directly addressed by the competition law, it can, however, indicate 
practices that violate the law‖428. This indeed explains why the ECA in some occasions 
conducts studies on markets primarily on the basis of high prices. For instance, the Steel 
report was entitled: ―Study on Justifications behind Increase in Prices of Steel Rebar in 
the Egyptian Market‖429. In other words, the fact that the ECA rationalizes its 
intervention by high prices in a given market does not necessarily mean that it deems 
excessive or generally high pricing in itself a violation to competition law
430
.  
 
It is, however, surprising and perhaps questionable that the Law No. 3/2005 and its 
Executive Regulations stipulate the: ―Ability of a person [...] to have an effective impact 
on prices [...] without his competitors having the ability to limit it [...]‖ as means for 
determination of dominance, whilst not explicitly prohibiting excessive pricing
431
. In 
essence, this stipulation means that a firm‘s ability to increase market prices should not 
be influenced by its competitors‘ ability to successfully undercut it. Hence, the 
difference between such stipulation and excessive pricing is that the former stands as a 
means for determining dominance that is neither in itself prohibited under Law No. 
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3/2005 and its Executive Regulations nor condemned by Shari‘ah, while the latter is an 
abuse of such position
432
.   
   
Nevertheless, some may argue that excessive pricing may develop in the form of refusal 
to deal and could, thus, be caught under Article 8(b) of Law No. 3/2005
433
. Advocates 
of such view may invoke the procedures for investigating refusal to deal conducts; as 
stipulated under the Executive Regulations. More specifically, Article 13(b) prohibits a 
dominant firm from: ―Refraining from entry into sale or purchase transaction regarding 
a product with any person or totally ceasing to deal with it in a manner that results in 
restricting that person's freedom to access or exit the market at any time, which 
includes imposing financial conditions or obligations or abusive contractual conditions 
or conditions that are unusual in the activity subject matter of dealings‖434. 
 
However, an argument as such may be countered on the basis that the wording of 
Article 13(b) seems to primarily confine the prohibition to upstream market dealings or 
dealings amid producers, suppliers, distributors or wholesalers and, as such, may not 
necessarily extend to consumers. Moreover, Article 13(b), notwithstanding that it may 
be construed to prohibit imposing high or abusive prices, it may be limited to the 
situation where the purchase agreement in question does not come into force. This 
means that the tangible effects of the excessiveness of prices are merely confined to the 
firm(s), which found that the sale conditions were deemed unusual. Even if one 
presupposes that it covers the event where the buyer (or retailer) agrees to conclude the 
deal, even though it involves tough financial conditions
435
, it certainly does not cover a 
prohibition of excessive pricing. In fact, Article 13(b) as such is only restricted to 
refusal to deal (or ‗constructive‘ refusal to deal) abuses (as will be argued later in part 
4.4).  
 
                                                          
 
432
 Greiss, M. (2010) op.cit., p.25 
433
 Article 8(b) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from: ―Refraining to enter into sale or 
purchase transactions regarding a product with any person or totally ceasing to deal with him in a manner 
that results in restricting that person‘s freedom to access or exit the market at any time‖. 
434
 Article 13(b), Executive Regulations; Greiss, M. (2010) op.cit., p.25 
435
 Note that it will be argued in favour of this broad interpretation in relation to the determination of 
whether or not Egyptian Competition Law prohibits the practice of margin squeeze (part 4.4.3 in this 
chapter). Greiss, M. (2010) op.cit., p.25  
  
144 
Moreover, it may be argued that high pricing could be prohibited in the form of price 
discrimination in relation to the firm(s) incurring such prices, pursuant to Article 8(e) of 
Law No. 3/2005
436
. However, this abusive practice assumes that a dominant firm 
charges different prices to its customers; a practice which a dominant firm may not 
necessarily resort to. In other words, the dominant firm may rather favour charging 
similar high prices to all its customers; a practice that would certainly not be caught 
under Article 8(e)
437
.   
 
Furthermore, the hardcore prohibition of price fixing among competitors, whilst often 
leading to high prices in the market in question
438
, does not cover all the common 
elements of prohibition of excessive price abuses. First, price fixing assumes the 
existence of an agreement on market prices – whether verbal or written - between two 
or more competitors (horizontal agreement). Second, such agreement may not 
necessarily relate to high prices
439
. Excessive pricing, on the other hand, may be 
practised by one or more firms and does not require an agreement between competitors 
to restrict competition
440
.                     
 
The concern pertaining to a prohibition of excessive pricing should instead be narrower 
in scope. If excessive pricing were to be prohibited, the Egyptian legislator would have 
provided a definition of excessive pricing and stipulated the necessary test to determine 
excessive prices. This includes the agreed upon benchmark that ought to be followed in 
investigations
441
. Consequently, the fact that these provisions may, on some occasions, 
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discipline high pricing does not necessarily mean that they encompass excessive 
pricing, given the non-existence of a benchmark to determine excessiveness
442
.                
 
4.3.3.2 Investigating the Islamicity of the practice of excessive pricing  
The question that should be raised for the purposes of this chapter: is excessive or 
unfairly high pricing as such legitimate under Shari‘ah? Some may argue that excessive 
pricing is legitimate under Shari‘ah since prohibited monopoly therein presupposes that 
a firm withholds a product for a period of time prior to selling it at high prices, while the 
factor of ‗withholding‘ does not necessarily exist when a firm prices excessively. In 
fact, advocates of such view may go further to argue that ‗withholding‘ production or 
distribution of a product is already tackled under Articles 8(a) and 13 of Law No. 
3/2005 and its Executive Regulations respectively
443
. Thus, a firm may not even get the 
chance to re-sell the product at inflated prices on the basis that the ECA would intervene 
to discipline withholding production/distribution of such product. However, this 
argument seems to be flawed in several respects.             
 
As to the argument that the prohibition of withholding production/distribution of a 
particular product may somehow preclude firms from setting up high market prices, this 
approach assumes that market intervention is instantaneous. The fact is that, in practice, 
competition authorities do not usually intervene in markets immediately once a 
prohibited practice is committed. In other words, it may take some time for competition 
authorities, first, to detect the practice in the first place; and second, to conduct various 
studies and investigative procedures following detection of the practice. This may mean 
that, until the ECA intervenes to prohibit the practice of withholding distribution, the 
incumbent may have already sold the products at inflated prices – prohibited monopoly 
under Shari‘ah.            
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Moreover, even if one presupposes that intervention is immediate, increasing prices in 
itself leads to the limitation of output; pursuant to the neoclassical approach of 
substantial market power (as discussed earlier). In other words, the higher the price a 
firm sets in a given market, the lower the volume of output that will be supplied to that 
market. This means that increasing prices will inevitably lead to withholding or limiting 
volume of output in a manner that would be condemned and prohibited under Shari‘ah.      
Even if one disregards these arguments and assumes that raising prices may amount to 
an ―act‖ under Articles 8(a) and 13(a) of Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations 
respectively, and thus caught under these provisions, the practice of excessive pricing in 
itself explicitly raises the question of fairness to societies – an aspect that raises 
Shari‘ah concerns. 
  
In fact, it would not be surprising to see how excessive pricing could be condemned 
under Shari‘ah from this perspective. Price control is usually guided by two principles 
under Islamic jurisprudence: First, the no-harm principle, and second, the maslahah 
principle
444
. The first criterion is arguably satisfied on the basis that excessive pricing 
unquestionably generates negative effects and deters consumer welfare, while the 
second is based on the premise that such a practice favours private interests over the 
broader scope of public interests that Shari‘ah initially seeks to accomplish. Having 
established that the lack of excessive pricing prohibition under Egyptian Competition 
Law arguably raises Islamic law concerns, the question that follows and remains to be 
tackled in the following chapter: Does the lack of its prohibition harm or is likely to 
harm the Egyptian economy?        
 
4.4 THE ABUSE OF MARGIN SQUEEZE   
4.4.1The practice of margin squeeze: Definition and comparison with 
excessive pricing 
Margin squeeze is a practice that takes place when a vertically integrated firm (i.e. a 
firm that operates at both the upstream (wholesaler) and downstream (retailer) markets) 
which is dominant in the upstream market sells its input (presumably an essential one) 
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to its downstream competitor at a price that is so high that it disables that competitor 
from selling it profitably. In this sense, the difference between the cost of the input and 
its downstream price is minimal and the competitor‘s profit margin is ―squeezed‖ as a 
result
445. To engage in margin squeeze, a vertically integrated firm that is dominant in 
the upstream market may opt for one of three strategies. 
 
First, it may choose to charge high prices for its input in the upstream in a manner that 
may disable its rivals from selling profitably and hinders their ability to compete with it 
in the downstream market - where it is not dominant. Second, the firm may, instead of 
charging high upstream prices, choose to sell at below-cost prices in the downstream 
market, yet, overall, attaining profits through its sales in the upstream market
446. Third, 
it may choose to both charge its rivals high prices for its upstream input and sell its 
retail product at low downstream prices. Although margin squeeze by virtue of these 
strategies may at first sight seem to raise some other abuses
447
 (most notably for the 
purposes of this thesis: Excessive pricing) in a confusing manner given the prevalence 
of some similarities, it still varies substantially from them
448. 
 
Take excessive pricing for instance in comparison with margin squeeze. The first 
impression of charging an ―excessive‖ upstream price for a given downstream market 
player is that it lies within the scope of the excessive pricing abuse. In fact, the EU 
Commission seemed, according to O‘Donoghue and Padilla, to confuse margin squeeze 
with excessive pricing in Deutsche Telekom when it indicated that margin squeeze 
represents an illustration of ―imposing unfair selling prices‖ that is prohibited under 
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Article 102(a) TFEU
449. This is notwithstanding the fact that the two practices vary in 
two major ways.  
 
First, margin squeeze is an ―exclusionary‖ abuse that is caught under Article 102(b), 
while excessive pricing is an ―exploitative‖ abuse that is prohibited under Article 
102(a). And, second, the two practices vary in terms of method of investigation. While 
the benchmark for determining excessive pricing is the incumbent‘s own costs of 
supplying the product at stake in comparison with similar products in the same market, 
with regards to margin squeeze the price does not become excessive relative to the 
incumbent‘s own costs, but rather in comparison with the price and profit margin as 
estimated in the downstream market
450. 
                                       
4.4.2 The legal treatment of margin squeeze under EU Competition Law 
The practice of margin squeeze has not been given much attention in EU practice during 
the second half of the Twentieth Century. The case law at that stage was quite limited in 
this regard. The notable case at the time was British Sugar/Napier Brown where the EU 
Commission found that British Sugar had maintained a retail price for its own sugar that 
could not reflect both repackaging and selling costs and thus its buyer (at the wholesale 
market), Napier Brown, was unable to effectively compete with it at the retail market
451. 
However, the post-2000 era experienced a remarkable increase in the number of margin 
squeeze investigations.  
 
Particularly the surge in the number of cases may be attributed to the liberalization of 
the telecommunications sector (among other utilities) that was aimed at intensifying the 
competitive process at the retail level
452. In fact, the principal case on margin squeeze in 
the EU so far is in the telecoms market. In Deutsche Telekom, the Commission found 
that Deutsche Telekom had abused its dominant position through forcing a margin 
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squeeze on its downstream competitors. More specifically, Deutsche Telekom, a 
dominant firm in the network access services (local loop access services)
453
, charged 
high prices for access to its local loop services to its competitors on the retail market. 
The Commission found that these prices were higher than those it had charged for its 
own retail customers (i.e. end-users)
454
.   
   
With regards to the method of determination employed in Deutsche Telekom, the 
Commission indicated that a practice would amount to margin squeeze: ―If the 
difference between the retail prices charged by a dominant undertaking and the 
wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable services is negative, or 
insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the dominant operator of providing its 
own retail services on the downstream market‖455. In this sense, the analogy is that the 
mentioned negative margin (or at the very least, slim margin) is capable of excluding 
the dominant firm‘s downstream competitors; even if they are as efficient as the 
former
456. The GC upheld the Commission‘s decision and concurred with the latter that 
the dominant firm‘s costs and prices should stand as the analogy for discerning margin 
squeeze
457
.        
 
On appeal, the CoJ upheld the GC and Commission‘s decisions on both the method of 
analysis employed and the findings and indicated that there was no need to exemplify 
and explain that both wholesale and retail prices of Deutsche Telekom were in 
themselves abusive. It suffices to demonstrate that the practice of margin squeeze at 
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stake was capable of driving its (as efficient) competitors out of the market in a manner 
that would strengthen its dominant position and, as a result, harm consumers by limiting 
their choices
458. The CoJ also added that this might undermine consumers‘ long-term 
gains that derive from the conceivable decrease in retail prices for end-user access (as 
an outcome of distorted competition)
459
.   
 
In yet another interesting case, the Commission in Wanadoo España v. Telefónica found 
that Telefónica, a dominant firm in regional and national markets for wholesale 
broadband access, had abused its dominant position by squeezing the margin of its 
competitors; even though it was subject to a sector-specific regulation that provides it to 
weigh interests and promote downstream competition and consumer welfare through 
supplying wholesale services. Particularly, the Commission held that, given its high 
wholesale prices, Telefónica‘s downstream competitors could not have equated their 
retail prices for Internet access without loss. The Commission employed the same test 
as that of Deutsche Telekom (the equally efficient standard) to conclude that the practice 
had distorted competition and undermined the ability of competitors to enter and exit 
the market; all of which had affected end-users
460
.     
 
In Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera, AG Mazák interestingly suggested that margin 
squeeze might appear in the form of ―constructive‖ refusal to deal. More specifically, he 
stated that: ―One particular manifestation of a refusal to deal occurs in the case of an 
abusive margin squeeze (or ‗constructive refusal to deal‘) where, instead of refusing 
entirely to supply the essential/indispensable input in question, the dominant 
undertaking supplies the input to its competitors on the downstream market at a price 
which does not enable those competitors to compete effectively on the downstream 
market‖. In fact, he argues that the concern and effects of both refusal to supply and 
margin squeeze is virtually identical; that is the distortion of competition in the 
downstream market (as EU case law suggests)
461
.       
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Indeed, AG Mazák‘s line of thinking derives from the EU Commission‘s Guidance 
where margin squeeze was linked with refusal to deal. Specifically, it indicated under 
Section (D) entitled ―Refusal to Supply and Margin Squeeze‖ that for a refusal to deal 
practice to be prohibited, it need not be explicit, but could rather appear in the form of 
―constructive‖ refusal to deal through, for instance, the ―imposition of unreasonable 
conditions in return for the supply‖. In particular, the Commission stated that: “Instead 
of refusing to supply, a dominant undertaking may charge a price for the product on the 
upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream market, 
does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the 
downstream market on a lasting basis‖. In such event, for a prohibition under Article 
102 TFEU, the Guidance provides the satisfaction of three pre-requisites: first, the 
refusal pertains to an ―objectively necessary‖ product/service for competition in the 
downstream market; second, the likelihood of eliminating ―effective‖ downstream 
competition, and; third, the likelihood of causing harm to consumers
462
.  
   
4.4.3 The legal treatment of margin squeeze under Egyptian Competition 
Law 
At the outset, it is imperative to note that for a legal provision that is intended to 
prohibit the practice of margin squeeze, it should, at the very least, contain its basic pre-
requisites
463
. First, the practice is exercised by a vertically integrated firm that is 
dominant in the upstream market; second, the practice concerns an essential product, 
and; third, the vertically-integrated dominant firm‘s pricing is capable of eliminating as 
efficient competitors in the downstream market
464
. Given the necessity of satisfying 
these conditions cumulatively, the question that should in turn be raised in this respect: 
Does Egyptian Competition Law cover these pre-requisites?    
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Article 13 of the Executive Regulations, at first sight, seems to recognize constructive 
refusal to deal within the framework identified by AG Mazák in Konkurrensverket v 
TeliaSonera. Particularly, Article 13(b) prohibits a dominant firm from: ―Refraining 
from entry into sale or purchase transaction regarding a product with any person or 
totally ceasing to deal with it in a manner that results in restricting that person's 
freedom to access or exit the market at any time, which includes imposing financial 
conditions or obligations or abusive contractual conditions or conditions that are 
unusual in the activity subject matter of dealings. Refraining from entry into 
transactions with any person or totally ceasing to deal with it shall not be prohibited if 
justified on the basis that this Person does not have the ability to fulfil its obligations 
arising from the contract‖465.  
 
Closer insights, however, may suggest that Article 13(b) as such is merely restricted to 
refusal to deal in its ordinary form and may not encompass margin squeeze. This is 
based on two grounds. First, the wording of the provision seems to be confined to the 
event where the dominant firm offers its input at high (wholesale) prices but the buyer 
(or retailer) does not accept these terms. Second, assuming that the provision provides 
that the concerned dominant firm is vertically integrated (i.e. also operates in the 
downstream market; other than the upstream market where it is dominant) – although 
this is not explicit - it does not require the input to be essential for the downstream 
market or competition therein
466
.  
 
Nonetheless, construing Article 13(b) from a very broad yet prudent perspective 
suggests that constructive refusal to deal (or margin squeeze) within the framework 
discerned by AG Mazák is covered by it. This could be premised on three assumptions. 
First, Article 13(b) could be read as implicitly providing that the dominant firm in the 
upstream market also operates in the downstream market (i.e. vertically integrated). 
Second, the term ―product‖ that is stipulated under Article 13(b) is very general and, 
hence, could be read to cover the intended essential input. And third, Article 13(b) 
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 In fact, Article 13(b) in relation to the term ―product‖ does not seem to be as explicit as, for instance, 
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could signify that the practice is prohibited if it restricts the concerned (retailer‘s) 
freedom to enter or exit the market (or indeed excludes it from the market).  
 
Based on the foregoing assumptions, one may submit that constructive refusal to deal 
(or margin squeeze). However, the treatment of margin squeeze under Egyptian 
Competition Law remains insufficient to cover all the likely strategies that a vertically 
integrated firm may resort to. Neither the Law No. 3/2005 nor its Executive Regulations 
seem to recognize that the practice of margin squeeze does not always appear in the 
form of refusal to deal. In other words, they do not address margin squeeze in other 
circumstances; or that are otherwise not in the form of refusal to deal. This may indeed 
be explained by the fact that the abusive practices stipulated under Egyptian 
Competition Law are provided on an exhaustive basis.    
 
To this end, a vertically-integrated firm that is dominant in the upstream market may 
strategically choose to charge its downstream competitors ordinary (or not unusual) 
wholesale prices so as to avoid the application of Article 13(b) but then accept to sell its 
product at the retail market at below-cost prices and, as a result, squeeze its competitors‘ 
prices (primarily for exclusionary purposes)
467
. However, this vitally presupposes that 
the firm at stake is not dominant in the downstream market (aside of its dominance in 
the upstream market)
468
; otherwise, it may risk being caught under Article 13(e) of the 
Executive Regulations as pricing below marginal or average variable costs (predatory 
pricing)
469
. The question that should then follow for the purposes of this thesis: Is 
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pricing below-cost condemned under Shari‘ah - even though not tackled in this 
particular circumstance by Article 13(b)?  
 
4.4.4 Investigating the Islamicity of the treatment of margin squeeze under 
Egyptian Competition Law  
Having assumed that the Egyptian legislator seems to have missed the event where a 
vertically-integrated dominant firm decides to squeeze prices of its downstream 
competitors in the downstream market (where it is presumably not dominant) through 
selling at below-cost prices; rather than in the upstream market (where it is dominant) 
and may be caught under Article 13(b) of the Executive Regulations, it is indispensable 
to discern the Islamicity of such omission. This provides evaluating the likely effects of 
below-cost pricing on the society in light of the definition of prohibited monopoly and 
the guiding principles of market intervention under Shari‘ah.       
 
While it is argued that the practice of excessive pricing, on the one hand, complies with 
the definition of prohibited monopoly under the Shari‘ah in the sense that increasing 
prices, in itself, limits the volume of output, below-cost pricing, on the other hand, does 
not seem to be directly tackled under this definition. Particularly, pricing below-cost is 
not addressed in a direct manner (it is rather pricing above market prices that is 
mentioned). Although not sufficiently addressed in the literature, this form of pricing 
raises significant debate among the Islamic jurisprudence. In a Hadith reported by Al-
Hakim Al-Nisaboury: The Prophet came across a person who sells food with a price 
that is cheaper than market prices; so he asked him: ―Do you sell in our market with a 
price that is cheaper than ours?‖ the person replied: ―Yes‖. The Prophet then preached 
him and said: ―The fetcher to our market is like the mujahid for the sake of God; and the 
monopolist in our market is an atheist in the Book of God‖470. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
pricing below average variable costs by dominant firms tend to eliminate competitors and as such must be 
presumed as abusive. Prices above average variable costs but below average total costs are abusive only if 
they comprise ―part of a plan to eliminate a competitor‖. Prices above average total costs are not abusive.  
See Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie v. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. I-3359, paras.70-72           
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 Hadith reported by Al-Hakim Al Nisaboury, 12/2, Kitab Al—Biyou‘ (Book of Sales), as cited by EL-
Din, M. M. S. (1997) ―Al-Ihtikar fi Al-Shari‘ah Al-Islamia‖ (Monopoly in Islamic Shari‘ah), International 
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The debate of pricing below market prices was given some attention in Islamic 
jurisprudence. The Malikis line of thought argues that the seller should take into 
account market prices in relation to weighable food or non-food products. As for other 
non-weighable commodities, the seller does not need to take into consideration 
prevailing market prices. The Shafei, on the other hand, take a more liberal stance in 
this respect. They believe that no one is entitled to prevent a person from selling below 
market prices
471
.  
 
Although these approaches (generally speaking) seem to preclude the possibility of 
market intervention in relation to low prices, they appear to premise these views on 
several assumptions. First, the seller in question operates only in one market (i.e. is not 
vertically integrated). Even if it is assumed that the seller is also active in another 
subsequent market, dominance is not assumed in the latter market. Second, the seller 
merely sells at below market prices in general and not necessarily below-costs; and third 
but not least; the seller has good intentions in relation to selling below market prices. 
These assumptions are indeed not applicable to the event at stake.                 
 
Furthermore, it is imperative to note that intentions (―Al-Niyyat‖) in Islam play a 
substantial role. According to the Prophet ―Actions are defined by intentions‖472. 
Arguably, this means that while discerning whether or not a practice should be 
condemned, the intentions of the person who commits it are taken into consideration
473
. 
In this sense, it may be argued that a vertically integrated dominant firm that intends to 
exclude its downstream rivals through squeezing their margins by setting its prices at 
below-cost may be condemned under Shari‘ah, since it conveys an exclusionary intent. 
However, as discussed in the preceding chapter, market intervention/price control is 
generally guided by two factors: First, the principle of no-harm and, second, the 
principle of maslahah
474
. Is a practice as such capable of satisfying these factors?    
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Undeniably, the concerned practice is capable of excluding the vertically integrated 
dominant firm‘s downstream competitors and, as such, may arguably fulfil the principle 
of no-harm. Where, however, the controversy could arise is in relation to the principle 
of maslahah which essentially weighs private with public interests and favours the 
greater interest. While, as indicated above, the concerned practice is capable of harming 
competitors by way of excluding them from the market, it concurrently benefits 
consumers who get to buy the product at below-cost prices. In this sense, one may 
suggest that consumers (and competitors in this case) represent the greater interest to 
which Shari‘ah should be concerned with and, as such, the lack of prohibition of this 
practice may not raise any Islamic law concerns.  
 
Nevertheless, this argument could reasonably be countered for two reasons. First, these 
below-cost prices will last only for a temporary period and thus, what consumers will 
benefit from could be outweighed by what they could lose in the long-run (e.g. lack of 
choice, likely high prices). Second, similar to the exploitative practice of excessive 
pricing, below-cost pricing raises fairness concerns (aside of the issue of intentions)
475
; 
which is indeed in itself one of the cornerstones of Shari‘ah. In fact, the latter 
suggestion (arguably) finds support by Imam Ibn Taimiyah who indicated that where 
market price ―Is not fixed at a reasonable level to fulfil the need of the great public by 
the operation of normal principles of marketing, then the price should be fixed for the 
welfare of the people with justice, neither more nor less‖476. To this end and given the 
foregoing, one may argue that the lack of comprehensive prohibition of margin squeeze 
under Egyptian Competition Law raises Islamic law concerns. Does this effect, 
however, extend to the degree that the lack of such treatment may hinder Egyptian 
economy in the future?      
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4.5 THE METHOD FOR ANALYSIS OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
UNDER EU AND EGYPTIAN COMPETITION LAWS    
4.5.1 Modernizing Article 102 TFEU   
As highlighted in the preceding chapter, the EU Commission expressed an intention to 
move towards an effects-based approach. There are major differences between form-
based approaches to competition law that are (arguably) supported by Ordoliberals and 
effects-based analysis. The former approach was subject to substantial criticism; 
particularly from the EAGCP
477
. Particularly, the notion of abuse of dominance in the 
style applied by the Commission was challenged on the basis of its protection of 
competitors of an incumbent instead of the competition process itself - which should 
have inherently been the ultimate goal of competition law. The Commission, according 
to the EAGCP, wrongly focuses on whether or not any of the prohibited conducts under 
Article 102 TFEU were committed irrespective of any anticompetitive harm thereby
478
. 
However, having said that the Commission showed interest in such modernized 
approach, it is indispensable to review the numerous underlying debates that stem from 
this method and discern whether it is envisaged in practice. 
     
It is debatable whether or not, by employing an effects-based approach to Article 102 
TFEU, the dominance test should be dropped from the appraisal. The EAGCP go as far 
to suggest that the dominance test should be dropped in the event of proving harm to 
competition on the basis that this latter may inherently imply dominance. More 
specifically, the EAGCP mentioned that: ―In contrast to a form-based approach, an 
effects-based approach needs to put less weight on a separate verification of dominance 
[...] if an effects-based approach yields a consistent and verifiable account of significant 
competitive harm that in itself is evidence of dominance‖479. This argument may 
nevertheless be countered on the basis that it may lead to ―excess intervention‖ – a 
counter-argument that may overlap with the Ordoliberal theory of intervention
480
. 
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As Majumdar notes, the feasibility of an effects-based approach depends to a large 
extent on the potency of the evidence of detrimental effects on competition and 
consumers. It is not sufficient to prove that the abusive practices at stake are ―capable‖ 
of distorting competition. This must be accompanied by verification that this effect is 
viable in the first place. This verification would initially be obtained through an 
assessment of market power. Hence, crossing out the dominance test and moving 
immediately to an evaluation of anti-competitive effects may constitute an unreliable 
finding; given that all market players may be deterred from the practice of the non-
dominant firm. Offering discounts, for instance, is capable of providing anti-competitive 
effects to all market players – though effect may vary in terms of degree; depending on 
each player‘s position in that market481. 
 
However, the EU Commission seems to have neglected the EAGCP‘s argument on 
dropping or at least minimizing the degree of reliance on dominance appraisal. In its 
Discussion Paper, it incorporated a whole section on ‗dominance‘482. Nonetheless, in its 
Guidance, the Commission interestingly suggested that the ―less efficient competitor‖ of 
a dominant firm might still pose anti-competitive constraints. Precisely, it stated that: 
―A less efficient competitor may also exert a constraint which should be taken into 
account when considering whether a particular price-based conduct leads to 
anticompetitive foreclosure‖483. However, this does not entail that the Commission had 
dropped the dominance test as a result of the initiative to employ an effects-based 
approach. On the contrary, the Guidance covers a specific and detailed part entitled 
‗market power‘484.               
 
Among the controversial questions that should indeed be addressed for the purposes of 
determining the scope of analysis within the context of exclusionary abuses under 
Article 102 TFEU: What does EU Competition Law aim to protect? Is it the process of 
competition, competitors or consumers that is given much attention? In relation to its 
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treatment of exclusionary abuses in general, the Commission primarily aims to prevent 
abuses that cause harm to end users/consumers. In its Discussion Paper, it stated that: 
―The central concern of Article [102] with regard to exclusionary abuses is thus 
foreclosure that hinders competition and thereby harms consumers‖485. In this sense, the 
protection of the competition process is perceived as means for protecting consumer 
welfare.   
 
This was indeed confirmed by the case law. According to AG Kokott in British 
Airways: ―Article [102 TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not 
designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors 
or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as 
an institution), which has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant 
undertaking on the Market‖486. On a more recent occasion, referring to its judgement in 
Sot. Lélos kai Sia E.E v Glaxosmithkline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proїonton, the CoJ in 
Deutsche Telekom stated that: ―Article [102 TFEU] aims, in particular, to protect 
consumers by means of undistorted competition‖487.  
 
For the purposes of protecting competition as a means for enhancing consumer welfare 
as such, the Commission indicated that while determining whether or not an 
exclusionary practice is abusive, it will consider the effects of such a practice on the 
exclusion of a competitor who is ―as efficient‖ as the dominant firm. Particularly, in its 
Guidance, it uses the terminology: ―Anticompetitive foreclosure‖ to which it defines as: 
―A situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or 
markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably 
increase prices to the detriment of consumers‖488. 
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In this sense, the Commission‘s approach of analysis is divided into two stages; 
foreclosure and consumer harms. Some, however, contest the first stage of analysis on 
the basis of uncertainty. For instance, according to Petit, the problem that arises in the 
Commission‘s approach is the lack of clarity pertaining to the volume of foreclosure 
that would necessitate intervention. Nevertheless the Guidance becomes clear when it 
stresses that not all forms of foreclosures are subject to intervention. For instance, with 
regards to pricing abuses, it indicated that foreclosure that would necessitate 
intervention is that which affects competitors who are ―as efficient‖ as the incumbent in 
question – yet in limited situations a competitor who is ―less efficient‖ may impose a 
―competitive constraint‖ on such incumbent (as indicated earlier)489. With respect to 
consumer harm, the Commission seems to set such harm as an analogy for 
determination of whether or not the abusive conduct at stake is anti-competitive. In fact, 
the Guidance stresses that harm is caused in the event where a dominant: ―Is likely to be 
in a position to profitably increase prices, to the detriment of consumers‖. This seems to 
happen as a result of foreclosing a competitor(s)
490
.            
 
Given the foregoing, the Commission seems to fairly uphold the EAGCP‘s proposal of 
an effects-based approach to Article 102 TFEU. In fact, former Commissioner Kroes 
believes that the aim of the post-2005 line of thinking in relation to the implementation 
of Article 102 TFEU is threefold. First, is to ensure that intervention takes place only 
when there is need for it to protect ―business‖ and ―consumers‖. Second, there is a need 
to circumvent ―false positives‖ (i.e. type II errors). According to Kroes, one should not 
undervalue ―over-enforcement‖ – given its very likely detrimental effects, not only on 
dominant firms initially at stake, but also their customers as well as the future behaviour 
of other dominant firms. Third, is to provide ―democratic accountability‖ to the public, 
aside of ―legal certainty‖491.         
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The imperative question, however, lies in whether or not such effects-based approach 
initiative is operative in EU practice. If so, is it the actual or likely anti-competitive 
effects that matter? In British Airways v. Commission, the GC took no notice of anti-
competitive effects whilst merely relying on former case law. More specifically, the GC 
stated that: ―In the first place, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 
[102], it is not necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect 
on the markets concerned. It is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the abusive 
conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, or, in 
other words, that the conduct is capable of having, or likely to have, such an effect‖492. 
Despite BA‘s appeal on the basis of not taking into account the ―probable effects‖ from 
the part of the GC, the CoJ merely upheld the GC‘s decision493.           
 
Furthermore, the GC in France Telecom SA v. Commission denied the necessity of 
identifying actual anti-competitive effects of the claimed predatory pricing or, at least, 
as evidence of hindrance of the competitive process – an approach that (arguably) 
coincides with the Ordoliberal perspective in terms of intervention. It stated that: ―For 
the purposes of applying that article, showing an anti-competitive object and an anti-
competitive effect may, in some cases, be one and the same thing. If it is shown that the 
object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position is to restrict 
competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an effect‖494. However, the 
British Airways and France Telecom judgments do not provide the whole picture.  
 
AG Colomer in Sot. Lélos kai Sia E.E v Glaxosmithkline AEVE Farmakeftikon 
Proїonton provided an interesting opinion that more or less reflects the Commission‘s 
modernization agenda. He suggests that employing a formalistic approach does not in 
fact take into account consumers‘ interests. On the contrary, these interests may not be 
accomplished except through a study of actual effect of the practices at stake. Moreover, 
according to him, Article 102 TFEU should not be read so as to mean that abusive 
conducts are prohibited per se even in the case of outstanding ―anticompetitive effect‖ 
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and ―intent‖495. However, the CoJ did not embrace this opinion or even make reference 
to it, arguably premising its analysis and reasoning instead on a ―formalistic‖ (or 
Ordoliberal) approach
496
.  
 
The Commission, nevertheless, in some cases, arguably appears to employ a less 
formalistic (or per se) approach. In Telefónica, the Commission indicated that the firm‘s 
practice distorted competition. Specifically, it stated that: ―The margin squeeze 
restricted competition by imposing unsustainable losses on equally efficient 
competitors: they were either ultimately forced to exit or in any event constrained in 
their ability to invest and to grow. Even if they met Telefónica both on prices and 
marketing expenditure, they were poorly placed in the long run to offer a vigorous 
competitive challenge to Telefónica as a result of their continuing losses. As a result, 
Telefónica's conduct was likely to delay the entry and growth of competitors‖497. 
Although the Commission appeared to have merely looked at the likely effects on 
competition, it investigated some actual effects on consumers. For instance, it held that 
that consumer welfare was deterred since retail prices in Spain were highest compared 
to other relevant EU states
498
. 
  
Even more recently, the Commission in Intel appears to have analyzed the effects of the 
latter‘s rebates practices on the foreclosure of competition and consumer welfare. 
Particularly, it held that Intel‘s conditional rebates and payments had attracted five well-
established equipment manufacturers (Dell, IBM, HP, Acer and NEC); along with a 
major retailer and found that the actual effects were significant in that they substantially 
undermined competitors‘ ability to compete on the merits of their x86 CPUs. It also 
reached a finding, in light of the foregoing, that Intel's anticompetitive conduct led to 
the reduction of consumer choice and generated lower incentives to innovate
499
.  
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However, EU Courts still show some reluctance in employing a full effects-based 
approach [as British Airways and France Telecom (above) exemplify]. Indeed the 
Commission‘s power to reform Article 102 TFEU in practice is not unlimited. The 
Commission highlighted this matter in its Guidance when it stated that while construing 
the terms of Article 102 TFEU: ―It is not intended to constitute a statement of the law 
and is without prejudice to the interpretation of Article 82 by the European Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance‖500. In fact, Ezrachi argues that a precept as such 
may restrict the Commission‘s plan to employ an effects-based approach to Article 102 
TFEU irrespective of the scope or framework adopted by EU case-law; otherwise it may 
be vulnerable to a court action
501
.              
 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the Commission and Courts do not preclude that 
prohibition of abusive practices within the scope of Article 102 TFEU may be escaped 
by means of objective justification. EU Courts initially suggested the notion of objective 
justification. In Centre Belge Détudes de Marché Télémarketing v. CLT regarding 
refusal to supply, the CoJ indicated that an infringement to Article 102 TFEU might be 
justified by way of ‗objective necessity‘502. In Tetra Pak, the CoJ upheld the GC and 
Commission decisions that denied Tetra Pak‘s allegation that its tying practice was 
essential for the purposes of aspects such as health protection
503
. In the same vein, in 
Tomra, the GC upheld the Commission‘s rejection of Tomra‘s claims that its exclusive 
agreements and system of rebates was objectively justified
504
.                  
 
A further means of defence within the context of Article 102 TFEU is the protection of 
a dominant firm‘s ‗commercial interests‘. This form is also known as the ‗meeting 
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competition‘ defence. However, the Commission and Courts, similar to ‗objective 
necessity‘, seem to envisage this form of defence from a very rigorous perspective; if at 
all. For instance, the GC in France Telecom indicated that: ―According to established 
case law, although the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive 
it of its entitlement to protect its own commercial interests when they are attacked and 
such an undertaking must be allowed the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems 
appropriate to protect those interests, such behaviour cannot be countenanced if its 
actual purpose is to strengthen this dominant position and abuse it‖505. In fact, the 
Commission, after previously discussing it in its Discussion Paper, seems to have left it 
out from the Guidance
506
.        
 
The final form of defence that may be invoked before the Commission and Courts is 
‗efficiency defence‘; that is to inquire about whether or not the abusive practice at stake 
may be justified from an efficiency point of view. In British Airways, the CoJ did not 
exclude the possibility that BA‘s practice could be justified. It stated that: ―It then needs 
to be examined whether there is an objective economic justification for the discounts 
and bonuses granted [...] an undertaking is at liberty to demonstrate that its bonus 
system producing an exclusionary effect is economically justified‖507. However, the 
Commission seems employ very high standard in relation to efficiency defences
508
.  
 
To this end, and given the foregoing treatment of the effects-based approach initiative in 
practice, one may argue that although the Commission had shown (on some occasions) 
some signs that it intends to employ such approach, EU Courts, until today, do not seem 
to endorse that initiative. Arguably it is only in rare circumstances (if at all) when EU 
Courts and Commission do analyse the actual effects of abusive practices on 
competition and consumer welfare. The standard seems to rather rely on likely or 
potential effects of these practices.       
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4.5.2 Articles 8 and 13 of the Law No. 3/2005 and Executive Regulations: A 
space for an effects-based approach? 
At the very outset, an important question that should be raised: What interests does 
Egyptian Competition Law seek to protect? Is it competitors, competition, and/or 
consumers? The ECA‘s former Executive Director stated that: ―Competition is not a 
goal in itself but rather a means for making markets work better for consumers‖509. 
This entails that the ultimate concern seems to be consumer welfare. However, similar 
to what the EU system provides or arguably inspired by its approach, the ECA perceives 
that consumer welfare may not be attained without ensuring that the process of 
competition is not properly safeguarded. In this sense, an effects-based approach in 
relation to the implementation of abuse of dominance would focus on the effects of 
abusive conducts on the competitive process and consumers, as a result.     
 
Article 8 of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from exercising any of nine 
abuses. The approach for the appraisal of these abuses is stipulated primarily under the 
Executive Regulations. However, the approach does not seem to be consistent under 
Egyptian Competition Law. While Article 13 of the Executive Regulations provides for 
an effects-based approach to some abuses, it left it open for investigating authorities to 
choose between a per se approach or effects-based analysis in relation to other abuses. 
This seems to depend on whether or not the practice in question has no other purpose 
but to restrict competition or that may otherwise be objectively justified
510
. Unlike the 
EU system, however, Egyptian Competition Law does not seem to categorize the 
objective justification defences that a dominant firm may invoke. Nonetheless, this does 
not mean that firms may not justify their conduct(s). On the contrary, the law seems to 
have left it for accused dominant firms to justify their practices according to the 
circumstances.       
 
Generally speaking, the Egyptian legislator has required an effects-based approach to 
the majority of abuses prohibited under Article 8 of the Law No. 3/2005. It should be 
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stressed however that, unlike most of the EU case law, the wording of Egyptian 
Competition Law (as will appear) seems to necessitate an actual effects standard in 
relation to abuses that require an effects-based approach. In other words, it does not 
suffice for ECA and Courts to find that the abusive practices under scrutiny are likely to 
have an anti-competitive effect (otherwise, this may arguably raise constitutional 
concerns). Indeed this reflects the principle of no-harm that is required by the Shari‘ah 
for market intervention purposes. It is questionable, however, whether investigating 
authorities do in fact employ such rigid standard in practice.    
 
Prohibiting a dominant firm from ―Undertaking an act that leads to the non-
manufacturing, or non-production or the non-distribution of a product for a certain 
period or periods of time‖ is decided by virtue of an effect-based approach511. This may 
be envisaged from the wording of Article 13(a) of the Executive Regulations: ―Period 
or periods of time shall mean the period or periods of time that suffice to result in the 
prevention, restriction or harm of the freedom of competition‖512. This entails that 
exercising a practice that limits the manufacturing, production or distribution process 
for a period of time in itself is not adequate for a dominant firm to be caught under 
Article 8(a). The ECA is required to prove that exercising such conduct during the 
period of time in question has distorted competition in the relevant market
513
.  
 
The same approach seems to be required in relation to refusal to deal (or constructive 
refusal to deal) abuses. A dominant firm is not caught under Article 8(b) of Law No. 
3/2005 unless its ―Refraining from entry into sale or purchase transactions regarding a 
product with any person or totally ceasing to deal with him‖ leads to: ―Restricting that 
person‘s freedom to access or exit the market at any time [...]‖514. In this sense, any 
dominant firm that refuses to deal with another firm – whether this concerns sale or 
purchase of a product – shall not be caught under Article 8(b) unless such refusal 
undermines that firm‘s ability to enter or exit the relevant market515. 
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Articles 8(c) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm from: ―Undertaking an act 
that limits distribution of specific product, on the basis of geographic areas, distribution 
centers, clients, seasons or periods of time among persons with vertical relationships 
[...]‖516. Article 8(c) as such left it open for investigating authorities to choose between 
an effects-based analysis or a per se approach. In other words, silence in relation to the 
approach of analysis under Law No. 3/2005 does not necessarily signify that 
investigating authorities should employ a per se approach; as EL-Far argues
517
. 
 
For instance, the ECA, in its Steel study, employed an effects-based approach to this 
practice. It was particularly concerned with the compatibility of Ezz Group‘s standard 
distribution agreement with Article 8(c). Article 4 of such agreement stipulates that: ―In 
the event where the second party (approved distributor) refrains from receiving the 
quantities specified to him/her on a monthly basis by virtue of this agreement by a 
volume exceeding 10% of the quantity initially agreed upon due to reasons related to 
him/her and not the market for a period of two consecutive months, the first party (Ezz 
Group) shall be entitled to reduce his/her monthly quantity to the extent of the actual 
quantities received for the remaining period of the agreement‖518.  
 
The ECA found that Ezz Group‘s system of approved distributors and monthly portions 
did not violate competition law. As for the issue of reduction of quantities, it perceived 
that this approach might raise competition law compliance concerns. More specifically, 
it stated that a practice as such might lead to exclusivity in dealing with Ezz Group‘s 
product. However, contrary to what El-Far suggests, the ECA concluded that such 
practice did not violate Article 8(c) on the premise that the volume of sales of other 
producers was not deterred. It indicated, on the contrary, that throughout the period of 
study, the demand on Steel Rebar in general significantly increased
519
. In fact, the 
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ECA‘s analysis confirms the suggestion that it is the actual effects on competition and 
consumers that matters; and as such reflects the Shari‘ah principles.   
 
The Egyptian legislator, furthermore, stipulates an effects-based approach to price 
discrimination abuses. Article 13(e) of the Executive Regulations provides that: 
―Discriminating between sellers or buyers having similar commercial positions in sale 
or purchase prices or in terms of the transactions, in a manner that weakens their ability 
to compete with one another or leads to drive out some of them from the market‖. This 
means that price discrimination exercised by a dominant firm shall not be caught under 
Article 8(e) of Law No. 3/2005 unless it is proven that such a practice undermines the 
position of related purchasers in the market or otherwise drives them out of it. In the 
same vein, predatory pricing or pricing below marginal cost or average variable costs 
does follow the same approach. In fact, the Egyptian legislator stipulates a four-tiered 
test for determination of whether or not such a pricing structure is anti-competitive. 
Article 13(h) of the Executive Regulations provides that: ―For the determination of 
whether the product is sold below their marginal cost or the average variable cost the 
following elements shall be taken into consideration: 
 
1. If the sale will drive out the dominant persons‘ competing persons from the 
market; 
2. If the sale will prevent the dominant person‘s competing persons from entering 
the market; 
3. If the dominant person will be able to increase prices after driving out its 
competing persons from the market; and 
4. If the period of time of the sale of a product below its marginal cost or its 
average variable cost will result into the occurrence of any of the 
aforementioned‖520. 
 
In this sense, for a predatory pricing practice to be deemed abusive, the Egyptian 
legislator required the satisfaction of the above-mentioned elements collectively. For 
instance, if the pricing below marginal or average variable costs by the dominant firm 
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does not drive its competitors out of the market or generate significant entry barriers, 
then the practice shall not be contemplated as abusive; even if the remaining elements 
were satisfied
521
. The Egyptian legislator, similarly, imposes an effects-based approach 
to exclusive dealing abuses. Article 8(i) of Law No. 3/2005 prohibits a dominant firm 
from: ―Obliging a supplier not to deal with a competitor‖522. Article 13(i) of the 
Executive Regulations adds to such stipulation that: ―The non-dealing shall mean the 
refraining from dealing with a competing person, whether totally or reducing the size of 
dealing with him to the extent that would drive it out of the market or prevent the 
potential competitors from entering the market‖523. This means that a dominant firm is 
not prohibited from obliging its supplier/distributor from dealing with its competitors 
unless such exclusivity drives the latter out of business or precludes market entry
524
.      
 
Similar to Article 8(c) of Law No. 3/2005 (as discussed above), the Egyptian legislator 
left it open for investigating authorities to choose the approach they find suitable to 
abusive practices stipulated under Articles 8(d) on tying arrangements, 8(f) on the 
refusal to produce scarce products whenever it is economically feasible, and 8(g) on the 
prevention of competitor(s) from gaining access to the dominant firm‘s utilities or 
services; despite being economically viable. Hence, the ECA and Courts may choose to 
employ an effects-based approach in respect of these practices.  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
The EU and Egyptian rules on dominance appear to function equivalently in the sense 
that dominance in itself is not prohibited. Moreover, despite that both systems require 
different market share thresholds for finding dominance one may arguably conclude that 
the determination of dominance in general reflects an equivalent treatment. This 
conclusion is based on two assumptions: First, market share thresholds are not credible 
indicators of dominance, and; second, EU and Egyptian systems similarly recognize 
market barriers and contemplate them as indispensable determinants of dominance.   
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This chapter explored three distinctive characteristics in the Egyptian system. First, that 
Egyptian Competition Law does not regulate or discipline the abuse of excessive 
pricing, in contrast with the EU system; although the latter system does not contemplate 
this practice as a priority for investigation. Despite that the arguments against regulating 
the conduct of excessive pricing may seem potential, Shari‘ah strongly condemns these 
practices. Indeed, this is based on the negative effects that may be inflicted by such 
practices on society in general and related consumers in particular – as proponents of a 
prohibition on excessive pricing argue.  To this end, the lack of excessive pricing 
prohibition under Egyptian Competition Law raises Islamic law concerns. 
 
The second characteristic is where the Egyptian law does not comprehensively regulate 
the practice of margin squeeze. Particularly, it appears to have missed the event where a 
dominant firm may choose to squeeze the margin of its competitors in the downstream 
market rather than the upstream one through pricing below-cost at the retail level. The 
third characteristic relates to the method of analysis. It is observed that the EU 
Commission is currently moving towards an effects-based approach in relation to the 
implementation of Article 102 TFEU. However, EU Courts still show some reluctance 
to employ this approach. In this sense, one may argue that the EU system is currently in 
transition in respect of deploying an effects-based approach. The Egyptian system, on 
the other hand, seems to reflect this modernized approach in many respects – as Article 
13 of the Executive Regulations provides. In fact, the ECA, contrary to civil law 
traditions, employed an effects-based approach in the Steel case whereas the Executive 
Regulations are merely silent in this respect. Arguably, however, the Egyptian regime, 
inspired by Islamic principles, seems to go a little further to adopt an actual effects 
standard.   
 
Exploring and discussing these three characteristics (which one may contemplate as 
gaps), however, is not sufficient; several vital questions underlie them. Does the lack of 
prohibition of excessive pricing pose any distorting threat to Egyptian economy? 
Similarly, does the lack of legal treatment of below-cost margin squeeze have any 
potential effects in Egyptian economy? Furthermore, notwithstanding the compatibility 
of this approach with Shari‘ah, are the ECA and courts at the current stage ready to 
employ an effects-based approach? If not, how can the deployment of this approach 
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harm the Egyptian economy and be incompatible with Shari‘ah as well as a result? 
What are the appropriate methods to tackle these characteristics? When should they be 
tackled accordingly, if at all?          
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CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATING POTENTIAL EFFECTS IN THE 
EGYPTIAN ECONOMY: METHODS FOR TACKLING 
GAPS IN THE TREATMENT OF ABUSE OF 
DOMINANCE UNDER EGYPTIAN COMPETITION LAW    
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The preceding chapter demonstrates that the Egyptian system is distinctive in three 
ways. First, it lacks an excessive pricing prohibition; second, it does not provide 
comprehensive legal treatments to margin squeeze, and third, it employs an effects-
based approach at this early stage of competition law implementation. These (one may 
term them ‗gaps‘) may arguably have potential effects in the economy and discourage 
trade and FDI in Egypt. In fact, several questions lie beneath these gaps. To what extent 
can they hinder the Egyptian economy? What is the best possible solution for Egypt at 
the current stage? If different, would the solution vary in the future compared to what is 
presently suggested?  
 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate and conceptualize the effects in the Egyptian 
economy that may arise from the concerned gaps. While it will be found that they may 
generate potential effects, legal reform may be deemed necessary in the future. The 
question is: What structure of legal reform and when? Is legal transplantation the correct 
answer to these gaps? Does timing play a decisive role in this respect? For this reason, 
the chapter constitutes a vital part of the present thesis. 
 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part will investigate in detail the 
effects of each gap in the treatment of abuse of dominance in the Egyptian economy. 
The second part will then attempt to tackle these gaps in light of the comparative law 
methods developed in chapter two. The third part recognizes technical assistance from 
competition authorities of the developed world as a method that generally ensures 
optimal implementation of Egyptian Competition Law. More specifically, it discusses 
the cooperation mechanisms developed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, along 
with some other multilateral projects.     
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5.2 INVESTIGATING POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE EGYPTIAN 
ECONOMY 
 
―There are strong links between competition policy and numerous basic pillars of 
economic development. […] There is persuasive evidence from all over the world 
confirming that rising levels of competition have been unambiguously associated with 
increased economic growth, productivity, investment and increased average living 
standards‖525. 
 
Competition law has been frequently associated with economic development. A report 
prepared by the WTO Working Group argues that competition law, as part of economic 
policy, provides economies – specifically emerging ones - with myriad benefits. For 
instance, economies that adopt competition law may benefit from an optimal allocation 
of resources, tackling high concentration levels, preventing anti-competitive practices, 
encouraging foreign investments, etc.
526
. Nonetheless, a competition law with loopholes 
or that is otherwise inappropriately implemented by competition authorities or courts 
may generate potential effects in national economies in a manner that may overcome 
these benefits.  
 
By employing the functionalistic method of comparative law, the preceding chapter 
surveyed some potential influences of EU rules and Islamic principles on the legal 
treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition Law and explored some 
major gaps in the latter emerging system. It is believed that these gaps, if not tackled, 
may have potential effects on the Egyptian economy. Chapter four encompassed the 4 
different possibilities which tertium comparationis ought to cover in comparative 
studies. First, it found that the EU and Egyptian systems share the ―same legal rule‖ in 
some respects (or the latter is arguably influenced by the former). For instance, 
dominance in itself is not prohibited and that it is the abuse of such dominance that is 
prohibited. Second, in several other respects, EU and Egyptian systems stipulate 
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―different rules‖ albeit serving the ―same function‖. For example, abuse of dominance is 
prohibited under EU and Egyptian regimes with distinct rules i.e. different stipulations 
and methods (e.g. market share thresholds for dominance determinations). Nevertheless, 
they appear to serve the ―same function‖: the protection of the competitive process as a 
means for enhancing consumer welfare. In fact, it is this ―same function‖ factor, among 
others, that exemplifies the influence of EU rules (and Islamic principles) on the 
Egyptian system.   
 
Third, the EU and Egyptian systems generate, or are likely to generate, distinct 
outcomes. For instance, the present study found that the EU‘s current approach to 
Article 102 TFEU does not yet fully endorse an effects-based approach. The ECA, Law 
No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations, on the other hand, explicitly made clear the 
intention to employ an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance. Despite it is 
argued that the Egyptian system‘s deployment of an effects-based approach originally 
derives from the EU Commission‘s initiative, it is perceived that the ECA, arguably 
influenced by Islamic principles, has gone a step further to require an actual effects 
standard
527
. This means that until the EU Commission‘s initiative to reform Article 102 
TFEU in a manner that may lead to the endorsement of a full effects-based approach 
would be supported by courts, the EU and Egyptian regimes may lead to distinct 
outcomes. Fourth, the study found some substantial omissions from Law No. 3/2005 
and its Executive Regulations; most notably for the purposes of this chapter: Excessive 
pricing
528
 and below-cost margin squeeze. These gaps and their potential effects will be 
investigated in turn.   
 
5.2.1 Potential effects that may arise from the lack of excessive pricing 
prohibition 
The fact that excessive pricing is not regulated under Egyptian Competition Law means 
that firms are entitled to set their prices above prevailing market ones; so long as they 
do not amount to any of the practices prohibited under that law (price fixing, price 
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discrimination, etc.)
529
. Indeed, the Egyptian legislator appears to have endorsed such 
arguments while drafting Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations. Nevertheless 
exercising this practice by large firms should not be ruled out; at least in some 
exceptional circumstances. This may be particularly the case in emerging economies 
like Egypt.  
 
In fact, the high levels of concentration that prevail in the Egyptian market as a result of 
the 1991 privatisation programme
530
 may increase the likelihood of success of excessive 
pricing. This may be the case due to the lack of effective competition culture in many 
sectors. This may also be attributed to the existence of high barriers to entry created by 
dominant firms. For instance, in the Fresh Juice and Non-Alcoholic Beverages Industry, 
there are only two or three firms that dominate 75% of the market. Moreover, only a 
few firms dominate 70% of the Fabrics Production Industry. In the Cement Industry, 
while twelve firms operate, only three of them account for 70% of total production. The 
above data indicates that the Egyptian market in general is highly concentrated
531
.        
 
Furthermore, the ECA in its Steel report noted that on some occasions having many 
players with close market shares in one market might indicate the absence of market 
power. However, closer insights reveal on the contrary that the Steel Rebar Market is 
―highly concentrated‖. The market share threshold of the top four companies amounted 
for 85% in 2006 – a finding that signifies that having many competitors does not in 
itself restrict the actions of Ezz Group. Consequently the small number of actual 
competitors, in addition to their undersized market share thresholds in comparison with 
Ezz Group, indicates a reasonable presumption of their inability to affect Ezz Group‘s 
prices and volume of output
532
. 
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In fact, the Harvard School‘s proponents argue in favour of a link between market 
concentration and high prices in a given market; namely the ‗structure, conduct and 
performance paradigm‘ (‗S-C-P‘). According to the S-C-P, the structure of a given 
market identifies the market behaviour of its players, which in turn verifies its 
performance. Hence, the structure remains the starting and core element in 
determination of the market‘s performance. The S-C-P works by carrying out the 
necessary studies on concentration and entry barrier levels, which, in turn, constitutes 
the market structure facts. These facts would then be linked with the degree of 
profitability in the market
533
. The S-C-P‘s proponents as such argue that firms with 
substantial market shares do essentially have monopoly power that would, in turn, result 
in high prices
534
. The question that lies beneath this school of thought is how may the 
Egyptian market and economy incur potential effects from high prices in general?
535
 
 
In essence, high prices directly harm consumer welfare
536
. Some argue that the core 
objective of antitrust law should be to offer the ―benefits of competition to consumers‖. 
Consumer gains in this sense are achieved through offering low-priced and quality 
products with reasonable choice. Put differently, the objective of antitrust is to protect 
consumers from anti-competitive and exploitative activities that may ―unfairly‖ shift 
welfare from consumers to dominant firms. This shift may not indeed result in total 
welfare maximization; but would merely increase welfare of the dominant firm(s) at 
stake. Prices set above the competitive level tend to generate ―allocative inefficiency‖. 
Monopoly raises prices and in turn reduces the volume of output. Products that are no 
longer sold may be valued more for future buyers relative to what they would cost 
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society to manufacture. This entails a case of ―pure social loss‖ in a manner that 
comprises ―allocative inefficiency‖537.  
 
Moreover, Bork argues that the likely purpose of antitrust is to promote the efficiency of 
economies. He suggests that: ―The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the 
effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly as to produce either no gain or net loss in consumer welfare‖538. This means that 
competition in itself encourages allocative efficiency that would inevitably enrich 
consumer welfare – needless to say that the success of excessive pricing may in itself 
imply lack of competition
539
. Bork rationalizes his aforementioned view by submitting 
that: ―The preference for competitive rather than monopolistic resource allocation is 
most clearly explained and firmly based upon a desire to maximize output as consumers 
value it‖540.        
 
In this sense pricing above the competitive level or excessive pricing in particular - in 
light of the above views – is incompatible with the objectives of competition law on the 
premise that it causes allocative inefficiency and is detrimental to consumer welfare and 
efficiency of the economy. Such effects may indeed be seen in the Egyptian market. For 
instance, if the price of a particular product or service is excessive, consumer welfare 
may be deterred in a manner that may lead to allocative inefficiency - an outcome that 
may gradually be passed on to the Egyptian economy; depending on the importance of 
that product or service and its usage. In fact, the potential effects of excessive pricing on 
consumer welfare may be better explained by two scenarios: First, excessive prices in 
the primary market; and second, excessive prices in the secondary market
541
. 
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The first scenario presupposes that excessive prices prevail in the primary market (i.e. 
the market that supplies the main product). This scenario assumes that the excessively 
priced product or service in the primary market is complementary to another product or 
service in the secondary market. For instance, in a study on the Egyptian Steel Market, 
whereby Steel is an essential product to construction, Selim found that when Steel 
prices arose in 2003, numerous small and medium-sized construction firms stopped 
operating on the basis that they could not afford such inflated prices. This is because 
Steel represents 20% of the constituents of construction, as the former Chairperson of 
the ECA, had once indicated
542
. Such effect, if lengthy, may drive even more 
construction firms out of the market. This means that when markets are characterised by 
inelasticity, excessive pricing may harm the Egyptian economy
543
. In this sense, the 
effects of excessive prices in the primary market, aside from their effects on consumers 
of that primary product, may have a formidable impact on the secondary market. Indeed 
such cause may have a chilling effect on other corresponding markets as well. 
 
The second scenario, in contrast with the first, assumes that excessive prices exist in 
aftermarkets (or secondary markets). Aftermarkets are markets that offer goods or 
services that complement the primary product or that are otherwise essential for it (e.g. 
spare parts, maintenance services, etc). Assume that a car manufacturer was dominant in 
the aftermarket of servicing and spare parts where it charged excessive prices; as 
opposed to the primary market (car manufacturing) where it was not dominant and 
prevailing prices were not excessive
544
. Inevitably, consumers/buyers of that car may 
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incur significant financial losses as a result of excessively priced spare parts and 
maintenance services
545
. 
     
Notwithstanding the foregoing effects that may arise, maximizing consumer welfare and 
attaining economic efficiency are prioritized in Egypt. The ECA on several occasions 
implied that they lie at the heart of competition law. For instance, a message from the 
ECA‘s former Executive Director read: ―The Egyptian Competition Law aims at 
ensuring that economic activities are carried out freely by all market players and that the 
market place offers an enabling framework for everyone to achieve his/her goal. This 
aim can be achieved only if equal opportunities were given to every person doing 
business in the market. The criterion for staying in/out of business should be economic 
efficiency and ability to satisfy consumers in terms of quality and competitive prices of 
goods and services in the market‖546. On another occasion (as highlighted in the 
preceding chapter), he stressed that: ―Competition is not a goal in itself but rather a 
means for making markets work better for consumers‖547.  
 
Moreover, in a statement of its vision in its Annual Report 2006-2007, the ECA 
mentioned that it: ―Aims to bring benefit to the national economy in general and welfare 
to the society‖548. However, it is (arguably) unequivocal from the foregoing appraisal 
that the national economy may be impeded by the lack of prohibition of excessive 
pricing. The income of the society may not be distributed equally among the society - a 
result that certainly raises Shari‘ah concerns. In addition, these potential effects may 
undermine the above-mentioned ECA‘s aims and vision. Some may, however, suggest 
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that these effects could be averted by the application of Articles 10 of Law No. 3/2005 
and 19 of its Executive Regulations
549
. 
 
Article 10 of the Law No. 3/2005 provides that: ―The Cabinet of Ministers may, after 
taking the opinion of the Authority, issue a decree determining the selling price for one 
or more essential products for a specific period of time. Any agreement concluded by 
the Government for the purposes of the implementation of these prices shall not be 
considered an anti-competitive practice‖550. Article 19 of the Executive Regulations 
expands on this by providing that: ―The Authority carries out the necessary studies for 
the Council of Ministers Cabinet to perform its competence set out in Article 10 of the 
Law regarding the determination of the selling prices of the essential products and 
prepares the reports on the opinion of the Authority on this matter‖551. 
 
However, an argument as such may be countered from several respects. First, Articles 
10 and 19 raise Islamic law concerns on grounds of its principles on market 
intervention. Specifically, as discussed in chapter three, the state‘s power to control 
market prices – in general – is not unlimited. It is essentially guided by two principles: 
the principle of no-harm; and, the principle of maslahah. Articles 10 and 19, on the 
other hand, seem to declare the power to control market prices as rather discretionary 
among the Council of Ministers Cabinet according to studies that the ECA undertakes. 
In other words, these provisions do not stipulate any limitations in relation to price 
intervention (such as for instance, an analysis of actual negative effects on consumers); 
leaving it subject to the discretionary power of the Council of Ministers Cabinet.    
 
Second but not least, even if one presupposes that Articles 10 and 19 are compliant with 
Islamic principles, the power to control prices in relation to essential products has 
hardly been used since the introduction of Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive 
Regulations. This is notwithstanding the fact that prices of Cement, Steel and Meat, as 
essential products, substantially rose throughout the period 2006-2009 and that the ECA 
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had already conducted studies on the three sectors. Although these studies found that 
prices of the aforementioned products were high, the Council of Ministers Cabinet did 
not make use of Articles 10 and 19
552
. This may, however, be explained by the fact that 
Articles 10 and 19 as such are incompatible with Article 10 of the Law No. 8/1997 for 
Investment Guarantees and Incentives which provides that any firm incorporated with 
an aim to engage in any activity will not be subject to any form of price control
553
.                               
 
Finally, Articles 10 and 19 only relate to essential products. This means that products 
that are not deemed essential per se are not covered. Indeed this limited stipulation may 
not raise any Shari‘ah concerns that are primarily focussed on essential or day-to-day 
products, which, if not supplied, may be life threatening. It rather raises consumer 
benefits concerns, which indeed seems to be the ECA‘s first and foremost concern - 
judging from the quotations above-mentioned - in the sense that excessive prices 
associated with any non-essential product would be detrimental to their welfare. 
 
5.2.2 Does the lack of comprehensive prohibition of margin squeeze pose potential 
effects to the Egyptian economy?   
As indicated in the preceding chapter, Article 13(b) of the Executive Regulations seems 
to focus solely on the event where a vertically integrated firm that is dominant in the 
upstream market chooses to squeeze its downstream competitors‘ prices through 
charging them high prices in return for the essential input (what is known as 
constructive refusal to deal or margin squeeze). In other words, the Egyptian legislator, 
while drafting Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations, seems to have missed the 
event where the firm concerned chooses to squeeze its competitors‘ prices in the 
downstream market rather than the upstream one through strategically selling its retail 
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product at below-cost prices. The question is whether this form of pricing may generate 
potential effects on the economy. 
    
In contrast with the case of exploitative or excessive pricing practices (as discussed in 
the preceding part) - where welfare is transferred from consumers to dominant firms - 
below-cost pricing transfers the welfare from firms to consumers
554
. Inevitably, 
however, this pricing strategy is capable of, not only driving current downstream 
competitors out of the market, but also creating high barriers to market entry and, as 
such, may undermine consumer choice in that market. In fact, this seems to contradict 
with the statement of former Executive Director that competition is a means for making 
markets work better for consumers (as cited in the preceding part). This is because 
excluding competitors may distort the process of competition as a consequence. Indeed, 
consumer welfare that seems to be the ultimate concern of the ECA may not be deterred 
in the short-run. Arguably, however, the lack of harm may only last for a very short 
term.   
 
Proponents of the Harvard School (although in relation to predatory pricing
555
) argue 
that below-cost pricing is an inevitably detrimental conduct to the structure of a given 
market. This is because it inherently increases concentration levels in the market by way 
of driving the incumbent‘s competitors out of the market556. Although hindering the 
market structure by way of excluding competitors as such may generate potential effects 
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that may be passed on to the economy (e.g. employment concerns), it is perceived that 
these effects are not as significant as those that may arise from the lack of exploitative 
or excessive pricing prohibition in Egypt. This is based on two vital intertwined 
grounds.  
 
First, the fact that the concerned vertically-integrated firm is not dominant in the 
downstream or retail market (where margin squeeze takes place) may reduce the 
potency of such effects, since consumers may (arguably) prefer to sacrifice the 
difference between the concerned firm‘s competitors‘ prices (no doubt for the dominant 
one(s) in the retail market who charge higher prices) and its own prices. This is indeed 
for reliability and commercial reputability purposes. This is not, however, to say that a 
firm that is not dominant may not pose any potential effect per se. It is rather to submit 
that the (presumably) relative lack of market power may reduce the likelihood of such 
effect – as opposed to where the firm is dominant557.  
 
Second, even if one presupposes that such practice may exclude dominant downstream 
firms (although relatively unlikely in this case), it is perceived that the more the 
competitors the vertically-integrated firm excludes from the downstream market, the 
higher the degree of market power it acquires in that market. The likely consequence 
indeed would be that the firm could be found price predating under Egyptian 
Competition Law. In this sense, Article 8(e) of Law No. 3/2005 acts as a safeguard for 
this practice and, as such, may arguably diminish the potential effects to the economy. 
However, this does not preclude the necessity of providing a much more comprehensive 
prohibition of margin squeeze; if not for the sake of the arguably limited spill-over 
effects in the economy, it is for the purposes complying with the principles of Shari‘ah.        
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5.2.3 Potential effects that may arise from employing an effects -based 
approach to abuse of dominance 
As envisaged in the preceding chapter, most abusive practices stipulated under Article 8 
of Law No. 3/2005 are settled through an effects-based approach, pursuant to Article 13 
of the Executive Regulations. This was confirmed in an interview with Dr. Khalid Attia 
(former Executive Director of the ECA)
558
. In this sense, the Egyptian approach to 
abuse of dominance seems to conform to Easterbrook‘s error-cost framework by 
favouring type I errors over type II errors
559
. However, this poses a key question that 
should be raised in this respect: Is Egypt, as an emerging economy with a newly 
introduced competition law, ready to deploy an effects-based approach to abuse of 
dominance at this early stage? 
 
The mainstream of the literature appears to suggest that emerging economies, while new 
to competition law, should try to avoid employing complex economic analysis in 
competition-related disputes. For instance, Mohieldin argues that ―Emerging economies 
with either little or no experience of administering a complex regulatory framework 
may at first opt for a competition law that can be easily enforced‖. In other words, he 
believes that an effects-based approach may not be the best possible approach for 
emerging economies. Instead, they should employ the ―more straightforward per se 
approach‖560. 
 
Furthermore, a group of constitutional economists argue against this degree of market 
intervention. As described in chapter three, they suggest that the process of 
implementing legal rules should be carried out with the least assessment possible
561
. 
This is to provide the public with predictability and legal certainty – characteristics 
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which undeniably apply to a per se approach to competition law
562
. Moreover, it is 
suggested that eradicating the ―wide discretionary scope‖ from governmental 
authorities, which an effects-based approach offers, may reduce the likelihood of 
―interest groups‖ influence in the decision-making process563. Although constitutional 
economists who adopt these insights were mostly Ordoliberals who based such views 
on their robust experience during the Weimar Republic era (where influence of ‗interest 
groups‘ was vast), these insights may still be pragmatic in Egypt.  
 
In fact, the risks of ‗interest groups‘ influence nowadays are primarily posed to 
emerging economies in particular. These economies tend to be distinguished by their 
significant ―government interference‖, not only in the economy, but also in legal 
proceedings. Particularly, these economies are often characterized by the tendency of 
misusing bureaucratic power through intervening in markets. This may take the form of 
adopting market barriers that may not be surpassed in specific sectors for the sake of 
‗interest groups‘ who may be entrepreneurs whilst being high-profile members of the 
government. This in turn may make legal judgments more political than they are 
judicial
564
.          
 
Furthermore, similar to Easterbrook‘s insights (as discussed in chapter three), it is often 
argued that the decision-making process may be ―imperfect‖ on the basis of the lack of 
sufficient ―knowledge‖565. In fact, the dilemma, as Mohieldin writes, is that competition 
law requires a substantial amount of knowledge on the interface between law and 
economics. Education and practice in emerging economies, on the other hand, tend to 
detach law from economics. Such a dividing line makes the task more elusive when it 
comes to carrying out economic analysis of competition law. That said, legal 
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practitioners (be it lawyers, judges or ECA researchers) might arguably lack the 
necessary experience to conduct economic analysis on antitrust practices at this stage
566
.     
 
Some argue that competition authorities of emerging economies with little experience 
are more likely to commit errors
567
. In fact, the problem that the ECA and courts may 
face, given Mohieldin‘s argument of inefficiency of education and practice in emerging 
economies, is when it comes to the anticipation of harm or effects caused by abusive 
practices. This is indeed the most critical and multifaceted part which investigators 
encounter while employing effects-based analysis
568
. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had once stated that: ―Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market 
structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice‘s effect on 
competition‖569. This signifies that experience of decision-makers is an indispensable 
pre-requisite for proper deployment of effects-based analysis. That said, the likely (yet 
understandable) lack of experience and economic expertise of the ECA and judges at 
this stage might in fact lead to costly judicial errors in general. 
 
More to the point, the cost of errors could be formidable. Aside from reducing public 
and government confidence in investigating authorities, as some suggest in relation to 
judicial errors in general, these errors may eventually impede FDI in Egypt, discourage 
innovation, and impair cross-border transactions and trade. Indeed FDI and trade are 
generally considered as vital pillars of an economy. If substantially hindered through 
such errors, these effects may be passed on to the economy. Put differently, errors in the 
implementation of competition law may cost the economy severely
570
. 
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5.3 METHODS TO TACKLE THE GAPS IN EGYPTIAN 
COMPETITION LAW: AN ACTIVIST APPROACH?  
 
―Where law develops internally through a process of trial and error, innovation and 
correction, and with the participation and involvement of users of the law, legal 
professionals and other interested parties, legal institutions tend to be highly effective. 
By contrast, where foreign law is imposed and legal evolution is external rather than 
internal, legal institutions tend to be much weaker‖571 
 
The mainstream of comparative law literature seems to embrace the view that legal 
borrowing or transplants of laws in general is virtually impossible. The arguments tend 
to vary from those who base their views on economic development to others who 
suggest that each law reflects its own legal culture or religion
572
. Berkowitz, Pistor and 
Richard (quoted above) appear to adopt this view. Several questions stem from this 
debate. With regards to excessive pricing, is the solution for the potential effects that 
may arise from the lack of its prohibition is to in fact prohibit it? If so, is it ever feasible 
for Egypt to successfully borrow a legal rule that prohibits it? Concerning below-cost 
margin squeeze, although the lack of its prohibition may not pose potential risks in the 
economy, is it possible to borrow a legal rule that covers such practice (for Islamic law 
purposes)? With respect to effects-based approach, is it appropriate from an institutional 
setting standpoint for Egypt to employ an effects-based approach at this stage?  
 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, there exists no precise definition for unfairly high 
pricing. Nonetheless, one may submit that the prevalent approach is that prices are 
contemplated as fair if they are equal to ―competitive‖ market prices; or otherwise not 
higher than these market prices. However, the complexity (and concern) which 
competition authorities tend to face while investigating excessive pricing relates to the 
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determination of the ―competitive price‖ of the product or service at stake. There 
appears to be various approaches for such determination
573
.  
 
One approach is to base such ―competitive‖ price on the incremental cost of production 
with market demand in mind
574
. In this sense, the product or service at stake is bought 
by consumers who have no problem in paying more than the incremental cost of 
production. However, as Evans and Padilla indicate, this mode of determination 
assumes that markets are ―static‖ and that production is not subject to high economies 
of scale. This is indeed hardly the case
575
. The ―competitive‖ price in dynamic markets 
for instance is not determined on the basis of marginal costs of production. This is 
because these markets are characterized by low incremental costs and high fixed costs 
and, thus, obtaining the relevant data on costs would not suffice for determination of 
―competitive‖ prices. The investigator, instead, would have to conduct research that 
surveys the number of consumers who intend to pay for the product/service at stake
576
.                
 
Furthermore, it is sometimes suggested to avoid employing these price-cost 
determinants and instead rely on a profits-based benchmark. In this sense, prices are 
contemplated as excessive if the firm at glance gains profits that exceed those which 
were otherwise initially predicted in a ―competitive market‖. Nonetheless this approach 
is often criticised on the basis of likely estimate impreciseness. For instance, 
complexities in such benchmark may arise when dealing with a set of ―related‖ goods 
instead of just one product. In addition, this approach may be impractical if the goods at 
stake are produced, for example, through numerous firm sectors or in more than one 
country
577
. However, estimation problems do not pose the sole concern in relation to the 
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profits benchmark. A further matter, as Evans and Padilla write, is that the accounting 
proceedings do not take into consideration aspects such as ―inflation‖ or ―capitalization‖ 
of research and development, as well as advertising, and that the ―rates of return for 
risk‖ are not accurately adjusted; all of which lead to unworkable determinations. It is, 
therefore, not surprising to deem the profits benchmark, akin to the price-cost 
benchmark, as highly debatable
578
.  
 
Given the sound debate surrounding these benchmarks, it is worthwhile exploring how 
comparable emerging economies investigate excessive pricing. Put differently, do they 
encounter hurdles in the investigation process? A fine illustration is Harmony Gold 
Mining Ltd. and Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd. v. Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd. and 
Macsteel International B.V. (‗Mittal‘)579. This case is particularly relevant to the 
foregoing controversy on the basis that it represents the first excessive pricing dispute in 
South Africa. This is in addition to the fact that the South African market, akin to the 
Egyptian market, is highly concentrated due to the existence of high market barriers
580
.   
 
In Mittal, the South African Competition Tribunal (‗Tribunal‘) found Mittal guilty of 
charging excessive prices for Flat Steel. Specifically, Mittal argued that domestic 
inflation which took place throughout 1984-1992 forced Iscor (currently Mittal) to 
follow such rates by 1992. The post-1992 period then featured a surge in imports due to 
high prices. This surge consequently pressured Mittal to consider ―import parity‖ 
prices
581. Harmony (complainant) alleged that Mittal had charged ―import parity‖ prices 
to the domestic market, while charging substantially lower prices or rebates in the 
export market. This meant an inevitable reduction in the volume of output supplied in 
the former
582
. From the very early stages of its judgment, the Tribunal explicitly 
affirmed that the definition of excessive pricing provided under the South African 
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Competition Act (‗SACA‘) seems to ―borrow‖ from the approach developed by the CoJ 
in United Brands
583
. Section 1(1)(ix) of the SACA defines excessive pricing as: ―A 
price for a good or service which [...] bears no reasonable relation to its economic value 
of that good or service [...]‖584. 
 
Moreover, the Tribunal indicated that although the definition of excessive pricing in the 
SACA is derived from the CoJ‘s approach in United Brands, there appears to be no 
such term in Article 102(a) TFEU. The only term used under Article 102(a) is ‗unfair‘ 
pricing which may entail either excessive pricing or predatory pricing. The definition of 
excessive pricing in the EU was rather developed under its case law – as opposed to the 
South African system where the term ‗excessive pricing‘ is derived from the SACA. 
The Tribunal indicated that in contrast with the EU, while there exists a definition to 
excessive pricing under the SACA, it must not be abandoned. It, however, interestingly 
questioned: ―What did the South African legislators mean by the definition of excessive 
price that it inserted into the statute? This enquiry must surely take precedence over an 
uncritical borrowing from the decisions of a foreign court. We emphasise that this is the 
approach that our superior courts have commended to us‖. Having established the 
importance of employing the SACA‘s definition, the Tribunal then debated over the 
wording of the definition
585
.  
 
It interestingly held that: ―The judgement then that we are required to make is not of the 
price level itself but rather of the market conditions that generated the price level. In 
other words, we must ask ourselves whether the relevant market in question is capable 
of functioning in a manner that is likely to produce a reasonable relationship of price to 
economic value, or, rather, whether the structure of the market and, conceivably, 
ancillary conduct that depends on that anti-competitive structure, forestalls the effective 
functioning of the market – forestalls ‗normal and effective competition‘ in the words of 
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United Brands - thus generating a price, the level of which, is unrelated to, is not 
influenced by, any cognisable competition considerations‖586. However, the Tribunal 
indicated that there was no impact posed by any ―cognisable competition 
considerations‖ in relation to Mittal‘s pricing structure. It, more specifically, stated: 
―The key competitive conditions in our market are Mittal SA‘s structural super-
dominance plus ancillary conduct aimed at maintaining the segmentation of differently 
priced markets, the cumulative effect of which is to produce a price that is not 
influenced by any competition considerations whatsoever and is, because of this, 
adjudged to be excessive‖587. 
 
The Tribunal‘s judgment as such raises significant debate. Particularly, the Tribunal did 
not conduct a comparison between Mittal‘s price and the reasonable economic value of 
Flat Steel. In turn, it did not discern whether or not Mittal‘s prices were reasonable per 
se in relation to economic value. Though finding Mittal‘s prices as excessive, the 
Tribunal did not estimate what would have then been the ―right price‖ that would have 
circumvented these allegations. In fact, it did not find Mittal guilty on the basis of 
charging import parity prices for the South African market, but instead relied on resale 
prices of Flat Steel in the domestic market
588
.  
 
Thus, it was not surprising to see the Tribunal‘s judgment being overturned by the 
South African Competition Appeal Court (‗CAC‘). The CAC found that the Tribunal 
had committed various errors in construing the SACA. In relation to the contemplation 
of foreign law whilst applying the SACA, the CAC stressed that thoroughness is a must. 
Specifically, it suggested that: ―Section 8(a) has its origin in the jurisprudence of 
European Competition Law. As important a consideration as that may be the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has cautioned that our Act must be interpreted primarily with reference 
to its own language. Thus, while S 1(3) of the Act provides that when interpreting and 
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applying the statute, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered, it is 
nonetheless ‗necessary to view the competition laws of other countries in their proper 
historical, social and institutional contexts‘‖589.   
 
The CAC indicated that when the Tribunal viewed the EU approach in United Brands, it 
seemed ―cautious‖. However, it found that the Tribunal‘s approach did not illustrate a 
proper application of Section 8(a). More specifically, the CAC emphasised that the 
Tribunal favoured ―market structure‖ over ―price level‖. It added that Section 8(a) 
prohibits only ‗excessive prices‘ and not ‗ancillary conduct‘ designed to take advantage 
of a particular market structure
590
. Consequently, the Tribunal seems to have rather 
developed on the prohibition stipulated under Section 8(a).   
 
In fact, the CAC importantly suggested that the SACA rather presupposes a four-tiered 
test that ought to be followed. First, is to identify the actual price that is alleged to be 
excessive; second, to determine the ―economic value‖ of the good or service in 
question; third, to discern whether the actual price exceeds the economic value and, if 
so, whether the difference is ―unreasonable‖; and, fourth, is to investigate whether such 
excessive price is detrimental to consumers. According to the CAC, the first two tiers 
are ―factual‖ while the second two tiers are to be based on a ―value judgement‖591. 
 
Moreover, the CAC suggested that Mittal‘s import parity pricing should not ―per se‖ be 
―excessive‖ on the premise that the SACA primarily requires the investigator to 
establish that the actual price is higher than the economic value. It added that: ―Only 
when there is no reasonable relation between the price and the value can the price be 
regarded as excessive. Whether the actual price is described or formulated on the basis 
of an IPP [import parity price] cannot, for the purposes of this determination, be 
definitive‖. Hence, the Tribunal should have compared the actual price with economic 
value prior to deeming a price as excessive
592
. The CAC then returned the case to the 
Tribunal for reappraisal in light of the four-step test
593
.   
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The South African approach to excessive pricing as such appears to be compatible with 
that of the CoJ in United Brands (as described in chapter four). Particularly, the CAC – 
akin to the CoJ‘s approach – indicated that the test for determining excessive pricing 
should include a comparison between the actual costs and price of the goods or services 
under analysis. In addition, similar to the CoJ‘s approach, the CAC implies that on some 
occasions it may be necessary as a comparator to compare the prices of the incumbent 
firm with the prevailing market ones or its competitors‘. In fact, Sections 1(1)(ix), 8(a) 
of the SACA and the four-step test adopted by the CAC seem to borrow the EU‘s 
approach to excessive pricing in United Brands.      
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Mittal case as such generally illustrates how the practice 
of excessive pricing is difficult to assess in emerging economies
594
. This implies that 
borrowing the EU approach was not receptive (in comparative law terms) in South 
Africa at this stage. In fact, despite the fact that the CAC had identified the necessary 
four-step text as means for inquiry, it still remains equivocal as to how investigating 
authorities should determine economic value and, in turn, reasonableness in the 
relationship between the latter and the actual price. In fact, as some rightly suggest: 
―The CAC judgement is clearer on how not to assess excessive pricing than it is on how 
to actually assess it‖595.          
 
Moreover, the foregoing exemplifies that the success of legal borrowing not only ought 
to reflect the lending system‘s culture, as Legrand596 and Montesquieu597 suggest, but 
more importantly, at least in the context of competition law, the degree of economic 
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expertise reached in that system. In other words, the level of economic expertise of the 
borrowing system‘s competition authorities and courts should at least be at a 
comparable level with the lending system for success and receptivity of legal 
borrowing. Inevitably this factor was absent in the borrowing of the CoJ‘s approach of 
excessive pricing in South Africa.    
 
Furthermore, the Mittal decision implies the difficulty in dealing with the practice even 
though economic expertise in South Africa may not be minimal in the field of 
competition law. In fact, economic expertise in South Africa is by no means to be 
compared with Egypt at this particular stage. The SACA was enacted as early as 1998 
and the South African Competition Commission and Competition Courts are therefore 
7-8 years older than Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations and the ECA 
respectively. Given this substantial difference, and while investigating the practice of 
excessive pricing in itself requires multifaceted economic analysis; the ECA and courts 
a priori may encounter even more hurdles in this case.  
 
Accordingly, the Egyptian legislator may have adopted the right approach not to 
regulate the conduct of excessive pricing. Indeed, the lack of prohibition of such 
practice under Egyptian Competition Law is arguably, in itself, incompliant with 
Islamic law – as explored in the preceding chapter. Concurrently, however, Shari‘ah 
would strongly condemn judicial errors (particularly type II errors; erroneous 
condemnations) – a likely outcome that may occur while investigating excessive prices 
at this stage of experience. Put differently, it is argued that the likely cause of 
prohibiting excessive pricing at this stage in Egypt (given the Mittal example) are type 
II errors that lead to the injustice of falsely accused defendants which, similar to the lack 
of prohibition of such practice, raises Islamic law concerns. For this reason, if the 
Egyptian legislator was to ever regulate excessive pricing, it would do so only at a very 
later stage; when experience of the ECA and economic courts increases. 
         
With regards to below-cost margin squeeze, notwithstanding the (arguably) limited 
effect of the lack of its prohibition, it remains indispensable to prohibit it for Islamic 
law purposes. The question is how to do so? In South Africa, margin squeeze is 
prohibited in very general terms. Particularly Section 8(c) of the SACA prohibits a 
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dominant firm from engaging in an: ―Exclusionary act [...] if the anti-competitive effect 
of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, gain‖598. The 
wording of Section 8(c) as such is quite general to a degree that may cover margin 
squeeze through downstream below-cost pricing
599
.    
 
However, it is argued that the Egyptian legislator may, instead of providing a general 
and separate stipulation, add another paragraph to Article 13(b) of the Executive 
Regulations prohibiting, in precise terms, the concerned form of margin squeeze. It is 
also perceived that borrowing from the EU system the as efficient competitor standard 
is important for two reasons. First, the test seems to provide a fair decision over whether 
or not the practice should be prohibited (although one should not preclude the 
complexities accompanying it) and; second, given the experience of the Commission in 
this respect, the ECA may request cooperation in relation to complex investigations. In 
fact, it is argued that capacity building, technical assistance, and cooperation in this 
respect may increase the degree of receptivity
600
.         
 
Similar to the lack of an excessive pricing prohibition, employing an effects-based 
approach at this stage may be questionable due to the potential effects of errors that may 
derive from the lack of economic expertise in competition law. However, the ECA has 
done a remarkable job in employing such approach so far. A fine illustration is its 
economic analysis in the Steel study (where it assessed the actual effects of Ezz Group‘s 
exclusivity practice on competition – as discussed in chapter four). Indeed this view 
adheres to Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard‘s ideology (see quotation at the beginning of 
this part) in the sense that the effects-based approach in that case was not imposed by a 
foreign law; but is rather an approach that was selected by the Egyptian legislator and 
employed by the ECA in the Steel case (arguably inspired by the EU Commission‘s 
initiative).  
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Moreover, an effects-based approach is more favourable because it is likely to avoid 
type II errors (erroneously condemning pro-competitive practices) and their effects that 
may be substantial on the market; particularly in relation to falsely condemned firms. 
Specifically, the effects of judicial errors in this respect may arise when a firm adopts a 
practice that, although may raise competition law compliance concerns, yields pro-
competitive benefits. This may discourage the erroneously condemned dominant firm(s) 
from engaging in pro-competitive practices in the future. Indeed type II errors are the 
likely outcome of a per se approach. 
 
In fact, employing a per se approach to abuse of dominance – similar to not regulating 
excessive pricing at this stage or regulating it but increasing the likelihood of 
committing type II errors – may raise Shari‘ah concerns on the basis that it prohibits a 
practice only if it generates actual negative effects on the society (as indicated in 
chapters three and four)
601
 – an outcome that may not be attained through a per se 
approach. Consequently, to avoid type II errors and for Islamic law purposes, it is 
suggested to stick to an effects-based analysis. However, Egyptian investigating 
authorities should be cautious, particularly in relation to practices that may have 
questionable anti-competitive effects on the market, so as to avoid injustice in 
decisions
602
. 
 
The Egyptian system, by employing an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance 
as such, seems to reflect the EU Commission‘s initiative603. However, as indicated on 
many occasions earlier, and influenced by Islamic principles, it goes a step further to 
suggest that it is the actual effects that matter. As for excessive pricing, the Egyptian 
system adopts a different approach from that of the EU and Islamic laws at the time 
being, although it should be stressed that the investigation of such practice does not 
represent a priority in the EU. Indeed the fact that transplanting the EU approach of 
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excessive pricing (as developed by the CoJ in United Brands) at this stage may not be 
receptive – as the Mittal case highlights – may stand as robust evidence that the wording 
of competition rules enshrined in the EMAA does not imply that Egyptian Competition 
Law must be modelled on EU rules – as is the case with candidate states. On the 
contrary, the language used in the EMAA implies that it is merely the responsibility of 
Egypt to adopt its own competition law, so long as it is properly able to implement it (or 
give meaning to it).  
 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that approximating Egyptian Competition Law with 
EU rules may not be desirable. On the contrary, the EU‘s desire to approximate 
Egyptian Competition Law with its own may be somehow implicit, since such cause 
would provide comparable treatment to EU investors in Egypt
604
. In fact, the EU 
Commission on some occasions emphasised the benefits of modelling competition laws 
of its trading partners with its own. For instance, in its Europe Mediterranean 
Partnership Review, the Commission stated that: ―Other areas where convergence in 
legislation would help contribute to meeting the objectives of the Association 
Agreements include [...] competition [...]‖605. More recently, it mentioned that: ―All 
partners have acknowledged that harmonising their legislative and regulatory 
frameworks in areas such as [...] competition laws [...] will facilitate their access to an 
enlarged market‖606.        
 
Furthermore, it is believed that legal borrowing as such may play a role in attracting EU 
investors on the basis of diminished transaction costs. Inevitably this may be beneficial 
to the Egyptian economy
607
. Moreover, harmonization may diminish ―costs of 
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elaboration of domestic competition law regime‖608. This means that borrowing the 
legal rule may not only be beneficial to Egypt and its economy, but also to EU investors 
and the case of EU/Egypt trade. However, recognizing that transplantation of an aspect 
such as the prohibition of excessive pricing may not be successful at this stage, one 
should rather direct the emphasis and attention on how the borrowing of such 
prohibition mechanism from the EU may be receptive, in case the Egyptian legislator 
wishes to contemplate this in the future.  
 
Generally speaking, the receptiveness of legal transplants in the field of competition law 
necessitates and presupposes similarities in the level of economic expertise between the 
lending and borrowing states. Hence, it is advisable for emerging economies with newly 
born competition authorities like the ECA to recruit a group of economic experts in the 
field. Inevitably, the fact that the ECA is currently looking to employ some senior 
economists, as discussed in chapter three, is a step forward. As for the courts, 
specialism in competition law is suggested for judges. 
  
The adoption of economic courts in Egypt indeed ensures specialism and enhances 
economic expertise. Nonetheless specialism in competition law in this sense is not 
attained to a great extent; compared to South Africa for instance, which appears to 
provide judges with speciality in competition law – Competition Tribunal and 
Competition Appeal Court. This is because Law No. 120 of 2008 issuing the Law 
establishing Economic Courts indicates the competency of economic courts in relation 
to competition-related disputes among many other fields
609
. Hence, it is suggested – at 
least at a later stage – to confine specialisation of economic courts to competition-
related disputes. This may indeed hasten the enhancement of economic expertise and 
experience in competition law. Particularly, this may facilitate investigating the 
proposed category of margin squeeze and ensure successful deployment of an effects-
based approach in Egypt in a manner that may increase credibility of the decision-
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making process among the business community. Concurrently, this raises the prospect 
of regulating excessive pricing in the future, should the Egyptian legislator wish to do 
so.  
 
5.4 CAPACITY BUILDING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND 
COOPERATION AS MEANS FOR THE OPTIMAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EGYPTIAN COMPETITION LAW 
Expertise, in general, in competition law needs to be enhanced in emerging economies 
with young competition authorities like the ECA for the purposes of ensuring the proper 
implementation of competition law. One method to do so, according to Dabbah, is by 
conducting training sessions that would equip young competition authorities‘ staff with 
a good understanding of competition law and policy. These sessions should, moreover, 
deal with competition law in practice and how legal and economic analysis is carried 
out
610
.  
 
Another method is by seeking technical assistance from developed countries‘ 
competition authorities. But what is meant by technical assistance as such? Technical 
assistance may be defined as: ―The transfer of skills and know-how from one 
agency/jurisdiction to another‖611. Technical assistance along with capacity building 
programs is usually offered by competition law regimes such as that of the EU and US. 
The aim of these programs is enable the ECA‘s staff to gain ―first-hand‖ experience on 
how to deal with competition-related disputes
612
.   
     
A further method, yet different from the former (technical assistance) – as will be 
delineated below - is cooperation between the ECA and competition authorities of the 
developed world. Surprisingly, the EMAA, followed by the ENP Action Plan, made no 
reference to cooperation or coordination between Egyptian and the EU investigating 
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authorities on competition. One would have expected the ENP Action Plan to introduce 
some mechanisms that aim to enhance cooperation in this respect. Issues such as 
positive and negative comity should have been put in the agenda, as well as other means 
that promote cooperation between competition authorities. By reviewing, however, the 
Action Plan of EU-Egypt, one may observe that it is modest both in terms of 
harmonization and cooperation
613
.  
 
However, this does not necessarily signify that the EU Commission does not intend to 
cooperate with the ECA. In fact, Phillip Lowe, former DG Comp, already raised this 
matter in a speech. He recognized the necessity of cooperation with competition 
authorities of the EU‘s parties in trade agreements – referring particularly to the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia. However, it is 
understood that cooperation may also extend to cover all of the EU‘s Mediterranean 
Partners (including Egypt)
614
.       
 
On the other hand, cooperation on the multilateral level is carried out by several 
institutions; most notably the International Competition Network (‗ICN‘), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‗OECD‘) and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (‗UNCTAD‘). The ICN is an 
international body that is entirely confined to the enforcement of competition policy. 
The OECD is a forum that frequently provides discussions on various debatable matters 
on competition law and enforcement. The UNCTAD plays a leading role in cooperation 
on competition law matters with particular emphasis on developing countries
615
.     
 
Inevitably, the gains from cooperation between competition authorities in general are 
quite substantial, whether in terms of knowledge and understanding or harmonization. 
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Commenting on such benefits, an OECD study mentions: ―Peer review may achieve a 
surprising degree of practical, informal consensus, and even where this is not the case, 
the process serves a useful purpose by identifying precise areas of disagreement, and, 
potentially, better understanding of those areas where convergence is not feasible or 
desirable‖616.   
 
Furthermore, according to Lowe, the accomplishments of international cooperation so 
far have been ―remarkable‖. In relation to the EU Commission‘s cooperation, he 
distinguishes between two pillars of cooperation: First, ―case cooperation‖, and second, 
―policy dialogue‖. Some may confuse ―case cooperation‖ with technical assistance 
sought by developing countries‘ competition authorities. The difference, however, is 
clear in that the former is only concerned with cases that are dealt with jointly between a 
developed country‘s competition authority and that of another nation i.e. cases that 
affect the interests of two or more countries. The Commission, for instance, cooperated 
with several competition authorities on joint competition-related disputes. Particularly, 
it cooperated with the South Korean Fair Trade Commission on several aspects of abuse 
of dominance such as that in relation to the settlement of the Microsoft case in 2005
617
. 
While technical assistance, on the other hand, is only concerned with a competition-
related dispute(s) (or legal issue) that affects the interests of the developing country at 
stake and whereby the latter seeks expertise from a developed country‘s competition 
authority. As for ―policy dialogue‖, it is a form of cooperation that is merely concerned 
with any future policy amendments. The Commission also cooperated with various 
competition authorities on policy-related issues that concern competition law reforms 
and experiences in dealing with practices
618
.              
 
In fact, technical assistance from the EU Commission is particularly important to the 
ECA for the purposes of enhancing economic expertise and experience in competition 
law implementation. This may in turn hasten Egypt‘s preparations for regulating 
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excessive pricing, should the Egyptian legislator contemplate legal reform on this 
matter in the future. Not least, it is also vital to seek technical assistance from the 
Commission in relation to the investigation of margin squeeze practices and deployment 
of an effects-based approach in abuse of dominance in general; specifically since both 
the proposed reform and method of assessment of abuse of dominance in general seem 
to coincide with the Commission‘s approach. In fact, technical assistance as such would 
not merely benefit the Egyptian economy (e.g. reduction of judicial errors, increasing 
credibility of the ECA, etc.), but also EU investors in Egypt and, in turn, FDI and 
EU/Egypt trade.        
 
Nevertheless, many challenges may pose a barrier to international cooperation. 
According to Lowe ―Cooperation will be easier if there is broad consensus between 
authorities and in areas where they share common interests. By contrast, cooperation 
will be rather tricky and burdensome in controversial areas, in particular if the 
underlying rational and objectives of competition laws differ considerably (e.g. total 
versus consumer welfare standard; per se rules of abusive conduct versus pure 
economic effects approach)‖619.  
 
However, these hurdles seem to presuppose that competition rules of the two 
cooperating parties are distinct and indeed have different objectives. As such, they may 
not obstruct cooperation between the Commission and ECA in relation to abuse of 
dominance on the basis that the latter showed intentions to employ an effects-based 
approach that is more or less expected to coincide with the former‘s future approach. In 
the same vein, these challenges may not be applicable to the suggestion of prohibiting 
excessive pricing in the future in Egypt; so long as that approach shall be modelled on 
the EU‘s approach in United Brands (in the event of future contemplation). In this 
sense, one may argue that the Commission and ECA arguably share common interests.           
 
To conclude this part, the objective of the proposed reform and approach is, by 2020, to 
regulate the practice of margin squeeze through below-cost downstream pricing and to 
have the option to regulate the practice of excessive pricing under Egyptian Competition 
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Law using the method employed by the CoJ in United Brands and followed by the CAC 
in Mittal. However, this latter resort should not be used unless such practice poses an 
actual threat to the economy. Not least, the objective is to also enable the ECA and 
economic courts to successfully employ an effects-based approach to abuse of 
dominance. The success of such reform and approach will very much depend on the 
degree of economic expertise reached by 2020. These objectives, if properly attained, 
should ensure that the Law No. 3/2005 and its Executive Regulations are compliant 
with Islamic law and that the Egyptian economy is not hindered (at least from this 
direction).      
 
5.5  CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the potential effects of the lack of excessive pricing prohibition, 
the absence of a prohibition of margin squeeze through below-cost downstream pricing, 
and the deployment of an effects-based approach at this stage in the Egyptian economy.    
It is perceived that notwithstanding the potential effects that may derive from the lack of 
excessive pricing prohibition, the Egyptian legislator seems to have adopted the right 
approach not to regulate it at this stage. Evidence for validity of the legislator‘s 
approach as such is the fact that the Tribunal and CAC in Mittal appear to have 
encountered difficulties in dealing with the appraisal of the conduct
620
. Indeed, the lack 
of its prohibition may in itself raise Islamic law concerns.     
 
Equally condemned under Shari‘ah principles, however, are judicial errors that may 
falsely condemn defendants (type II errors) on the basis of injustice. In fact, had the 
legislator regulated excessive pricing at this stage, and given the complexities in 
calculations of a competitive price - as Mittal demonstrates - this may have led to type II 
errors in the near future. Indeed, aside from these Shari‘ah concerns, the likely costs of 
committing this category of errors may outweigh the detrimental effects that may arise 
from the lack of the practice itself. For this reason, regulating excessive pricing is not 
ideal at this stage due to the lack of sufficient economic expertise in competition law. 
Nevertheless, the Egyptian legislator should not entirely abandon such initiative in the 
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future so long as the ECA and courts gain the necessary experience and economic 
expertise in the field and that such practice continues to pose a threat to the national 
economy. 
 
Furthermore, the lack of recognition of margin squeeze through below-cost pricing may 
pose some potential effects in the Egyptian economy. However, it is argued that these 
effects are not severe. Nonetheless, for Islamic law purposes, and given that 
investigating such practice involves less sophisticated analysis compared with excessive 
pricing, it is recommended that the Egyptian legislator regulate this event in particular 
through adding a paragraph to Article 13(b) of the Executive Regulations. It is also 
suggested to employ the EU‘s as efficient competitor standard while analysing the anti-
competitiveness of such practice.      
 
As for employing an effects-based analysis, and although it is often argued that it may 
not be the best of approaches to emerging economies with newly introduced 
competition laws and the least implementation experience, the ECA has shown 
competence in employing such approach in the Steel study. Therefore, an effects-based 
approach may still be the suggested method of analysis; so long as a cautious approach 
is adopted in relation to practices that generate questionable anti-competitive effects
621
.     
 
However, for the purposes of considering the three proposals in the future, increasing 
the level of economic expertise in competition law in Egypt remains vital. Recognizing 
the necessity of such factor, the ECA indeed shows intentions to increase the level of 
economic expertise through attempting to recruit a senior economist (supposedly to 
share the same roles as the CCE in the EU Commission). In the same vein, the Egyptian 
government introduced the Law establishing Economic Courts. Nonetheless, one 
drawback to this latter law is that competition-related disputes, although now subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of economic courts, are merely among several other disputes 
that fall under these courts‘ jurisdiction. Drawing on the South African regime, it may 
be suggested to select a group of judges who shall only be specialised in competition-
related disputes.            
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Not least important is cooperation between the ECA and competition authorities of the 
developed world. Aside from cooperation that may be offered on the multilateral level 
by the ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD, the ECA may seek technical assistance from the EU 
Commission. Particularly, the ECA may request technical assistance (or ‗case 
cooperation‘ – where applicable) from the Commission while investigating abusive 
practices that employ an effects-based approach – given that the ECA and Commission 
share common interests in this respect. Furthermore, the Egyptian government may 
request ‗policy dialogue‘ from the Commission, should it consider providing a 
comprehensive treatment of margin squeeze or transplanting the EU‘s approach to 
excessive pricing in the future.         
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
EU/Egypt trade relations appear to have encouraged Egypt to enact its own competition 
law. In fact, the debate over the enactment of competition law, among the Egyptian 
Parliament, arose at a time when the negotiation process of the EMAA in Barcelona had 
commenced (mid-1990s). However, the enactment of competition law in Egypt was not 
solely attributed to the EU‘s implicit encouragement per se. The privatisation 
programme along with the desire to comply with the Shari‘ah principles that prohibit 
monopoly, by virtue of Article 2 of the Constitution, arguably signifies that the 
Egyptian government had a long-term commitment to introduce competition law. It is, 
nonetheless, perceived that the negotiation process of the EMAA hastened the 
enactment of such law. 
 
The wording of the EMAA does not require or imply that Egypt should transplant EU 
competition rules. The EU merely encouraged Egypt to introduce its own competition 
law so as to offer EU investors a comparable treatment. It is thus perceived that it was 
Egypt‘s responsibility to adopt its own competition law so long as it is able to properly 
implement it. Nevertheless, it remains implicit that it would have been desirable from 
the EU‘s part for Egypt to enact competition rules that are modelled on EU ones so as to 
reduce transaction costs for EU investors. This is rationalized by the fact that Article 
34(1)(ii) of the EMAA is only applicable if the abusive conduct at stake generates an 
effect on trade on the EU or Egypt as a whole or a substantial part of either of them. 
Otherwise, the national competition law where the conduct was exercised shall be 
applicable.  
 
Although Ordoliberalism was (arguably) a major influence on those who drafted 
competition law in Europe, it does not appear to have any constitutional underpinnings. 
In other words, EU investigating authorities are not compelled to abide by the 
Ordoliberal themes on competition. In fact, the EU is arguably departing nowadays 
from these themes in relation to abuse of dominance. Particularly, the Commission 
intends to transform the appraisal of abusive practices under Article 102 TFEU into an 
effects-based approach. Likewise, Egypt is not obliged to abide by the principles of 
Shari‘ah (precisely the principles of no-harm and maslahah) in relation to competition 
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law. Despite the wording of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, there is no direct 
evidence that the Islamic principles should be reflected within the Egyptian Legal 
System. Nevertheless, it is argued that Article 2 implies the desire to do so (be it in 
theory or practice).      
 
The Egyptian Competition Regime (be it the drafters of Law No. 3/2005 and its 
Executive Regulations or the ECA)
622
 was arguably influenced by the EU 
Commission‘s initiative to employ an effects-based approach to abusive practices. 
However, the Egyptian system, inspired by the Islamic principles on market 
intervention, seems to go a step further to adopt an actual effects standard
623
. 
Nevertheless, an effects-based analysis to competition law is often criticised by many 
for lacking predictability and legal certainty and for yielding wide discretionary powers 
to investigating authorities. In addition, many – including some U.S. Supreme Court 
judgements – argue that the process of determining a practice‘s effects is quite complex, 
if at all conceivable.  
 
However, these arguments may be countered by the fact that this form of analysis, as 
opposed to a per se approach, raises the chances of avoiding the undesired type II errors 
(erroneously condemning pro-competitive practices). Nonetheless, economic expertise 
remains a cornerstone for employing an effects-based approach in the manner that 
prevents these type II errors. That said; the EU Commission appointed a CCE in 2001. 
The ECA, inspired by the EU Commission‘s approach per se, is nowadays looking to 
recruit a senior economist. In fact, the Egyptian government enacted the law 
establishing economic courts in 2008 for a similar purpose (as it appears).  
 
Nevertheless, the foregoing argument on the necessity of economic expertise for 
employing an effect-based analysis suggests that deploying such approach in Egypt at 
this early stage of competition law implementation may have potential effects in the 
economy. Particularly employing such approach may lead to judicial errors that may 
eventually impede FDI and discourage trade that are key pillars of the economy. Thus 
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these effects may directly be passed on to the economy. However, the fact that the ECA 
has shown some promising capabilities in its Steel study implies otherwise. It suggests 
that the ECA should stick by an effects-based approach so long as practices that 
generate questionable anti-competitive effects are treated cautiously.   
 
It is, moreover, distinctive that the Egyptian Competition Law, as opposed to EU rules 
(although only investigated in the latter system in exceptional circumstances), does not 
prohibit excessive pricing. This is indeed notwithstanding the fact that excessive pricing 
(arguably) constitutes a direct condemnation of Islamic law principles. The Egyptian 
legislator seems to have adhered to the arguments against regulating this practice. 
However, given the likelihood of success of excessive pricing in emerging economies in 
general on the basis of high concentration levels, the lack of prohibition of such practice 
may have potential effects in the Egyptian economy. Specifically, excessive pricing 
directly harms consumer welfare and leads to allocative inefficiency in a manner that 
may have spill over effects on the economy.   
 
However, the Mittal case generally illustrates how the practice of excessive pricing is 
difficult to assess; at least at the early stages of competition law implementation. Indeed, 
the South African approach had attempted to borrow the CoJ‘s analysis in United 
Brands but apparently the latter was not receptive due to the complexity of the appraisal 
necessary in relation to the investigation of excessive pricing disputes. While South 
Africa had introduced its competition law in 1998 (7-8 years older than Egypt); and in 
turn economic expertise therein inevitably surpasses that in Egypt, transplanting the 
relevant CoJ‘s rule may not a priori be receptive.  
 
Precisely, the illustration of Mittal provides three imperative observations. First, it 
explains why the Egyptian legislator did not regulate such practice under Law No. 
3/2005 at this particular stage. In fact, had the Egyptian legislator prohibited excessive 
pricing, this may have increased the chances of committing type II errors at the present 
stage. While, as mentioned earlier, Shari‘ah condemns excessive pricing, it would 
simultaneously condemn false accusations (type II errors) on the basis of injustice. This 
means that the lack of excessive pricing prohibition may, to some extent, be justified 
under Islamic law at this stage.  
  
212 
Second, but not least, Mittal shows that the wording of competition rules enshrined in 
the EMAA does not imply an obligation on Egypt to transplant EU rules. Otherwise, 
EU investors may not have a fair treatment in Egypt – a cause that was patently not the 
intention of the EMAA‘s drafters. Third, it sends a message to comparative lawyers 
who share particular interest in competition law that aspects such as culture, society, 
religion etc. are not the only obstacles for receptivity of legal transplants; economic 
expertise should also be given due consideration. Nonetheless, given the potential 
effects that may be generated from excessive pricing and the Islamic law concerns it 
raises, it may still be suggested to re-consider regulating excessive pricing in the future; 
so long as this is accompanied by sufficient economic expertise and that such practice 
poses actual threat to the economy.  
 
Furthermore, the Egyptian legislator did not seem to recognize the fact that margin 
squeeze does not always appear in the form of constructive refusal to deal. Particularly, 
Egyptian Competition Law lacks a prohibition for the event where a vertically 
integrated firm that is dominant in the upstream market strategically chooses to avoid 
the prohibition of constructive refusal to deal under Article 13(b) of the Executive 
Regulations by squeezing its competitor(s) margin(s) in the downstream market through 
selling its retail product at below-cost prices. Although the potential effects of such 
practice in Egyptian economy are (arguably) limited to a certain extent, it raises Islamic 
law concerns on the basis of its incompatibility with the Shari‘ah principle of fairness 
since it is likely to exclude competitors from the market. The practice also may be 
condemned under Shari‘ah since the latter relies on intentions and that the concerned 
incumbent (in this event) would not have any intention other than driving its 
competitors from the market. In fact, it is on this basis that it is suggested to regulate 
such practice through adding another paragraph to Article 13(b).             
 
For the purposes of endorsing the foregoing reforms in the future, increasing the degree 
of economic expertise in Egypt remains a key pre-requisite for maintaining a proper 
implementation of its competition law and for avoiding potential effects in the 
economy. At this stage, however, cooperation and seeking technical assistance from 
competition authorities of the developed world (particularly the EU Commission) is 
recommended. Specifically, technical assistance may help avoid type II errors in 
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competition-related disputes; be it in relation to margin squeeze or any other abuse 
where the ECA employs an effects-based approach. In addition, the Egyptian 
government may request policy dialogue from the Commission, should it consider 
transplanting the EU‘s approach for excessive pricing and margin squeeze in the future.           
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ANNEX 1 
 
 LAW NO. 3 OF 2005  
PROMULGATING THE LAW ON THE  
PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND THE 
PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
c 
 LAW NO. 3 OF 2005  
PROMULGATING THE LAW ON THE  
PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND THE PROHIBITION OF 
MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES [AS AMENDED BY LAW NO. 190/2008]  
 
 
In the name of the People  
 
 
The President of the Republic,  
The People's Assembly has decided the following law and we hereby promulgated it:  
 
 
(Article One)  
This Law shall apply with regards to the protection of competition and the prohibition of 
monopolistic practices.  
 
 
(Article Two)  
The Prime Minister is the minister competent to give effect to the provisions of this Law.  
 
 
(Article Three)  
The Executive Regulations of this Law shall be issued by a Prime Ministerial Decree within 
one month, from the date of the entry into force of this Law.  
 
 
(Article Four)  
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall enter into force after three 
months from the following day of the date of its publication.  
 
This law shall be stamped by the seal of the State and executed as one of its laws.  
 
Issued by the Presidency of the Republic on 6 Moharam, 1426 H. (Corresponding to 15 
February, 2005)  
 
 
Hosni Mubarak 
  
d 
THE LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND THE 
PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES  
 
 
Article 1  
Economic activities shall be undertaken in a manner that does not prevent, restrict or harm 
the freedom of competition in accordance with the provisions of the Law.  
 
 
Article 2  
For the application of this Law, the following terms and phrases shall have the meanings 
indicated next to each of them:  
 
a)  Persons: Natural and juristic persons, economic entities, unions, financial associations 
and groupings, groups of persons, whatever their means of incorporation, and other 
related parties as set forth in the Executive Regulations concurrently with the 
objectives and provisions of this Law.  
 
b)  Products: Goods and services.  
 
c)  The Authority: The Authority for the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices established in accordance with the provisions of this Law.  
 
d)  The Board: The Board of Directors of the Authority for the Protection of Competition 
and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices.  
 
 
Article 3  
The relevant market, in the application of the provisions of this Law, is the market that 
consists of two elements, namely, the relevant products and the geographic area. Relevant 
products are products considered to be practical and objective substitutes to each other. The 
geographic area means a certain geographical territory where competition conditions are 
homogenous while taking into consideration the potential opportunities for competition, all 
in accordance with the criteria set out by the Executive Regulations in a manner consistent 
with the objectives and provisions of this Law.  
 
 
Article 4  
In the application of the provisions of this Law, dominance in a relevant market is the 
ability of a Person, holding a market share exceeding 25% of the aforementioned market, to 
have an effective impact on prices or on the volume of supply on it, without his competitors 
having the ability to limit it.  
 
The Authority shall determine the situations of dominance according to the procedures 
provided for in the Executive Regulations of this Law.  
 
 
Article 5 
The provisions of this Law shall apply to acts committed abroad should these acts result 
into the prevention, restriction or harm of the freedom of competition in Egypt and which 
constitute crimes under this Law.  
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Article 6  
Agreements or contracts between competing Persons in any relevant market are prohibited 
if they are intended to cause any of the following:  
 
a) Increasing, decreasing or fixing prices of sale or purchase of products subject matter 
of dealings.  
 
b) Dividing product markets or allocating them on grounds of geographic areas, 
distribution centers, type of customers, goods, market shares, seasons or time periods. 
  
c) Coordinating with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in tenders, 
auctions, negotiations and other calls for procurement.  
 
d) Restricting processes of manufacturing, production, distribution, or marketing of goods or 
services. This includes restricting product type or volume or limiting the availability 
thereof. 
  
 
Article 7  
Agreements or contracts between a Person and any of its supplier or clients are prohibited if 
they are intended to restrict competition.  
 
 
Article 8  
A Person holding a dominant position in a relevant market is prohibited from carrying out 
any of the following: 
  
a) Undertaking an act that leads to the non-manufacturing, or non-production or the non-
distribution of a product for a certain period or certain periods of time. 
  
b) Refraining to enter into sale or purchase transactions regarding a product with any 
Person or totally ceasing to deal with him in a manner that results in restricting that 
Person‘s freedom to access or exit the market at any time.  
 
c) Undertaking an act that limits distribution of a specific product, on the basis of 
geographic areas, distribution centers, clients, seasons or periods of time among 
Persons with vertical relationships.  
 
d) To impose as a condition, for the conclusion of a sale or purchase contract or 
agreement of a product, the acceptance of obligations or products unrelated by their 
very nature or by commercial custom to the original transaction or agreement. 
  
e) Discriminating in selling or purchasing prices or in terms of transaction between 
sellers or buyers whose contractual positions are similar. 
  
f)   Refusing to produce or provide a product that is circumstantially scarce when its   
production or provision is economically possible. 
  
g)   Dictating on Persons dealing with him not to permit a competing person to have 
access to their utilities or services, despite this being economically viable. 
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h) Selling products below their marginal cost or average variable cost. 
  
 i)  Obliging a supplier not to deal with a competitor.  
 
The Executive Regulations shall set out the conditions and procedures for implementing the 
provisions of this Article.  
 
 
Article 9  
The provisions of this Law shall not apply to public utilities managed by the State.  
 
The Authority may, upon the request of the concerned parties, exempt some or all the acts 
provided for in articles 6, 7 and 8 regarding public utilities that are managed by companies 
subject to the Private Law where this is in the public interest or for attaining benefits to the 
consumers that exceed the effects of restricting the freedom of competition. This shall be 
done in accordance with the regulations and procedures set out by the Executive Regulation 
of this Law.  
 
 
Article 10  
The Cabinet of Ministers may, after taking the opinion of the Authority, issue a decree 
determining the selling price for one or more essential products for a specific period of 
time.  
 
Any agreement concluded by the Government for the purposes of the implementation of 
these prices shall not be considered an anti-competitive practice.  
 
 
Article 11  
There shall be established an authority called ―The Authority for the Protection of 
Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices‖. The Authority shall be located 
in Cairo and shall have the public juristic personality. The Authority shall be affiliated to 
the Competent Minister and shall have, in particular, the following powers:  
 
(1) Receiving requests for inquiry, inspection, collecting information or issuing orders to 
initiate such actions in relation to anti-competitive agreements and practices. This 
shall be done in accordance with the procedures set out by the Executive Regulations. 
  
(2) Receiving notifications mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 19 thereof.  
  
The Executive Regulations of this Law shall specify the notification date and data, 
documents attached thereto and procedures of its submission. 
  
(3) Persons shall provide the Authority with the required data, papers, or documents 
necessary for the exercise of the competence thereof within the time set by the authority. 
 
(4) Taking the measures stipulated in Article 20 of this Law. 
  
(5) Giving its opinion on draft laws and regulations relating to the regulation of 
competition. 
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(6) Coordinating with its counterparts in other countries on matters of common interest. 
  
(7) Organizing training and educational programs with a view of creating awareness 
about the provisions of this Law and free market principles in general.  
 
(8) Issuing periodicals containing decisions, recommendations, procedures and measures 
adopted and pursued by the Authority as well as other matters relating to the 
Authority. 
  
(9) Preparing an annual report on the activities of the Authority and its future plans and 
recommendations to be submitted to the Competent Minister upon its approval by the 
Board of Directors. A copy thereof shall be sent to the People's Assembly and the 
Shura Council.  
 
The Executive Regulations of this Law shall determine the procedures to be followed by the 
Authority to investigate and prove acts that are deemed violation of the provisions of this 
Law.  
 
 
Article 12  
The Authority shall be managed by a Board of Directors the composition of which shall be 
formulated by virtue of a decree of the Competent Minister as follows: 
  
(1) A full-time Chairperson with distinguished experience.  
 
(2) A Counsellor from the State Council, holding a vice-president rank, to be chosen by 
the President of the State Council.  
 
(3) Four members representing the concerned ministries to be nominated by the 
Competent Minister.  
 
(4) Three specialists and expert members.  
 
(5) Six members representing the General Federation of the Chambers of Commerce, the 
Egyptian Federation of Industries, the Banking Federation, the General Federation for 
Civil Associations, the General Federation for Consumer Protection and the Egyptian 
General Union of Labour. Each Federation/Union shall appoint its own representative.  
 
The Board shall be appointed for four years which may be renewed for another term.  
 
The Decree on the formation of the Board of Directors shall contain the remuneration of the 
Chairperson and Board Members.  
 
 
Article 13  
The Board shall convene upon an invitation of its Chairperson at least once every month 
and whenever the necessity so requires. The meetings of the Board shall be valid with a 
quorum of ten members and the resolutions shall be passed with the majority of votes of its 
members.  
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A Board member shall not be eligible to take part in the deliberations or voting with regard 
to a case under the consideration of the Board, if he/she has an interest in it, or if he/she is a 
relative to any of the parties up to the fourth degree, or if such member currently represents 
or has represented any of the parties.  
 
The Board may invite to its meetings specialists it wishes to seek their assistance. Such 
specialists shall not have a counted vote.  
 
The Executive Regulations shall specify the competences of the Board in accordance with 
the provisions of this Law and the procedures for the invitation to its meetings and its 
operational rules.  
 
 
Article 14  
The Authority shall have an independent budget following the model of Public Service 
Authorities. Any surplus in the budget shall be forwarded from one fiscal year to another. 
The resources of the Authority consist of the following:  
 
(1) Appropriations designated to the Authority in the State General Budget.  
 
(2) Grants, donations and any other resources accepted by the Board and which do not 
contradict with its goals.  
 
(3) Revenues from the fees provided for in this Law.  
 
 
Article 15  
The Authority shall have a full-time Executive Director whose appointment, remuneration 
and competences shall be decreed by the Competent Minister upon the recommendation of 
the Chairperson of the Authority.  
 
The Executive Director shall represent the Authority before courts and third parties.  
 
The Executive Director shall attend the Board meetings but shall be ineligible to vote.  
 
The Board of Directors of the Authority shall issue regulations concerning the organization 
of the work in the Authority and setting out the financial and administrative rules pertaining 
to its employees, without being restricted by the rules and regulations applicable to State 
employees. Such regulations shall be decreed by the Competent Minister. 
 
  
Article 16  
The employees of the Authority are prohibited to disclose any information, data or the 
sources thereof, in relation to cases falling under the scope of this law which are submitted 
or circulated during review, taking actions and issuing decisions in such cases.  
 
These information and data as well as their sources shall not be used for any purposes other 
than those for which they were submitted.  
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Employees of the Authority are prohibited to work with Persons that were subject to 
examination or are in the process of examination on, for a period of two years from the end 
of their employment.  
 
 
Article 17  
The employees of the Authority, who shall be specified by virtue of a decree issued by the 
Minister of Justice, in agreement with the Competent Minister and upon the 
recommendation of the Board, shall be granted the status of law enforcement officers in 
applying the provisions of this Law.  
 
Such employees shall be entitled to review records and documents, as well as to obtain any 
information or data from any governmental or non-governmental authority for the purpose 
of examining cases considered by the Authority.  
 
 
Article 18  
The Executive Regulations shall determine the categories of fees payable to the Authority 
for the services it renders. Such fees shall not exceed ten-thousand Egyptian Pounds per 
case.  
 
 
Article 19  
Any Person may report to the Authority any breach of the provisions of this Law. 
Persons whose annual turnover of the last balance sheet exceeded one hundred million pounds 
shall notify the Authority upon their acquisition of assets, proprietary or usufructuary rights, 
shares, establishment of unions, mergers, amalgamations, appropriations, or joint management 
of two or more persons according to the rules and procedures set forth in the Executive 
Regulations of the current Law 
 
 
Article 20  
Upon establishing a breach of any of the provision of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of this Law, the 
Authority shall order the violator to readjust his position and to redress the violation 
forthwith or within a period of time to be specified by the Board; otherwise the agreement 
or contract in breach of Articles 6 and 7 of this Law will be considered void.  
 
The Board may issue a decision to stop the prohibited practice immediately or after the 
lapse of the said period of time without readjustment of position or redress for violation.  
 
The above shall apply without prejudice to the liability arising from such breaches.  
 
 
Article 21  
Criminal lawsuits or any procedure taken therein shall not be initiated in relation to acts 
violating the provisions of this Law, unless a request of the Competent Minister or the 
person delegated by him is presented.  
 
The Competent Minister or the person delegated by him may settle with regard to any 
violation, before a final judgment is rendered, in return for the payment of an amount not 
less than double the minimum fine and not exceeding double its maximum.  
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The settlement shall be considered a waiver of the criminal lawsuit filing request and shall 
result in the lapse of the criminal lawsuit relevant to the same case subject of suing.  
 
 
Article 22  
Without prejudice to any harsher penalty provided for in any other law, whoever violates the 
provisions of Articles 6, 7, 8 hereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred 
thousand pounds and not more than three hundred million pounds. The minimum and maximum 
limits of the fine shall be doubled in case of recurrence. 
 
 
Article 22(bis) 
Shall be punished with a fine of not less than ten thousand pounds and not more than a hundred 
thousand pounds any person who: 
 
1. Fails to give the notification described in the second paragraph of Article 19 hereof, or 
 
2. Fails to provide the Authority with any data, papers, or documents provided for in the 
third paragraph of Article 11 hereof. 
 
Without prejudice to any harsher punishment, the penalty shall be a fine of not less than twenty 
thousand pounds and not more than two hundred thousand pounds in case false data, papers, or 
documents were knowingly provided to the Authority 
 
 
Article 22(bis) 
Without prejudice to any harsher penalty provided for in the Law, shall be penalized by a fine of 
not less than twenty thousand pounds and not more than five hundred thousand pounds whoever 
fails to abide by the decisions rendered by the Authority in accordance with Article 20 hereof.  
 
Both the minimum and maximum limits of the penalty shall be doubled in case of recurrence. 
 
 
Article 23  
Without prejudice to any more stringent penalty stipulated in any other Law, the breach of 
the provisions of Article 16 of this Law shall be sanctioned by a fine not less than ten-
thousands Egyptian Pounds and not exceeding fifty-thousands Egyptian Pounds.  
 
 
Article 24  
Final judgments of conviction regarding the actions stipulated in Article 22 of this Law 
shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two wide spread daily newspapers, at the 
convicted person's expenses.  
 
 
Article 25  
The person responsible for the actual management of the juristic person in breach shall be 
subject to the same penalties stipulated for the acts committed in breach of the provisions of 
this Law, if it has been established that such person had actual knowledge of such breach 
and if his default on assuming the duties of his office as the responsible manager has 
contributed to the breach.  
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The juristic person shall be jointly liable for the payment of the fines and compensation 
ruled, if the breach has been committed by one of its employees, acting in the name or on 
behalf of the juristic person. 
 
 
Article 26 (Added by Law No. 193/2008) 
In case of committing any of the crimes mentioned in Articles (6) and (7) of this Law, the court 
may exempt, up to the half of the sanction decided thereby, violators who take the initiative to 
inform the Authority of the offence and submit the supporting evidence, and for those whom the 
Court considers to have contributed to disclosing and establishing the elements of the offense at 
any stage of inquiry, search, inferences gathering, interrogation and trial processes. 
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PRIME MINISTERIAL DECREE 
NO. 1316 OF 2005 
ISSUING THE EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS OF PROTECTION OF 
COMPETITION AND 
PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES LAW NO. 3 OF 2005 
[AS AMENDED BY PRIME MINISTERIAL DECREE NO. 2957/2010] 
______________ 
 
 
The Prime Minister 
 
After reviewing the Constitution, 
 
The Law concerning the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices issued by law No. 3 of 2005, 
 
And in accordance with the view of the Council of State 
Decides 
 
 
Article (1) 
There shall come into force the provisions of the executive regulations of the Protection 
of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices law issued by law No. 3 of 
2005 hereby attached. 
 
 
Article (2) 
This Decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall be enforced as of the following 
day of its publication. 
 
 
 
 
16 August 2005 
 
Dr. Ahmed Nazif 
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THE EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS FOR THE LAW CONCERNING THE 
PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLISTIC 
PRACTICES 
ISSUED BY LAW NO. 3 OF 2005 
____________ 
 
PART ONE 
GENERAL RULES AND DEFINITIONS 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL RULES 
 
 
Article 1 
In the application of the provisions of these Regulations the law means the Law of 
Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices issued by the Law 
No. 3 of 2005 and the Competent Minister means the Prime Minister. 
 
The Authority means the Authority for the protection of competition and prohibition of 
monopolistic practices established in accordance with the provisions of the law and the 
board means the board of directors of the Authority for the protection of competition and 
prohibition of monopolistic practices. 
 
 
Article 2 
Economic activities shall be undertaken in a manner that does not prevent, restrict or harm 
the freedom of competition in accordance with the provisions of the Law and these 
Regulations. 
 
 
Article 3 
The provisions of the Law and these Regulations shall apply to all acts including practices, 
contracts or agreements committed abroad, which constitute crimes according to the Law if 
they prevent, restrict or harm the freedom of competition in Egypt. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEFINITIONS 
 
Article 4 
In the application of the Law and these Regulations, the words and the phrases stipulated in 
the following articles shall have the meanings set out for each of them. 
 
 
Article 5: Persons 
Persons mean natural or juristic persons, economic entities, unions, federations, associations 
and financial grouping, whatever the method of their establishment, mechanisms of their 
financing, their nationalities, head quarters or main centers of activities. 
 
Persons referred to in the first paragraph include, the related parties that are composed of 
two or more persons, each of them has an independent legal personality, where the majority 
of stocks or shares of one of them is owned, directly or indirectly, by the other party or 
where the majority of stocks or shares in both parties are owned by one party. 
 
Related parties also include the person or persons who are subject to the actual control of 
another person. Actual control means every arrangement, agreement or ownership of stocks 
or shares, regardless of its percentage, in a manner that leads to the control of the 
management or decisions-taking. 
 
 
Article 6: The Relevant Market 
The relevant market means the market that consists of two elements: the relevant products 
and the geographical area. Each of these elements is determined as follows: 
 
First: The relevant products: They are the products that can be considered, from the 
consumers' point of view, practical and objective substitutes to each other. In determining 
such products the following criteria, in particular, shall be taken into consideration: 
 
1. The resemblance of the products in the characteristics and usage. 
 
2. The probability that the buyers shift from a certain product to another as a result of the 
relative change in price or in any other competitive factors. 
 
3. If the sellers take their commercial decisions on basis of the shift of the buyers from the 
products to other products as a result to the relative change in prices or any other 
competitive factors. 
 
4. The relative ease by which other persons can enter the market of the product. 
 
5. The availability of the substitutive products before the consumer. 
 
Secondly: Geographical area: It is the geographical area where the circumstances of 
competition are homogenous. In this regard, the potential probabilities of competition shall 
be taken into consideration and any of the following criteria: 
 
1. The ability of the buyers to move between geographical areas as a result of the relative 
changes in prices or in other competitive factors. 
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2. Whether the buyers take their commercial decisions on basis of the movement of buyers 
between different geographical areas due to the relative changes in prices or in other 
competitive factors. 
 
3. The relative ease that enables other persons to enter the relevant market. 
 
4. The transportation costs between geographical areas, including the insurance costs and 
the required duration to provide the geographical area with the relevant product from other 
markets or geographical areas or from abroad. 
 
5. The customs tariffs and the non-tariff barriers on both domestic and international levels. 
 
 
Article 7: Dominance 
The dominance of a person in a relevant market is achieved with the availability of the 
following elements: 
 
1. The person has a market share exceeding 25% of the relevant market. The calculation of 
this share is based on the two elements of that market together, namely, the relevant 
products and the geographic area during a certain period of time. 
 
2. The ability of a person to exercise an effective impact on the prices of the products or on 
the quantity supplied of them in the relevant market. 
 
3. The inability of the person's competitors to limit his/her effective impact on the prices or 
on the quantity of the products supplied in the relevant market. 
 
 
Article 8 
The person shall have effective impact on the prices of the products or the quantity supplied 
in the relevant market if this person has the ability, through his/her individual acts, to 
determine the prices of these products or the quantity supplied in that market where his/her 
competitors do not have the ability to prevent these acts, taking into consideration the 
following factors: 
 
a) The person's share in the relevant market and his/her position in comparison to the 
remaining competitors. 
 
b) The conduct of the person in the relevant market in the previous period. 
 
c) The number of competing persons in the relevant market and its relative impact on the 
structure of that market. 
 
d) The ability of the person and his/her competitors to obtain the raw materials necessary 
for production. 
 
e) The existence of barriers facing other persons to enter the relevant market. 
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Article 9: Competing Persons 
Competing Persons shall mean any of the persons who have the ability to carry out the same 
activity in the relevant market at the present time or in the future. 
 
 
PART TWO 
AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS BETWEEN COMPETING 
PERSONS 
 
Article 10 
The agreements and contracts concluded between the Competing Persons in the Relevant 
Market include verbal and written agreements and contracts. 
 
 
Article 11 
Agreements or contracts between Competing Persons in any relevant market shall be 
prohibited if they are intended to cause any of the following: 
 
a) Increasing, decreasing or fixing prices of sale or purchase of products subject matter of 
dealings. Determination of price shall cover due returns on instalments, guarantee duration, 
after sale services and other contractual conditions that influence the purchasing or selling 
decision. 
 
b) Dividing product markets or allocating them on grounds of geographic areas, distribution 
centers, customer base, goods, market shares, seasons or time periods. 
 
c) Coordination with regard to proceeding or refraining from participating in tenders, 
auctions, bids and other calls for procurement. The indications that are taken into 
consideration for the existence of such coordination are, in particular, the following: 
 
• Submitting similar offers, which include the agreement on common rules for the 
calculation of prices or the determination of the offer conditions. 
• Agreeing on the person who will submit the offer, which includes the prior agreement 
on the person who will be awarded the tender either by alternation, or on geographical 
basis or on customer division basis. 
• Agreeing on the submission of fictitious offers. 
• Agreeing on preventing a person from submitting or participating in submitting 
offers. 
 
d) Restricting the manufacture, distribution or marketing, either for goods or services, including 
limiting of the product in terms of its kind or volume or restrictions for their availability. 
 
 
PART THREE 
AGREEMENTS OR CONTRACTS BETWEEN A PERSON 
AND ANY OF ITS SUPPLIERS OR CLIENTS 
 
Article 12 
Agreements or contracts between a person and any of its suppliers or clients are prohibited 
if they are intended to restrict competition. 
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The evaluation of whether or not the agreement or contract between a person and any of its 
suppliers or clients would restrict competition is based on the inquiry made by the 
Authority on a case by case basis in light of the following factors: 
 
1. The effect of the agreement or contract on the freedom of competition in the market. 
 
2. The existence of benefits accrued to the consumer from the agreement or contract. 
 
3. The considerations of preserving the quality of the product, its reputation, safety, and 
security requirements, in a manner that do not harm competition. 
 
4. The extent of compliance of the conditions of the agreement or the contract with 
established commercial customs in the activity subject to examination. 
 
 
PART FOUR 
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION 
IN A RELEVANT MARKET 
 
Article 13 
A Person holding a dominant position in a relevant market is prohibited from carrying out 
any of the following: 
 
a) Undertaking an act leading to the non-manufacturing, non-production or non-distribution 
of a product, whether totally or partially, for a certain period or certain periods of time. 
Period or periods of time shall mean the period or periods of time that suffice to result in the 
prevention, restriction or harm of the freedom of competition. 
 
b) Refraining from entry into sale or purchase transaction regarding a product with any Person 
or totally ceasing to deal with it in a manner that results in restricting that Person's freedom to 
access, continue, or exit the market at any time, which includes imposing financial conditions or 
obligations or abusive contractual conditions or conditions that are unusual in the activity 
subject matter of dealings. 
 
Refraining from entry into transactions with any Person or totally ceasing to deal with it 
shall not be prohibited if justified on the basis that this Person does not have the ability to 
fulfil its obligations arising from the contract. 
 
c) Any act that limits distribution of a specific product, on the basis of geographic areas, 
distribution centers, clients, seasons or periods of time among Persons with vertical 
relationships. Vertical relationship shall mean the relationship between the Dominant 
Person and any of its suppliers or between the Dominant Person and any of its clients. 
 
d) Imposing as a condition, for the entry into a sale or purchase agreement of a product, the 
acceptance of obligations or products unrelated by their very nature or by commercial 
custom to the original transaction or agreement. 
 
e) Discriminating between sellers or buyers having similar contractual positions in sale or 
purchase prices or in the terms of the transactions, in a manner that weakens their ability to 
compete with one another or leads to drive out some of them from the market. 
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f) Refraining, whether totally or partially, from producing or providing a product that is 
circumstantially scarce in the market when its production or provision is economically 
possible. 
 
A circumstantially scarce product shall mean the product of which the available quantities 
do not fulfil except a small percentage of the demand size in the Relevant Market. 
 
g) For the Person in a dominant position to dictate on Persons dealing with it not to allow 
the usage of their utilities or services to any of its competitors, despite this being 
economically possible. 
 
These utilities and services shall include those which are privately owned by those dealing 
with the Person in a dominant position, and which are indispensable for the competing 
persons to enter or to remain in the market. 
 
h) Selling products below their marginal cost or average variable cost. 
 
Marginal Cost shall mean the share of one unit of a given product from the total costs 
within a certain period of time. The Variable Cost shall mean the cost which changes with 
the change in the volume of products provided by the Person during a certain period of 
time. 
 
Average Variable Cost shall mean the total variable costs divided by the number of units of 
products. 
 
For the determination of whether the product is sold below their marginal cost or the 
average variable cost the following elements shall be taken into consideration: 
 
1.  If the sale will drive out the Dominant Persons' competing persons from the market. 
 
2. If the sale will prevent the Dominant Person's competing persons from entering the 
market. 
 
3. If the Dominant Person will be able to increase prices after driving out its competing 
persons from the market. 
 
4. If the period of time of the sale of a product below its marginal cost or its average 
variable cost will result into the occurrence of any of the aforementioned. 
 
i) Imposing an obligation on a supplier not to deal with a competitor. 
 
The non-dealing shall mean the refraining from dealing with a competing person, whether 
totally or reducing the size of dealing with him to the extent that would threaten its 
existence in the market or drive it out of the market or prevent or restrict the freedom of the 
potential competitors from entering the market. 
 
 
PART FIVE 
PUBLIC UTILITIES AND ESSENTIAL PRODUCTS 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PUBLIC UTILITIES 
 
 
Article 14 
The provisions of the Law and these Regulations shall not apply to public utilities managed 
by the State. The decisions, agreements, contracts and works related to these public utilities 
managed by the State are not subject to any of the acts provided for in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of 
the Law. 
 
 
Article 15 
Any company subject to the provisions of the Private Law and managing a public utility, 
before concluding agreements, contracts or carrying out works related to the activity of this 
utility and is within the scope of the prohibitions set out in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Law, 
may request the Authority to exempt all these agreements, contracts or works or any of 
them from the prohibition where this is in the public interest or for attaining benefits to the 
consumers that exceed the effects of restricting the freedom of competition. 
 
 
Article 16 
The request referred to in Article 15 of these Regulations and the decision on it shall be in 
accordance with the following measures and procedures: 
 
1. The request is to be presented in writing to the Chairperson of the Authority, prior to 
the conclusion of the agreement or the contract or prior to the carrying out of the works 
subject matter of the request, provided the request includes an extensive presentation of 
its reasons and a clarification of the public interest attained by the agreement, contract 
or works, or to the benefits to the consumer. Supporting evidence shall be annexed to 
the request. 
 
2. The Chairperson presents the request to the Board to review it in its first upcoming 
meeting or in the meeting determined by the Chairperson when necessary. 
 
3. The Board may refer the request to the competent department of the Authority to 
examine it and to prepare a report within the time limit determined by the Board and 
not exceeding thirty days. The Board may extend this period for additional thirty days 
upon the request of the Executive Director of the Authority. 
 
4. The competent department may request additional information and data from the 
concerned parties or others and may hold hearings to which the submitter of the request 
is invited. 
 
5. The competent department submits its report regarding the request to the Executive 
Director in order to present it to the Board in the first upcoming meeting after 
finalizing the report. The Board shall decide on the request within thirty days from the 
date it was presented in. 
 
6. The decision of the Board accepting the exemption from the prohibition shall be 
based on the attainment of public interest or benefits to the consumers that exceed the 
effects of restricting the freedom of competition, otherwise the request shall be 
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rejected. The decision of acceptance may include an obligation on the requestor to 
carry out a certain act or to refrain from carrying out a certain act. 
 
7. The Executive Director shall be responsible for delivering the decision of the Board 
to the requestor by registered mail, to be signed upon receipt. A decision of refusal 
shall be justified. 
 
 
Article 17 
The exemption granted by the Authority is valid for two years, and may be renewed upon 
the request of the concerned parties sixty days prior to the end of the exemption period. The 
Authority reviews the renewal request in accordance with the same provisions and 
procedures set out by Article 16 of these Regulations. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
ESSENTIAL PRODUCTS 
 
Article 18 
The Council of Ministers may, after taking the opinion of the Authority, issue a decree 
determining the selling price for one essential product or more for a specific period of time. 
 
 
Article 19 
The Authority carries out the necessary studies for the Council of Ministers Cabinet to 
perform its competence set out in Article 10 of the Law regarding the determination of the 
selling prices of the essential products and prepares the reports on the opinion of the 
Authority on this matter. 
 
 
Article 20 
Any agreement concluded by the government for the purposes of the implementation of the 
selling prices of the essential products determined according to Article 10 of the Law shall 
not be considered an anti-competitive practice. 
 
 
PART SIX 
THE AUTHORITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND 
THE PROHIBITION OF MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
BOARD MEETINGS AND ITS WORK FLOW 
 
Article 21 
The management of the Authority shall be carried by a Board of Directors composed of a 
Chairperson and fourteen members and formed as set out in Article 12 of the Law. The 
Board shall have a Secretariat of which the formation and work flow shall be issued by 
virtue of a decision of the Board. 
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Article 22 
The Board shall convene upon an invitation of its Chairperson at least once every month 
and whenever the necessity so requires. Invitations to the meeting are to be sent, in writing, 
at least four days prior to the date of the meeting. The agenda of the meeting shall be 
attached to the invitation. 
 
The meetings of the Board shall be valid with a quorum of at least ten members, and the 
resolutions shall be passed by a majority vote of its members. 
 
 
Article 23 
No Board member shall participate in the deliberations or voting concerning a case 
presented to the Board, if he/she has a direct or indirect interest in it, or if he/she is a 
relative to any of the parties up to the fourth degree, or if such member currently represents 
or has represented any of the parties. The Board member is committed to disclose in writing 
any of the previously mentioned reasons before the beginning of the hearings or voting 
regarding the presented case. 
 
 
Article 24 
The Board may invite to its meetings specialists of whom it wishes to seek assistance. Such 
specialists shall not have voting rights. 
 
 
Article 25 
The minutes of the Board meetings shall be regularly documented in a special register, after 
each meeting and shall be signed by the Chairperson and the Secretary of the meeting. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
COMPETENCES OF THE BOARD 
 
Article 26 
The Board shall be competent of the following: 
 
a) Giving its opinion to the Ministers' Cabinet to determine the selling price of one or 
more essential products for a specific period of time pursuant to Article 10 of the Law. 
 
b) Accepting grants, donations and any other resources are granted to the Authority and 
which do not contradict with its goals. 
 
c) Issuing the regulations concerning the organization of the work in the Authority and 
concerning the financial and administrative rules pertaining to its, without being 
restricted by the rules and regulations applicable to State Civil Employees, and 
referring it to the Competent Minister for issuance. 
 
d) Recommending the names of the employees of the Authority who are shall be 
granted the status of law enforcement officers in applying the provisions of the Law, 
who shall be specified by virtue of a decree issued by the Minister of Justice in 
agreement with the Competent Minister. 
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e) Approving the annual report regarding the activities, future plans and 
recommendations of the Authority. 
 
f) Giving its opinion on draft laws and regulations relating to the regulation of 
competition. 
 
The aforementioned competences are in addition to other competences provided for under 
the Law and in the other articles of these Regulations. 
 
 
Article 27 
The Board may assign one of its members or a committee formed among them to carry out 
a specific assignment or to supervise any of the aspects of the activities of the Authority, 
and subsequently to prepare reports on the assignment or the supervision performed to be 
presented to the Board. 
 
 
Article 28 
The Chairperson shall be competent of the following: 
 
a) Coordinate with competition authorities in other countries on matters of common 
interest, and to present the respective reports to the Board. 
 
b) Preparing an annual report on the activities of the Authority and its future plans 
and recommendations and presenting it to the Board for its approval. 
 
c) Nominating the Executive Director of the Authority and send this selection to the 
Competent Minister. 
 
d) Supervising the organization of training and educational programs related to the 
awareness about the provisions of the Law and free market principles in general. 
 
e) Supervising the issuance of the periodic reports which include the decisions, 
recommendations, procedures and measures taken by the Authority and other matters 
relating to the Authority. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
FEES 
 
 
Article 29 
The exemption request provided under Article 9 of the Law and the request of renewal of 
this exemption shall be subject to a fee of ten thousands 10,000 LE payable at the time of 
the submission of the request to which the receipt evidencing payment shall be attached. 
 
 
Article 30 
The request of review or that of issuing a certificate or an official copy of one of the 
documents that the Authority is allowed to circulate shall be subject to a fee of one hundred 
100 LE. 
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PART SEVEN 
FILING COMPLAINTS AND THE PROCEDURES OF 
INQUIRY, INSPECTION, COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 
AND RECEIVING NOTIFICATIONS 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
FILING COMPLAINTS 
 
 
Article 31 
Any person may report to the Authority any breach of the provisions of the Law. The 
Authority shall not collect any fees for receiving the above complaints or for their 
examination. 
 
 
Article 32 
The complaint shall be filed with the Authority in writing and shall be accompanied with 
the following data and documents: 
 
1. The name of the complainant and his/her address, profession, capacity and his/her 
interest in filing the complaint and the supporting documents. 
 
2. The name of the complained against, his/her address and the nature of his/her 
activity. 
 
3. The kind of breach. 
 
4. The supporting evidence on which the complaint is based and related documents if 
available. 
 
5. The indication of the damage incurred by the complainant if available. 
 
The Authority may not review any complaint that does not fulfil the aforementioned data 
and documents. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
PROCEDURES OF INQUIRIES, INSPECTION 
AND COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 
 
Article 33 
The Authority shall handle all complaints filed, and it may, without the need of receiving a 
complaint, initiate the procedures of inquiry, inspection and collection of information and 
issue orders to initiate such actions in the cases of anticompetitive agreements and practices. 
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Article 34 
The procedures of inquiry, inspection and collecting of information regarding the cases of 
anticompetitive agreements and practices or other breaches of the provisions of the Law 
shall be carried out in accordance with the following articles. 
 
 
Article 35 
The complaint shall be registered upon its filing in a specially held record, and the 
complainant shall be given a receipt with the number and the date of registration of the 
report. 
 
Cases in which the Authority carries out the inquiry, inspection and collection of 
information on its own or cases in which the Authority issues orders to initiate such actions 
shall be registered in another specially held record. 
 
Any procedures carried out regarding any of the registered cases as well as any decisions or 
rulings issued in this respect shall be regularly recorded in both aforementioned records. 
 
 
Article 36 
Complaints shall be presented to the Executive Director to ensure their fulfilment of the 
data and documents provided under Article 32 of these Regulations, and to refer the 
complying complaints to the competent department and to notify the Chairperson of this 
referral. 
 
 
Article 37 
The competent department in the Authority will carry out the procedures of inquiry, 
inspection and collection of information regarding complaints it was referred by the 
Executive Director within a period not exceeding ninety days from the date of referral. 
Minutes, encompassing all procedures carried out, shall be prepared. 
 
The Executive Director assigns the competent department to carry out the aforementioned 
procedures in the cases in which the Chairperson so decides. 
 
 
 
Article 38 
Employees who are granted the status of law enforcement officers shall be entitled to carry 
out the following procedures after disclosing their identity and presenting it to the 
concerned party: 
 
1.  Reviewing records and documents, as well as obtaining any information or data 
from any governmental or non-governmental authority for the purpose of handling 
cases submitted to the Authority. 
 
2.  Entering, during official working hours, work places or headquarters of Persons 
subject to examination upon obtaining a written permission from the Executive 
Director, and they can call for the assistance of the Public Authority personnel the 
need arises. 
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3. Carrying out the necessary procedures of collecting information necessary for 
examination and interrogating any person regarding his committing of any breach of 
the provisions of the Law. 
 
 
Article 39 
The competent department shall, subsequent to the accomplishment of the procedures of 
inquiry, inspection and collection of information, prepare an opinion to be presented to the 
Executive Director of the Authority. The Executive Director presents the above opinion to 
the Board accompanied by his/her own opinion, in its first upcoming meeting after 
receiving the opinion. 
 
 
Article 40 
The Board may, after reviewing the report on the case at hand, issue a justified decision to 
terminate the matter or to carry out further inquiry, inspection and collection of information 
by the competent department in the Authority. 
 
 
Article 41 
Upon establishing a breach of any of the provisions of Articles 6, 7 and 8, the Authority 
shall order the person in breach to remedy the situation and eliminate such breach 
immediately or within a given period of time specified by the Board. 
 
The Executive Director shall notify the person in breach of the remedy order by means of 
registered mail, to be signed upon receipt. 
 
The Board may issue a decision to stop the prohibited practice immediately or after the 
lapse of the said period without remedying the situation or eliminating the breach. 
 
 
Article 42 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 40 of these Regulations, the Board may refer 
the report regarding the case at hand to the Competent Minister or any person delegated by 
him to carry out the procedures of filing the criminal lawsuit. 
 
 
Article 43 
The Executive Director shall notify the concerned person or persons of the decision taken 
by the Board regarding the complaint or the case at hand by means of registered mail, to be 
signed upon receipt. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
RECEIVING NOTIFICATIONS 
 
Article 44 
The Authority shall receive notifications of acquisition of any assets, propriety rights, usufruct, 
shares, setting up of unions, mergers or amalgamations or joint management of two or more 
Persons. The notification shall be submitted within 30 days as of the date of effectiveness of the 
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notified legal action as long as the annual turnover of the last balance sheet of the concerned 
persons exceeded one hundred million Egyptian pounds. 
 
 
Article 44(bis) 
Any person who acquires assets, propriety rights, usufruct, shares, setting up of unions, mergers 
or amalgamations or joint management of two or more Persons, shall submit notification to the 
Authority in accordance with the requirements stipulated in article 44 hereof. In case that 
several persons undergo through merger, the emerging person shall submit the notification. 
 
 
Article 45 
Notification shall be presented to the Authority in writing and must include the following 
data: 
 
1. The name of the notifying person and other concerned persons, their nationalities, 
administration centers and the headquarters of their activities. 
 
2. The notified legal disposition, its date and the legal position arising from it. 
 
3. The licenses and approvals obtained. 
 
4. The annual turnover according to the last approved balance sheet and clarifications 
thereof. 
 
All references supporting the aforementioned data shall be attached to the notification. 
 
 
